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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
Research Topic  
Afghanistan today is a continuation of nearly four decades of uninterrupted conflict and 
instability.  The turmoil in the country has been exacerbated by international interference and 
influence, and by complexities of the Pashtun tribal society as well as multi ethnic, linguistic, 
and religious dimensions.  In the past decade the country has become the focus of American 
intervention and its ‘war on terror’ against Islamist extremism.  As the American 2014 military 
withdrawal looms, the Karzai government and its international backers have yet to create an 
atmosphere of stability and peace, which the country so desperately needs.  The insurgents refuse 
to accept the legitimacy of the Karzai government and continue to garner support among various 
Pashtun tribal and religious communities (which make up roughly 40% of the population).  Prior 
to the decades of turmoil, these same Pashtun communities were the backbone of government 
support.  This era, known as the Musahiban dynasty (1929-1963), was an era of peace and 
stability, a rarity in modern Afghan history. The focus of this analysis is centered on this era and 
the current Karzai government.   
The purpose of this thesis is to analyze how the Afghan government’s relationship with 
the Pashtun communities affects the group’s acquiescence and support, thereby creating a less 
belligerent and more stable environment.  The emphasis on the Pashtun communities is 
especially relevant due to their historical role as king maker, as well as the leaderships primary 
threat of delegitimization and conflict.  To fully understand how the current Karzai government’s 
relationship with the Pashtun communities has failed to create conditions amenable to stability 
and has generally fostered an environment of discord and conflict, this analysis will utilize a 
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comparative approach.  The comparison under question will examine the central government’s 
relationship with the Pashtun communities during a period of stability and strong government – 
tribal relations, that of the Musahiban monarchy (1929 – 1963).  The examination of this period 
will provide distinctions in the relationship under analysis, in an effort to draw attention to 
aspects of the current relationship under Karzai (and his US backers) that hinder stability and 
support continued conflict and turmoil. The most obvious difference between the two eras is the 
existence of foreign occupation, specifically the United States and to a lesser extent other NATO 
countries. Historically Pashtuns have summarily rejected foreign occupiers, evident in the three 
Anglo Afghan wars in the19th and 20th centuries, and the Soviet intervention in the 1980s; both 
wars witnessed massive bloodshed that again has reemerged today. Although the rejection of 
foreign occupiers plays a primary role in why Pashtuns have joined the insurgency, this analysis 
will examine the specific policies and actions by Karzai and his US benefactors that have pushed 
Pashtuns to reject the central government.  
A comparison between the Karzai government and the Musahiban monarchy holds 
particular relevance as it stresses the importance of the Pashtun’s role in creating a stable 
environment.  Today the Pashtun tribal and religious groups make up the vast majority of those 
fighting and supporting (with the additional support from Pakistan, specifically the ISI) the 
insurgency against the Karzai government and his patrons the United States and NATO.  In 
contrast, the Musahiban monarchy recognized the importance of the Pashtun tribal and religious 
communities, by absorbing them into government, creating strong patronage relationships, and 
implementing policies agreeable to the group.  This in turn, contributed to the stable and 
prosperous nature of the era.  Other Afghan governments in modern history chose to alienate the 
Pashtun communities, who were often deemed backwards.  These governments imposed 
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economic and social reforms, with little support outside the urban educated elite, which offended 
Pashtun religious and tribal beliefs or were deemed threatening to their independence.  
Pashtun’s tend to be independent minded (a cultural attribute) and skeptical of central 
government involvement in their communities. This makes the central government and the tribal 
communities relatively independent of each other.  There are of course differing degrees of 
independence. Generally speaking, Afghan central governments haven’t survived without 
Pashtun tribal support.  Central governments in modern Afghan history have continually 
attempted to implement social and economic modernization reforms, but have only been 
successful with a certain degree of tribal support.  When governments pursue ideologies or 
reforms anathema to tribal culture (such as the communist ideology which led to the Soviet 
invasion), Pashtun tribal and religious communities revolt, resulting in the overthrow of 
governments or outright chaos.  This suggests a distinction between the Pashtuns that rule the 
country and the Pashtuns in the tribal communities.  Historically, Pashtun leaders have come 
from a royal family or a royalty lineage, which includes both the Musahiban leaders and Karzai.  
Especially as it relates to past governments, Pashtun leaders count themselves among a very 
small group of urban educated elite.  This group, although not part of the tribal communities, 
may still utilize the tribal structure, which is the case in both the Musahiban and Karzai 
governments.  These elites have studied or traveled outside the country and have developed 
progressive social ideologies which they have attempted to implement in their own country.  The 
pursuit of these reforms while maintaining tribal support has created a cultural tug of war 
between the government and Pashtun communities; sometimes giving the government slack to 
pursue reforms, other times resisting with full force.   
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It’s worth briefly describing events in Afghan history where the government’s 
relationship with the Pashtun communities broke down, inevitably leading to conflict.  This will 
highlight the relevance of utilizing the Musahiban era as a comparative tool.  This era represents 
one in which strong center peripheral relations existed with the Pashtun tribal and religious 
communities, which led to an era of relative peace and stability, an anomaly in modern Afghan 
history. There are two primary traits of the Musahiban era that other political eras in modern 
Afghan history lack; a strong central government relationship with the Pashtun tribal and 
religious community, and stability.  Prior to Musahiban rule in 1929 King Amanullah headed the 
country.  Amanullah imposed social and economic reforms that offended and threatened Pashtun 
tribal and religious cultures.  These reforms triggered a Pashtun tribal uprising, forcing the king 
to flee, and created a power vacuum followed by chaos.  The Pashtun tribal and religious 
authorities eventually rallied behind Nadir Shah, the first of the Musahiban leaders, who ended 
the conflict by creating newly formed patronage relationships with the Pashtuns, solidified in the 
1931 constitution (Ewans, 2002).  The Musahiban era under analysis ends in 1963 when a new 
constitution is written the following year, culminating in a liberal era known as the New 
Democracy. This liberal era was spurred by the urban educated elite as well as King Zahir 
Shah’s own intentions of modernizing the country.  The liberal policies of the era triggered 
protest and discontent among the Pashtun religious and tribal communities (Hyman, 1984).    
The turbulence created under the 1964 constitution would end in a bloodless coup, with ex 
Musahiban Prime Minister Daoud taking power and declaring a republic in 1973. Daoud’s coup, 
supported by Soviet influences, began the permeation of communist ideology and reforms, which 
supported an atheistic ideology and centrally sponsored national unity superseding tribal ties 
(Sen Gupta, 1986).  These policies instigated a violent backlash from the Pashtun communities, 
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which led to a decade long Soviet intervention in 1979, and ultimately cost over a million 
Afghan lives.  The Soviet backed government was succeeded in 1992 by a coalition government 
of Tajik and Uzbek mujahidin warlords, which was summarily rejected by the Pashtun 
communities, leading to civil war and further bloodshed.  The various warlords vying for power, 
representing religious factions (supported by ethnic ties) would eventually fall to a newly 
emerged Pakistani supported Deobandi religious group, known as the Taliban.  The Taliban’s 
ideology was supra tribal in nature, although wholly Pashtun.  The Pashtun communities would 
initially support their religious brethren but would grow weary of the group’s constant war with 
the northern Tajiks (who controlled roughly 10% of the country), extreme religious ideology, 
and inability to function as an effective government.  How long the Taliban government (1996 – 
2001) would have lasted is uncertain, due to its abrupt end in 2001 after the American invasion 
(Rashid, 2001).   
This historical summary is meant to highlight the importance of the Pashtun relationship 
with the government, as it relates to maintaining a stable, conflict free environment.  
Furthermore, history suggests the Musahiban era (1929 – 1963) was unique in that its leaders 
understood the importance of Pashtun tribal and religious approval, and sought to bring the tribal 
structure into government and empower the religious community, as opposed to undermine the 
groups, as had various other Afghan governments.  Lastly, the Musahiban era, due to their 
supportive relations with the Pashtun communities, experienced a period of peace and stability, 
unlike any other era in the country’s modern history.  The Musahiban era therefore represents an 
optimal historical comparative benchmark in which to analyze the policies of the current Karzai 
government, which have undermined both the tribal structure and religious communities, and 
how these policies have exacerbated the continued instability in the country.    
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The Karzai government’s inability to create a relationship with the Pashtun tribal and 
religious community amenable to stability is due to a number of reasons. Similar to past 
governments and their failure to placate to the tribal group, the Karzai government has embraced 
measures that are often considered foreign or threatening to the tribal and religious communities, 
this is partly attributed to the foreign influences that support the government.  Furthermore, the 
government has undermined the tribal structure at large by supporting local strongmen or 
warlords.  Warlordism, originally derived from the Soviet occupation and the subsequent 
mujahidin government, reemerged and was reinforced during the Karzai government.  These 
local strongmen, supported by the United States (and NATO), other international organizations, 
and the Afghan government, have undermined the tribal structure but have also created a base of 
support for Karzai and his family.   
 The relationship under examination between the Afghan government and the Pashtun 
communities, during the two time periods, will focus on the patronage relationship between both 
the Pashtun tribal communities and religious community. The distinction is often necessary as 
the religious authorities influence often times (both at the local and national level) falls outside 
the authority of the tribal structure.  Ultimately their authority is derived from their ability to 
‘arouse devout and suggestible followers on occasions when acts and policies of the government 
are regarded as offensive to Muslim faith and traditions.” (Wilber, 1962, 146)  Although, at the 
same time, the tribal communities may rise up against the government when they deem their 
tribal traditions or their particular tribe as being undermined, which falls outside of the religious 
spectrum. Creating this distinction allows the analysis to highlight the various relationships the 
central government has with the Pashtuns.  Furthermore, the relationships under analysis will 
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include the patronage networks and access to government resources, as well as government 
reforms, which have affected the Pashtun communities.   
Research Questions   
Primary Research Questions: 
1. What aspects of the central government’s relationship with the Pashtun tribal and 
religious communities under the Karzai government have contributed to the continued 
unrest and instability in the country?  
2. How does this compare to the same relationship during the stable era of Musahiban rule 
(1929 – 1963), and how has the differences in the relationship affected stability? 
Hypotheses 
My hypothesis is that the current conflict in Afghanistan is attributed the alienation of 
Pashtun communities derived from their relationship with the central government, and have been 
a focal point of violence and predation, by both local and foreign forces. Additionally, resources 
from the central government and foreign agencies have channeled patronage to local Pashtun 
warlords, excluding and undermining the traditional tribal structure. These warlords, benefit 
from an atmosphere of chaos, earning revenues as security contractors, smuggling and the opium 
trade, while forcing their authority on the tribe and predating on other members of the Pashtun 
communities, pushing many towards the alternative political vehicle, the Taliban. Furthermore, 
implementation of secular policies, ignoring current religious and tribal norms, as well as 
excluding religious authorities from the dialogue, has pushed many Pashtuns towards to 
insurgency. This is especially relevant at the local level where local mullahs, an important voice 
and disseminator of information (and propaganda), have been entirely excluded from the 
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community decision-making process. Collectively these reasons account for why many Pashtuns 
are joining the insurgency, and creating instability in the country.  
Alternative Hypothesis 
The common narrative among western media attributes the continuing conflict in 
Afghanistan under the broad umbrella of radical Islam, a term which is also attributed to the 
Taliban, the primary insurgent group.  This alternative hypothesis, accrediting the current 
violence solely to a conflict between western or secular forces and radical Islam, over simplifies 
the dynamics that exists. Economic alienation and tribal aspects as well as a religious dimension 
contribute to the ongoing conflict. However, the religious element that does exist can’t simply be 
attributed to the emergence of a radical form of Islam, exemplified in the Taliban.  The Pashtun 
communities’ rejection of secular and foreign ideologies is not unique to the current period.  The 
groups have continually rejected foreign influences, especially those that are deemed threatening 
to Islam and their culture. This rejection of secular ideology has been a central theme throughout 
the twentieth century, which has, with few exceptions, ended in the overthrow of the leader or 
government entirely. Habibullah Khan, the king of Afghanistan from 1901 – 1919, was 
assassinated for his refusal to join the Turks in jihad during WW1. His successor, Amanullah, 
would escape a similar fate by fleeing the country and abdicating the throne after he attempted to 
advance secular ideologies, which included women’s rights and the creation of a secular penal 
code and constitution.  His policies infuriated the religious community who called for jihad, 
arousing the tribal communities and sending the leadership fleeing (Ewans, 2002).   The 
Musahiban monarchy, the first period under analysis (1929 – 1963), managed to secure their 
place in power by coopting and defending the religious community from the liberal elites, 
exemplified during the Liberal Parliament era (1949 -1952).  These educated urban elites were 
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allowed a prominent voice but were quickly dismissed when they attacked the clergy.  The 
Musahiban leaders during this era generally understood the importance of Islam in society, 
which partly accounts for their peaceful and long tenure in power (Dupree, 1973).  The 
emergence of foreign ideology threatening the religious nature of society again emerged under 
the New Democracy era in 1964.  This era made way for a new constitution and reforms, which 
were supported by the urban liberal elites.  This liberal element was quickly overshadowed by 
leftist parties (specifically the Soviet supported PDPA), this spurred protests by the religious 
community, leading to imprisonment of religious leaders and eventual revolts in the Pashtun 
south and east (Hyman, 1984).  This led to a series of coup d’etats and eventually the outright 
rejection of the atheistic ideals of communist ideology, which was followed by the ten year 
Soviet occupation, and over one million lives lost.  The simple point being made is religious 
rejection of secular and foreign ideologies is not distinct to the Karzai era nor should be solely 
attributed to the emergence of a radical strain of Islam. It existed long before the Taliban and 
continues to be a primary point of contention today.   
 The alternative hypothesis of attributing the current conflict solely to ideological discord 
overlooks other central elements of the problem, namely economic disenfranchisement.  Among 
the largest of the economic issues relates to opium cultivation.  Opium, the plant used to make 
the illicit drug heroin, is a staple crop in the Pashtun south; Helmand Province (a southern 
Pashtun province) alone cultivates 50% of the world’s opium (Coghlan, 2009).  Government and 
foreign organizations have targeted opium farms, but offer little in alternatives.  This has forced 
many farmers to go into debt and become beholden to various warlords and corrupt government 
officials (Rubin, 2008).  In interviews with these Helmand Province Taliban fighters, 40% had 
their opium fields destroyed, and a majority of those citing this as a reason for joining the 
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insurgency (Smith, 2009).  Furthermore, there has been a disproportionate lack of aid devoted to 
Pashtun areas as well as an excessive amount of military activity in the Pashtun south and east.  
Leading Afghan academic, Akbar Ahmed, suggests the military activity in the country is 
perceived as a war against the Pashtuns (Ahmed, 2011), which is supported by interviews of 
Kandahari Taliban, where a third joined the group after a family member had died at the hands of 
the military (Smith, 2009).  
 Arguably the most overlooked aspect of the conflict is its tribal nature and warlordism, 
which is most often intertwined.  Regional warlords in the Pashtun south emerged to power 
either through their own ability or more often through connections with power brokers connected 
to Karzai.  These warlords have flourished in the atmosphere of chaos.  They control highways 
(by extorting the international agencies under the guise of protection), traffic drugs, and have 
been the primary beneficiaries of US military operations who work with these warlords and their 
militias, in their effort to hunt down al Qaeda and the Taliban. These warlords, who have Karzai 
and American backing, prey on rival communities, pushing them towards insurgency. 
Commander Razik provides a perfect example of this.  Razik, police commander of the 
smuggling town of Spin Boldak bordering Pakistan, is a member of the Adozai clan.  He 
emerged from obscurity to one of the most powerful warlords in the south by gaining US Special 
Forces (USSF) trust then targeting the rival Noorzai tribe by designating them Taliban 
insurgents.  In reality, the Noorzai had controlled the lucrative smuggling trade at the Spin 
Boldak border, which Razik and his tribe now control after violent confrontation with both 
Razik’s militia and USSF.  Today the Noorzai of the southeast are largely Taliban (Aikins, 
2009).  Examples like this abound, where a local strongmen with a militia supported by both the 
Karzai government and international agencies, prey and exploit rival tribes and clans that 
 
 
15 
threaten their own stature.  This has pushed entire clans towards the insurgency, seeking 
alternative political venues and power structures. 
 The commonly accepted alternative hypothesis that the conflict in Afghanistan is simply 
discord between secular and radical religious forces clearly, as the above argument has 
demonstrated, doesn’t paint a proper picture of the dynamics that exist.  There exists an 
economic element (or general alienation of the Pashtun communities), a tribal element, as well as 
a religious element.  Although, the religious element can’t be wholly attributed to the emergence 
of a radical Islamic group. As discussed, Pashtun rejection of secular ideology is not unique to 
the current period; it has existed throughout modern Afghan history.   
 As the above argument suggests, Islamic rejection of secular ideas is an aspect of the 
multidimensional nature of the conflict.  Although this discord has existed throughout Afghan 
history, it’s not to say Islamic radicalism doesn’t play a part in the conflict. The emergence of the 
Taliban generally represents a departure from the historical tribal power structure due to their 
supra-tribal nature.  They were products of over a decade of war and the Deobandi madrassas 
system along the Pakistani border, where they studied as refugees and orphans. Here they would 
develop deep religious convictions without learning of their tribal roots and culture (Rashid, 
2001). Today, the Taliban leadership that emerged from these madrassas, have reestablished 
themselves in Quetta Pakistan, and represent the ‘political’ Taliban, who fight essentially to 
regain power.  The actual foot soldiers, or ‘fighting’ Taliban, are much more multidimensional, 
and fight for number of reasons discussed above. These ‘fighting’ Taliban, tend to be much more 
tribal in nature, and hold a number of different views than the political leadership in Quetta, 
Pakistan (Ruttig, 2010).  The ‘fighting’ Taliban often hold very negative views of their supposed 
patron, Pakistan, and the vast majority of which don’t recognize the Durrand Line (historically a 
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divisive issue between the two countries).  These foot soldiers often don’t even agree with the 
policies implemented under the previous Taliban government nor accept Mullah Omar as the 
leader (Smith, 2009).  The Taliban essentially represent an alternative to the Karzai government, 
and a venue to reject the government for whatever reason.     
Conceptual Framework and Methodology 
The periods under analysis, that of the current Karzai era and the Musahiban dynasty, 
reflect two unique eras in Afghan history.  These eras have maintained commonalities such as 
the traditional and tribal nature of the rural peoples of south, but they exhibit obvious difference 
as well; the growth of Islamic fundamentalism, new pressures from foreign occupying forces, 
different types of central governments, to name a few.  To properly analyze these similarities and 
differences two different theoretical frameworks will be utilized, that of the rational choice 
theory (also known as the rational actor theory or rational actor) and political clientelism (patron-
client relations, or patronage relationships).   Discussed below are the basic assumptions of the 
theories and how and why these theories are useful in the present analysis.  
The rational choice theory was originally rooted in classical economic theory derived 
from Adam Smith in the 18th century.  He argued that individuals assert their interests in the 
market place, which collectively guides the market towards efficiency and reflects the collective 
desires of the group (Monroe, 1995, 2).  The underpinnings of this economic theory evolved into 
a political theory in the 1950’s, which we know as the rational choice theory.   The transfer from 
an economic theory to a social science theory didn’t come without snags. Economic exchange is 
voluntary, some win while others may not participate in the exchange, in politics all members are 
affected by the decisions of the group (Riker, 1995, 24).  Furthermore, the goals in politics can 
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vary as opposed to economics where profit maximization or cost minimization are commonly the 
key determinants (Green, 1994, 18).  What makes the rational choice model relevant to the 
current analysis is it “does not specify any particular goal as being universal.” (Riker,1995, 23).  
With this said, human goals are a key point of contention among rational choice scholars.  Riker, 
as quoted above, utilizes a ‘thin rational’ approach, while other scholars subscribe to a ‘thick 
rational’ approach.  The thick approach includes an assumption about the individual’s goals, 
generally involving wealth, power, or status.  The thin approach makes no such assumptions; 
they assume an individual will maximize their respective utilities but not assume what that utility 
might be (Green, 18, 1994).  
Due to the various interpretations of the rational choice model it’s prudent at this point to 
specify the assumptions related to the concept.  The list of assumptions defined below could be 
described as a ‘sparse’ version of the concept.  Meaning, it’s broad with less restraints than other 
conceptual definitions of rational choice.  Macdonald states, actors “behave according to the 
rationality assumption” (Macdonald, 2003, 552).  This assumption consists of three components, 
which are listed from Macdonald’s analysis verbatim.   
1. Purposive action posits that most social outcomes can be explained by goal-oriented 
action on the part of the actors in the theory, as opposed to being motivated by habit, 
tradition, or social appropriateness.  
2. Consistent preferences refers to preferences that are ranked, are transitive, and do not 
depend on the presence or absence of essentially independent alternatives.  
3.  Utility maximization posits that actors will select the behavior that provides them with 
the most subjective expected utility from a set of possible behaviors. (ibid, 552) 
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These assumptions generally suggest an individual makes decisions based on his/her 
judgment of what is most beneficial.  Again this does not assume that goals are in any way 
universal.  Goals may not even appear to be self interested. As Riker points out, “while all 
actions are by definition self –interested, some self-interested goals are self-regarding and other 
self-interested goals are other-regarding.” (Riker, 37, 1995)  Meaning when a soldier jumps on a 
grenade to save his comrades, this still follows the logic of rational choice.  The expected value 
of saving his comrades was worth dying for.  This is an important concept because it legitimizes 
altruistic actions, which may not be entirely ‘self serving’, in the traditional sense of the term.  
As it relates to this analysis, some of the actions taken by Zahir Shah (and his PMs) may have 
been purely altruistic as opposed to realpolitik.   
The broad applicability of the rational choice model makes it especially fitting for the 
complexity of the task at hand.  This paper will use the rational choice model to analyze the two 
eras of Afghan government, the corresponding Pashtun tribal and religious communities at those 
times, as well as the insurgency in the current time period. These various groups had vastly 
different agendas and goals but can all be analyzed utilizing the rational choice model.   
 Clientelism, or patron – client relations, will be used to supplement the arguably broad 
based theory of rational choice.  Clientelism, simply put, is “a relationship of exchange between 
unequals” (Clapham, 4, 1982).  The theory is derived from the Max Weber’s, ‘The Theory of 
Social and Economic Organization’, in which he argues ‘traditional grounds’ are one of three 
types of legitimate authority that exist.  The concept of ‘traditional grounds’ rests heavily on a 
concept he refers to as patronage (Weber, 342, 1947).  This original work developed into various 
overlapping concepts such as patrimonialism, neopatrimonialism, and political clientelism,.  
Each of these concepts touches upon various aspects of the patron client relationship, all of 
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which are relevant to the analysis at hand.  Although each of these three concepts are relevant to 
the two Afghan governments under analysis, clientelism is the more encompassing of the three 
concepts.  Patrimonialsim relates to the patron client networks in a state without differentiating 
between the private and public realms.  Neopatrimonialsim makes the distinction between the 
private and public realm, where rulers utilize the formal government as a source of legitimacy, 
while utilizing the informal space to maintain relations with clients (Erdmann, 2006, 18).   
Clientelism, on the other hand, encapsulates both these concepts but using a broader definition.  
For the purpose of this paper, the following definition will be used in reference to clientelism; 
“the analysis of how person of unequal authority, yet linked through ties of interest and 
friendship manipulate their relationships in order to attain their ends.” (Weingrod, 1968, 379)  
The core elements of this concept are exchange and inequality.  The exchange can encompass a 
wide variety of tangible and intangible things.  A patron may supply land, wealth, security, 
prestige, to name a few.  While the client in return will give allegiance, military service, and 
otherwise general support (Clapham, 1982, 4).  Clientelism extends beyond individuals and can 
be collective in nature as well.  The irrigation of Pashtun lands by the central government is an 
example of collective benefit for all Pashtun communities and not just an individual.  
Furthermore, the collective nature of the relationship goes both ways, where an individual or 
group may support a government structure and not just one particular individual or patron (ibid, 
11).  Furthermore, clientelism is not specific to the national realm either, it can involve a states 
influence over a weaker state.  This relationship can take the form of a mutually beneficial 
economic relationship, but more commonly, and as it relates to this analysis, there exists a 
military or security dimension.  “The client principally seeks technology, sophistication… as 
well as security guarantees” (Shoemaker, 1984, 14), return the patron expects various types of 
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support in an effort to enhance its own stature (ibid, 15).   This element of clientelism is 
especially pertinent to the relationships governing modern day Afghanistan.   
 Collectively clientelism encapsulates the wide ranging patron client relationship that exist 
in Afghanistan.  During the reign of Zahir Shah, the government maintained special relationship 
with the various Pashtun tribes, providing various types of services or providing for level of 
tribal independence in exchange for their support.  Today, the dynamic has become more 
complex as tribal linkages have been undermined by new patron client networks between the 
central government and warlords.  Many of the tribal Pashtuns, feeling alienated from the current 
relationship have given their support to insurgence groups whom have their own patron in 
Pakistan. The Karzai government itself represents only a link in the patronage chain, as they 
support various warlords and tribes, the central government is in turn supported by the United 
States and its allies, whom have their own interests as heart.  With this said, Afghanistan clearly 
exemplifies poltical clientelism par excellence.  Clientelism, of course, does not always tell the 
whole story when it comes to government or local actions, but together with the rational choice 
theory, these concepts will provide a relevant framework in the forthcoming analysis.   
This thesis will depend on the use of both primary and secondary sources.  Unfortunately, 
the dangerous climate in Afghanistan makes it extremely difficult to conduct useful interviews 
with Afghans.  Fortunately, since 2001, there has been numerous newspaper, magazines, blogs, 
and other online resources that can be used as primary sources.  There will be a heavy 
dependency on blogs and newspaper articles to fully articulate a conclusion to the research 
problem.  Secondary resources, such as books and journal articles will also be used especially 
relating to historical periods of Afghan history where access to first hand resources may be 
limited.   
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Literature Review 
 The literature post and prior to the installation of the Karzai government tends to focus on 
different aspects of the Afghan political system and its participants. What makes this thesis of 
particular interest is there tends to be a lack of comparative analysis between various eras in 
Afghan history, particularly as it relates to the Musahiban monarchy, prior to 1963.  Due to 
minimal western interest during the Musahiban dynasty there hasn’t been a preponderance of 
scholars focused on the area.  Although the scholars that did have such a focus tended to produce 
in depth and enlightening analysis.  Preeminent among these scholars were Louis Dupree, Vartan 
Gregorian, Akbar Ahmed, Asta Olesen, W.K. Fraser-Tytler, and Donald Wilber, to name a few.  
Arguable the prolific scholar of this era was Louis Dupree and his seminal 1973 work 
Afghanistan.  Dupree, who had spent years in the country, was a great admirer of the Musahiban 
monarchy, but especially the era of Daoud (1953 – 1963).  His historical review spent much of 
the analysis focusing on development of the era, specifically the Helmand Valley Project and 
how these measures benefitted the Afghan populace, specifically the Pashtuns (Dupree, 1973).  
He delves further into specific issues such as the ‘Pashtunistan’ issue and the government’s 
ability cajole the Pashtun tribes to accept international aid, which Daoud uses to create a modern 
military and further development initiatives, both of which has an effect on the government’s 
relationship with the Pashtuns (Dupree, 1961).  Another scholar of the era, Vartan Gregorian, 
whose historical analysis spans the era from 1880 – 1946, focused on national reforms under 
Nadir and his predecessor Hashim.  He stressed Nadir’s desire to reform but not to the detriment 
of the tribes and clergy, thereby maintaining an uncertain balance between economic and social 
development and but only with the implicit approval of the Pashtuns and the clergy (Gregorian, 
1969).  Olesen and Fraser-Tytler had similar focuses, Olesen paying especial attention to the 
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effects of Islam in society and the need to placate to this group (Olesen, 1995) and Fraser-Tytler 
demonstrated the importance of tribal acquiesce and gave a thoughtful summary of various tribal 
unrest and the reasons behind the unrest (Fraser-Tytler, 1967).  
 Akbar Ahmed, Olaf Caroe, Sayed Mousavi, Hasan Polladi, Leon Poullada, Nancy 
Tapper, and Hassan Poladi, each take a more anthological perspective in their analysis and focus 
on individual tribes and ethnicities, their local government structure, and it’s interaction with 
various governments.  Ahmed and Poullada each provide rare insight into the interworking of 
Pashtun tribes, and to a certain extent their interaction with the central government (Ahmed, 
1980) (Poullada, 1970).  Caroe, focuses on the Pathans of Pakistan which overlap with the 
eastern Pashtuns of Afghanistan, providing insight into their internal networks and interaction 
with central governments.  Tapper directs her attention also with the Pashtun demographic by 
focuses on the northern Pashtuns, the interactions amongst different tribal groups, and relates it 
to the politics of marriage (Tapper, 1991).  Lastly, Mousavi and Polladi focus on the central 
Pashtun governments and their exploitation of the Hazaras (Mousavi, 1997) (Polladi, 1989). 
 The more contemporary historical analysis tends to focus attention on the effects of 
rentier revenues, the development of the state, and the emergence of Islamists.  Barnett Rubin 
analyzed economic data of the 1950’s and 60’s to demonstrate the economic impact of 
development initiatives.  His analysis provides insight into the dynamic relationship of the 
central government’s relationship with the periphery, namely religious groups, ethnic and tribal 
groups, and peasants at large, in a rentier state atmosphere.  He builds upon this by analyzing the 
effects of Soviet aid on the Afghan state, through the modern era (Rubin, 2002).  Roy also 
analyzes the impact of the Soviet intervention as well as the development of education as it 
relates to the emergence of political Islam (Roy, 1986).  This naturally leads into the works of 
 
 
23 
Steven Coll who demonstrates how foreign assistance of the mujahidin fighter (especially 
American) led to the political emergence of the Islamists and the Taliban (Coll, 2004).  From this 
point Ahmed Rashid’s influential work, Taliban, describes the forces behind the emergence of 
the group.  This of course, has particular relevance to the insurgency today (Rashid, 2001). 
 Current academic literature, especially in the early years of the Karzai regime, focuses on 
the legitimacy of the Karzai government and its institutional structures and the ability of US led 
intervention to create a stable state.  There’s a preponderance of literature relating to the electoral 
system and its faults. Beginning with the Bonn Conference, Dobbins sights the disproportional 
representation of Northern Alliance members in government and its potential impact (Dobbins, 
2008).  Post Bonn, the construct of the electoral system, has analysts like Barnett Rubin 
suggesting the ‘single non transferable vote’ system is undermining to democracy (Rubin 2005), 
and the International Crisis Group questioning the objectivity of the appointed members creating 
this system (ICG, 2003).  International organizations at large have highlighted the existence of 
fraud in the electoral process.  Scholars have supported this as Shahrani argues Karzai is given a 
disproportionate advantage due to his ties with the US (Shahrani, 2004), Abdul Ahad describes a 
electoral system similar to that of common street haggling (Abdul-Ahad, 2009), and Johnson 
through a robust statistical analysis suggests the outright fraud is coupled with a electorate which 
only votes via ethnic relations (Johnson, 2006).   
It is worth noting the use of the term corruption in academic literature is often skewed 
towards the western sense of the word.  A corrupt electoral process, in the western sense, is one 
in which votes are bought, intimidation is used, ballot stuffing occurs, to name just a few ways to 
influence electoral outcomes.  With this in mind, the traditional Afghan decision making process 
could often also be viewed as corrupt from a Western perspective.  This of course does not 
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necessarily mean that Afghans hold this same attitude.  For instance, in traditional Pashtun 
society khans are only as powerful as the amount of patronage they provide.  Khans will compete 
with one another in maintaining these patron client networks.  In essence khans are distributing 
assets in return for support; this clearly could be construed as a corrupt practice from a western 
perspective but is simply a way of life in traditional Pashtun society (Rubin, 2002).  
The more recent academic literature has shifted their focus towards the reemergence of 
the Taliban and other insurgency groups.  Much of the literature has attempted to decipher why 
Pashtuns are joining groups like the Taliban.  Giustozzi argues the Taliban garner their strength 
and the ability to infiltrate communities through a network of local mullahs (Giustozzi, 2007).  
Ruttig takes a less simplistic analysis and argues the structure of the Taliban is essentially a 
‘network of networks’, some of the individual members may join due to disenfranchisement, 
some join for jihad against a foreign invader, and some are very tribal in nature while others are 
not (Ruttig, 2010).  Strives suggests specific characteristics relating to tribal unity will identify 
whether the insurgency is part of Hizb Islami or the Taliban, suggesting Hizb tends to operate in 
areas where tribal ties are strong and the Taliban do not, with one exception being the Haqqani 
Network which is often associated with the Taliban (Strives, 2006).    
 The preponderance of Afghan related literature today is heavily weighted towards the 
current era.  This of course makes it slightly more difficult to find sources on the Musahiban 
monarchy but it also adds to the importance of the analysis.  There has been a clear lack of 
literature today that attempts to understand current dynamics in Afghanistan from a perspective 
of different historical eras of the country, specifically the Musahiban monarchy.  This thesis 
hopes to contribute to bridging this gap in an effort to better understand the current Afghan 
landscape as well as the reasons for it’s current instability.    
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CHAPTER 2 
DEMOGRAPHICS / HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
 
Pashtuns  
 Ethnic Pashtuns are a diverse group of roughly 30 tribes including numerous sub tribes 
and clans, inhabiting both Afghanistan and Pakistan (ICG, 2003).  The 12.6 million Pashtuns in 
Afghanistan populate the south and eastern parts of the country, and represent 42% of the total 
population.  In Pakistan, where they number 28.8 million in total and 15.5% of the total 
population; Pashtuns are found in the western parts of the country that border Afghanistan (CIA 
World Factbook).   
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 The diversity of the Pashtuns is especially important to this analysis.  The central 
government’s relationship with the various Pashtun tribes often depends on the location of the 
tribe, the level of tribe’s adherence to traditional tribal practices, and the tribe’s historical 
relationship with the tribe in power.  Past and present governments of Afghanistan have utilized 
the tribal structure as a venue to disperse patronage and garner support.  Within the tribal 
structure intertribal and clan rivalries also exist.  These rivalries, particularly between the 
Durrani and Ghilzai tribal confederations, are often at the center of the political dynamic.  In 
essence, the tribe (and its various levels of identity) is a political entity and the venue in which 
politicking is played out.  The tribe often acts as a single political unit, with its members 
adhering to the decisions of tribal leadership, in regard to political decisions and relationships. 
The highest common denominator of the Pashtun identity (other then the Pashtun 
ethnicity itself) is generally the tribal confederation.  The primary tribal confederations in 
Afghanistan are the Durrani and Ghilzai, as well as the eastern Pashtuns, which are an 
amalgamation of various tribes (Roy, 1986, 61).    The Ghilzai, the largest of the Pashtun tribal 
confederations, are located primarily in the east inhabiting areas from Kandahar to Kabul 
(Barfield, 2010, 25) (although they also make up various communities in the north as a result of 
historical forced migrations (ICG, 2003)).  The confederation is made up of various tribes, the 
largest of which are Hotaki, Tokhi, Kharoti, Nasiri, Taraki, Sulaiman khel, and Ahmadzai.  The 
Durrani tribal confederation, generally located in the southern and southwestern areas of the 
country stretching from Kandahar to Farah provinces, may not be has big as their Ghilzai 
brethren but have historically dominated political power (Barfield, 2010, 25).  Durranis are split 
up into two factions, the Zirak, or royal lineages of the Popalzai, Alikozai, Barakzai, and 
Achakzai, and the lesser Panjpai faction which are made up of Nurzai, Alizai, and Isaqzai, 
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among others.  The eastern tribes inhabit the southeastern region of the country, centered around 
Loya Paktia (a region consisting of Paktia, Paktika, Khost and part of Logar and Ghazni 
provinces) and the Pakistani border. The most important among these tribes are the Wardak, 
Orakzai, Afridi, Wazir, Jaji, Khattak, Zadran, Mangal, Mahsud, and Khugiani (Barfield, 2010).  
Other eastern Pashtun tribes reside in the Peshawar area in Pakistan, which is dominated by the 
Yususfzais tribe, which inhabits the plains and valleys surrounding Peshawar (Caroe, 1958).    
Within each of these tribes are subtribes, clans, and qawms.   The hierarchal order of 
identity could appear as follows; Pashtun (ethnicity), Durrani (tribal confederation), Zirak (sub 
confederation distinction), Popalzai (tribe), Saddozai (sub tribe or clan), then local village qawm.  
Qawm, or solidarity group, represents the ‘lowest common denominator’ within communal 
identities, essentially every individual in a tribal village belongs to one (Roy, 1989, 71).   
 
 
Historically the Durranis have been the most privileged group within Pashtun society.  
The Safavid empire, the Persian empire ruling parts of modern day Afghanistan up until the mid 
Tribal Confederations 
Durrani   Ghilzai    Eastern Tribes (Karlani) 
Zirak Tribes (royal lineages) Panjpai  Ahmadzai   Afridi   
      Hotaki    Jaji   
 Achakzai  Alizai  Kharoti    Khattak   
 Alikozai   Isaqzai  Nasiri    Khugiani  
 Barakzai  Nurzai  Sulaiman Khel   Mahsud   
 Popalzai     Taraki    Mangal   
      Tokhi    Orakzai   
          Zadran 
  
 
 
Figure 1 – Breakdown of Pashtun Tribal Communities 
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18th century, established two royal lineages within Durrani society, that of the Sadozai (which 
are a clan with in the Popalzai tribe) and the Muhammadzai (which were a clan within the 
Barakzai) (Rubin, 2002).   These royal lineages have rotated among the leadership of 
Afghanistan, beginning with Ahmed Shah Durrani, known as the father of modern day 
Afghanistan. The hierarchy of power is further enhanced by their economic success and access to 
government resources.  The Durranis inhabit a much more arable land then the Ghilzai, which 
has led to increased wealth which in turn facilitates patronage networks and powerful khans.  
The hierarchies created in society are then handed down through the generations, creating ruling 
lineages and subordinate lineages, something that isn’t as apparent within the Ghilzai 
confederation (Barfield, 2010).  
The Ghilzai tribal confederation, as well as the eastern tribes, tends to be more egalitarian 
then the Durranis.  Ghilzais generally inhabit land that is less irrigable, which makes it difficult 
for an individual to amass wealth, and therefore patronage, which has created a more egalitarian 
society.  Leaders within this society tend to be charismatic due to the lack of a royal lineage and 
the egalitarian nature of the group (Rubin, 2002). This egalitarian nature of the group has made it 
difficult for a leader to consolidate power and lead the group as a whole.  Their leadership tends 
not to emerge during times of order (as when Ahmed Shah came to the throne or during the Bonn 
Conference, where they were under represented), but during times of chaos.  In recent history 
this is exemplified during the Soviet occupation where the communist backed PDPA leadership 
was dominated by Ghilzais (including the president, Mohammad Najibullah), Gulbuddin 
Hekmatyar and Abdul Haq were two of the most prominent mujahidin leaders whom were 
Ghilzais, and Taliban leader Mullah Omar was a Ghilzai.  With possibly the exception of Mullah 
Omar, all of these leaders’ positions were fleeting and stood above a wavering base of support 
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(Barfield, 2010).  The history of the Ghilzai in the context of its leadership rides in stark contrast 
to the Durranis who have managed to continually control the upper echelons of power.  
 Arguably the more discernable difference between various tribes, especially as it relates 
to their relationship with the state, is the area in which the tribe inhabits.  Pashtuns living in the 
mountainous region, known as nang Pashtuns, have generally been inaccessible to government 
infringement and taxes throughout history.  These Pashtuns, without foreign interference, have 
continued the practice of tribal culture, known as Pashtunwali (or tribal honor code), in its purest 
form.  This has created egalitarian societies, a primary characteristic of Pashtunwali, as well as 
societies deeply skeptical of any type of foreign infringement. The Pashtuns considered nang, are 
some of the Ghilzai tribes and the majority of the eastern Pashtuns that reside in Loya Paktia and 
across the Pakistan border in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas.  In contrast to the nang 
hill tribes are the qalang Pashtuns of the plains.  These tribesmen, due to the more accessible 
habitats, have had more interaction and infringement with the central government and have 
generally been more prosperous due to the easily irrigated lands.  These qalang Pashtuns, since 
being subject to the state have established patronage networks with the central government, 
utilizing middlemen known as khans and maliks. The use of appointed representatives, often 
large landowners, creates a hierarchy of power which undermines the egalitarian nature of 
Pashtunwali.  Generally these tribes, mostly Durrani as well as some Ghilzai, tend not to follow 
Pashtunwali as closely as their nang brethren, nor are they as skeptical of government 
infringement (Rubin, 2002, 28). Generally speaking nang Pashtuns are respected for their strict 
adherence to Pashtunwali, although are often considered unsophisticated and barbaric (Ahmed, 
1980). The difference is summarized in the oft-quoted verse, “Honor, nang, ate up the mountains 
and taxes, qalang, at up the plains.” (ibid, p.177) 
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Pashtunwali, the tribal honor code, is adhered to at various levels, by the vast majority of 
Pashtuns.  The tribal honor code is not only important in understanding the Pashtun people, but 
it’s also necessary to fully understand how actions by the central government or foreign entities 
will be perceived by the group.  To get a better sense of the essence of the code, below is a 
translation of a local tribes interpretation. 
“To avenge blood. 
To fight to the death for a person who has taken refuge with me no matter what his 
lineage. 
To defend to the last any property entrusted to me. 
To be hospitable and provide for the safety of the person and property of guests 
To refrain from killing a woman, a Hindu, a minstrel, or a boy not yet circumcised. 
To pardon an offense on the intercession of a woman of the offender’s lineage, a Sayyid 
or a mullah. 
To punish all adulterers with death 
To refrain from killing a man who has entered a mosque or the shrine of a holy man so 
long as he remains within its precincts; also to spare a man in battle who begs for a 
quarter.” (Dupree, 1973, p.126) 
 A central element of the code, that the above translation stresses, is the importance of 
manliness, which is among the highest compliments one can receive. Manliness is derived from 
two central themes, tarboorwali (or agnatic cousin rivalry) and tor (upholding female honor) 
(Ahmed, 1980, 121).  These themes are “the two main features, through which Pashtunwali is 
interpreted, enacted, judged in society” (Ahmed, 2006, 20).  Tarboorwali is important for a 
number of reasons.  First, the existence of an agnatic cousin rivalry (your father’s brother’s son) 
creates a very competitive and combative society.  Pashtun legend maintains that all Pashtuns are 
derived from one of the four sons of Qais Abd al-Rashid, the father of all Pashtuns and a 
contemporary of the Prophet Mohammad, therefore all male Pashtuns are believed to be agnatic 
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cousins at one level or another (Tapper, 1991, 40).  This rivalry suggests the status of one 
individual is inversely related to the position of his agnatic cousin, in many ways this is a zero 
sum game.  This creates “concentric circles of protection and compulsion” (Poullada, 1970, 6) 
where agnatic rivalries exist within each circle. So in essence each clan of a tribe is in 
competition with other clans, but these clans will unite and relate to the higher identity when in 
competition with another tribe, and Pashtun tribes will unite when threatened by a foreign source 
(Roy, 1989).  
Tarboorwali, or agnatic rivalry is derived from zar, zan, zamin, or gold (material goods), 
women, and land.  Ownership and wealth are a direct reflection of one’s status.  This makes 
ownership of land of primary importance and often results in continuous conflict over land rights 
and boundaries, which inevitably leads to blood feuds (ibid, 14). Tarboorwali also reflect the 
importance of women as it relates to honor.  Specifically, men in a particular qawm see the 
women as a reflection of their own honor.  If a woman is viewed as defaming this honor, harsh 
repercussion can occur such as death or ostracism in the cases of sexual promiscuity, depending 
on the tribe. In most cases women are segregated from unrelated males in one capacity or 
another (seclusion of women is known as purdah, often with the use of the garment known as the 
burka). The defense of the honor of women has, by and large, created a society that is dominated 
by males (Rubin, 2002, 24).   
Intertwined with tribal identities, Pashtuns society is very religious, as is Afghan society 
at large. As Olivier Roy notes, “Afghan peasant life is permeated by religion.  It provides the 
intellectual horizon, the system of values and the code of behavior.” (Roy, 1986, 30)  Roughly 
99% of the country is Muslim, with the vast majority Sunni (80%) and a smaller minority Shia 
(19%) (Wahab, 2007, 18).  Of the Pashtuns, the vast majority are Sunni of the Hanafi school, the 
 
 
32 
most common among the four schools of jurisprudence. Religion is prevalent in nearly all 
aspects of life.  As an early adventurer noted during his travels, “one would think the whole 
people, from the King to the lowest peasant, was always occupied in holy reflections.” (Rubin, 
2002, p. 38)  
The religious authorities relevant to this analysis are the mullahs and the ulama.  At the 
village level the mullahs control all religious activities as well as the religious teachings in the 
madrassa, which is often the only source of education in a village.  Although, mullahs are not 
always held with high esteem, in areas where tribal structures are strong the role of the mullah is 
looked upon as an occupational group and often outside the tribal structure. Among Durranis, in 
the southern plains, mullahs are held with higher esteem and participate in different aspects of 
decision-making.  The mullah’s station in a particular village is elevated during times of crisis, 
particularly when there is a call for jihad.  When these events occur, religious authority 
transcends tribal authority (Roy, 1986).   
Although there is no real organized clergy there is an obvious difference between the 
mullahs of the villages and the ulama.  The ulama are essentially defined by their educational 
background. They graduated from the village madrassa and attended various higher education 
religious schools, many of who travel outside of Afghanistan, in particular the Deoband 
madrassas in Pakistan and India.  Among the ulama are the Sufi pirs (who head Sufi orders), 
such as well known members of the Mujaddidi and Gaylani families who have played 
historically influential roles in Afghan politics.  Collectively, similar to the mullahs, their power 
stems from rousing Pashtun tribes to jihad (ibid).   
 
 
33 
The Pashtuns, by and large, are an extremely independent minded and prideful people. 
An oft cited quote which encapsulates the ethnic pride was stated by a Pakistani Pashtun activist 
Abdul Wali Khan when questioned over his loyalties, he was quoted as saying, “I have been 
Pakistani for thirty years, a Muslim for fourteen hundred years, and a Pashtun for five thousand 
years!” (Barfield, 2010, p.20) 
Minority Groups 
 There are an estimated 55 different ethnic groups throughout Afghanistan.  Only in recent 
history have these minority groups begun to take part in the political process and the struggle for 
political influence.  Other than the Pashtuns, the largest ethnic groups consist of the Tajiks, 
Hazaras, and Uzbeks.  The Tajiks represent the second largest ethnic group, situated in Kabul 
and other urban centers, Herat, and the northeast by Tajikistan.  They’re Dari speaking Sunni 
Muslims whom historically have acted as the Pashtun government’s ‘junior partner’, working in 
key administrative roles and have found success in business as well (ICG, 2003).  With the 
exception of most recent history, Pashtuns have considered the Tajiks humsayeh, or adopted by 
the tribe, and by and large the two groups mixed more then any other ethnicities (Cervin, 1952). 
 The Hazaras have historically been at the bottom of the social pecking order in 
Afghanistan.  They represent about 15% of the country’s population and inhabit the mountainous 
area of Hazarajat within the Hindu Kush in central Afghanistan (Barfield, 2010).  They stand out 
from other Afghans, as they are Shia Muslim, speak a dialect of Dari known as Hazaragi, and 
exhibit Mongoloid like feature (folklore suggests the groups is descendent of Gehgis Khan).  
Their Shia religion especially has made them a target of various rulers.  Beginning in the late 19th 
century Abdur Rahman Khan, designated the group as infidels and called for a tribal jihad, this 
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began the Hazara – Afghan war (1890-1893), which ended in the destruction of their homeland 
while many of the inhabitants were enslaved and brought to work in Kabul (where a large 
population exists today) (Mousavi, 1997).  The Taliban escalated the subjugation of the group by 
committing numerous massacres (Rashid, 2001).  The harsh treatment of the groups continues to 
be a sore spot today, although they’ve dramatically gained in strength after militarizing during 
Soviet occupation and given an opportunity to participate in government under Karzai. 
The Uzbeks and their Turkmen brethren are Turkish speaking Sunni Muslims located in 
the north near the borders of their respective homeland of Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan; they 
represent roughly 10% of the total population. These groups have had less significance in 
Afghanistan’s history compared to other groups noted above, although after living in relative 
autonomy under the Soviet occupation and the subsequent civil war, the groups gained 
considerable military and political strength.  Warlords like Uzbek General, Abdul Rashid 
Dostum, went on to play significant roles in the toppling of the Taliban regime and the 
subsequent Karzai government (Barfield, 2010). 
Historical Background 
A brief historical description is necessary to provide a better understanding of the 
mindset of the Pashtun people during the first period under analysis.  Historically speaking, 
Pashtuns are a prideful and deeply religious group, and generally skeptical of foreign 
interference.  Their pride is rooted in storied empires of the past, such as Alexander the Great 
and Genghis Khan, who once ruled parts of modern day Afghanistan. In modern Afghan history, 
Pashtuns have ruled the country nearly without interruption to the current period.  Their 
ascension to power began in 1747 under the leadership of Ahmed Shah Durrani, generally 
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considered the father of modern day Afghanistan.  He was crowned leader of the Pashtuns in a 
Loya Jirga (grand assembly) of tribal chiefs following the death of the king of the Safavid 
Empire, which had controlled the area of todays Afghanistan.  Ahmed Shah was a member of the 
Sadozai clan of the Popalzai tribe, within the Durrani confederation, a royalty lineage.  This tribe 
would rule until 1818 when the more powerful Barakzai clan of the Mohammadzai tribe, within 
the Durrani tribal confederation, would take power, the second of the royalty lineages.  These 
two tribes would dominate the leadership of the country, which continues to this day, as the 
current president, Hamid Karzai, is a member of the Popalzai tribe (Ewans, 2002).   
The 19th century and early 20th century, leading up to the first period under analysis, was 
a period which strong leaders such as Dost Mohammad and Abdur Rahman carved out the 
borders of todays Afghanistan, forcefully pacified pugnacious tribes, and subjugated non Pashtun 
races such as the Hazaras.  The country also faced constant pressure from the world powers that 
surrounded the nation.  Russians from the north were stretching their imperialistic arms south 
towards the Gulf. This was of great concern to the British whom had monopolized the trading 
posts in India through the East Indian Company, which eventually gained administrative and 
military control of the country.  The British saw Afghanistan as a ‘buffer’ state between the two 
imperial powers and wanted to ensure the country wouldn’t fall under the Russian umbrella.  
This period gave way to what Rudyard Kipling described as the “Great Game”.  What ensued 
was three Anglo Afghan wars the first of which began in 1838 and the second in 1878. The 
culmination of these wars ended with the Afghans submitting to British suzerainty in exchange 
for subsidies, and a growing sense of xenophobia among the populace (Gregorian, 1969). 
These events were followed by the establishment of the Durrand Line (Afghan’s eastern 
border with what is now Pakistan), and the third and last Anglo-Afghan war.  The Durrand Line 
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has been hotly contested as an arbitrary dividing point, which separated a homogenous people, 
the eastern Pashtun tribes.   This line would be a point of contention in future Afghan 
governments whom would call for the consolidation of the Pashtun tribes.  The third Anglo-
Afghan war began under the leadership of King Amanullah, in an effort to free the country from 
English suzerainty in 1919.  The short lived war ended with the British ceding total Afghan 
independence but left the Durrand Line intact.  The Durrand Line issue coupled with ambitions 
and unrealistic liberal modernizations policies, eventually led to Amanullah’s abdication and 
flight out to the country.  His modernization policies included advancing the rights of women 
(especially in education), creating a secular penal code and constitution, creating a new tax 
system, giving equal rights to all religious faiths, creating a minimum age for marriage, 
enforcing monogamy among public employees, and suggesting modern western dress among the 
populace.  The policies were a direct challenge to both the religious authorities (and the general 
religious sense of the populace) and the tribal establishment.  This would culminate in a call for 
jihad by the religious authorities, spurring Pashtun tribal groups to take up arms, which led to the 
eventual abdication of Amanullah (ibid). 
What followed was a period of chaos as a Tajik bandit, Bacha-i Saqao, managed to gather 
a following and claimed the crown in Kabul, exercising nominal power throughout the country.  
His tenure lasted 9 months, when he was eventually overthrown by Nadir Khan in 1929.  This 
began a new dynasty, known here as the Musahiban dynasty, and the focus of the first part of this 
analysis.   
Nadir Shah (changed from Khan to Shah when he became king) was the great grandson 
of the brother of the Afghan king, Dost Mohammad Khan (reign; 1826 – 1863) and a cousin of 
King Amanullah, which made him a Durrani member of the Mohammadzai branch of the 
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Barakzai tribe (Watkins, 1963, 59).  His specific lineage within the branch was known as the 
Musahiban clan, which was a collateral line of Amanullah’s lineage. Nadir was the Commander 
in Chief of the Afghan Army and well respected for his worldly outlook, intellect, and 
temperance.  He commanded the army during the Third Anglo Afghan War and received high 
accolades for his conduct. His growing influence and respect began to worry the monarchy, 
which would eventually lead to his dismissal in 1924. Amanullah sent Nadir to Paris to act as the 
Afghan agent to the country, far from his tribal roots and military garrisons (Fraser-Tytler, 1967, 
224).  As his country slipped into chaos and Amanullah abdicated the throne and fled the 
country, Nadir and his brothers plotted the over throw of the Tajik bandit, Bacha-i Saqao.  Two 
of his brothers, Hashim Khan and Shah Wali Khan, met with Nadir in France and left to India.  
These three with the help of a fourth brother, Shah Mahmud already in Afghanistan, would 
overthrow Bacha and reclaim the Durrani dynasty (ibid, 225).   
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CHAPTER 3 
THE MUSAHIBAN MONARCHY (1929 – 1963) AND ITS RELATIONSHIP WITH THE 
PASHTUNS 
 The first era under analysis, the Musahiban monarchy (1929 – 1963), is meant to 
demonstrate how the central government managed to maintain an era of relative stability through 
its relationship with the Pashtun communities. During this period, the Musahiban government, 
pursued social and economic reforms, similarly to the current Karzai regime, but did so without 
provoking political backlash, something the Karzai government nor most governments in 
Afghanistan’s history have been able to emulate.  This analysis will analyze the government’s 
relationship with the Pashtuns through the lens of the rational choice model and political 
clientelism, which will highlight both the government’s relationship with the Pashtun 
communities and its efforts pursuing reforms.  The chapter will be divided into three parts.  The 
first section will focus on the policies established under Nadir Shah, specifically the 
government’s inclusion of the Pashtun religious and tribal communities.  These polices, 
solidified under the 1931 constitution, were the backbone of succeeding Musahiban governments 
and its relationship with the Pashtuns after Nadir’s short reign.  Section two will focus on the 
development policies of the Musahiban regime beginning under the leadership of Prime Minister 
Hashim Khan.  The section will demonstrate how not only did development policies buttress 
Pashtun support of the government, but also how the government was able to pursue and finance 
these measures while still maintaining the policies created under Nadir.   The last section will 
focus on the era under Prime Minister Daoud, the last of the Musahiban leaders under analysis, 
and how his government was able to push forward social reforms after years of building a 
national identity through the education sector and military.  Collectively, this chapter will 
demonstrate how the government’s relationship with the Pashtun communities created an 
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atmosphere of stability, which will ultimately be used as a comparative tool when analyzing the 
destabilizing nature of the current Karzai regime.   
Part 1 - Nadir Shah and Political Clientelism 
The reign of Nadir Shah began during a period of chaos and turmoil but he consolidated 
the warring factions and eventually brought relative peace and normalcy to the country. The 
importance of Nadir’s reign lies in the patron-client relationship he built among the Pashtuns and 
the corresponding religious community, which are the basis of the social dynamics that existed 
during through the Musahiban rule. As history suggests, without the support of the Pashtuns, 
unrest and warfare ensues, and in Amanullah’s case, the toppling of a monarchy (Roy, 1986, 46).  
As the rational actor model indicates, the actor, Nadir in this case, will pursue actions in which 
he will derive “the most subjective expected utility” (Macdonald, 2003, 552), which in this case 
is to maintain power. To do this, Nadir and future Musahiban leaders, would build new 
relationships with the tribal and religious communities.  These relationships were predicated on 
political clientelism where an exchange of tangible and intangible goods will be exchanged 
(Clapham, 1982). The basis of this exchange is grounded on the support and allegiance to the 
new Musahiban monarchy. 
Nadir Shah and Pashtun Tribes Take Back Afghanistan 
The Musahiban brothers would draw support in overthrowing the Tajik bandit Bacha-i 
Saqqao from three different venues, all of which were the basis for future patron client networks.  
First, and arguably most important, was the support for the religious establishment or ulema.  
The ulema had called for the overthrow of Amanullah after his progressive reforms infringed on 
their religious beliefs and stature, now they called for the support of Nadir and his brothers.  
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Specifically, the powerful Mujaddidi family rallied their Pashtun followers to the side of Nadir, 
this support of the tribal militias was instrumental in their success (Roy, 1986, 46).   
The tribal lashkars, who were the backbone to Nadir’s overthrow of Bacha, were also 
instrumental in maintaining security and suppressing residual minor rebellions.  Lashkars are 
tribal militias meant to defend tribal sovereignty and have been utilized by various Afghan 
leaders for various purposes.  The lashkar also falls under the jurisdiction of the jirga (Tariq, 
2008). Originally a 12,000 lashkar made up of Mahsud and Wazir and other tribes of Loya 
Paktia would follow Nadir into Kabul on October 15th 1929, sending Bacha fleeing (Saikal, 
2006, 97).  With the collapse of the central government and the country in chaos the Pashtuns 
tribes were warring and completely independent of the state. In a seemingly short period of time 
Nadir had amassed an army of 40,000 Pashtuns to subdue these various revolts and instilled upon 
the populace his dominance in the country (Fraser-Tytler, 1967, 231). Nadir also paid off local 
khans most notably the pugnacious Pashtun Shinwari tribe of Kunar and Nangarhar provinces  
(Dupree, 1973, 459). 
Lastly, and more peripherally was the support of the British in India.   The British had 
been constantly harassed by tribal revolts in the Pashtun belt, largely instigated by Amanullah 
whom supported their irredentist goals.  Coupled with this the British wanted to counter the 
perceived pro Russian tendencies of the Amanullah government. For these reasons the British 
allowed Nadir passage to Afghanistan and to rally support among the Pashtun tribes of the tribal 
belt (Olesen, 1995, 172).   Subsequently they supported the Nadir with funds and military aid, 
specifically 10,000 rifles, 5 million cartridges, and 180,000 British pounds (Saikal, 2006, 100). 
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This marked the beginning of new bonds between the various parties and the Musahiban 
monarchy.  Among the various Pashtun tribal and religious communities newly formed patron 
client relationships would emerge.  These newly formed relationships would last for decades to 
come, in which the Pashtun tribal and religious communities would support the government in 
return for various privileges.  The British and the Nadir monarchy would also build up their 
relationship, which as we know, wouldn’t endure the length of the Musahiban dynasty as British 
withdrew from the region in 1947.  The following sections will build upon these newly formed 
patron client relationships as the government pursues desperately needed economic growth and 
consolidation of their newly formed regime.   
Political Clientelism, the Monarchy, and the Tribal Communities 
 Nadir’s ascension to power was legitimized through the traditional tribal structure, the 
Loya Jirga.  A jirga, or assembly (a Loya Jirga being a grand or national assembly, generally 
including all tribal leaders), is a prominent aspect of the tribal structure and village tribal 
communities. A jirga is called to settle disputes, discuss pertinent issues relating to tribal 
relations, handle administrative tasks and judicial decisions.  It’s a venue to air grievances and 
solve problems using a combination of Pashtunwali and Islamic law, which can convene at any 
level of the tribal hierarchy, including the national level.  The jirga, which is ruled by consensus 
encapsulates the egalitarian nature of the Pashtuns, although individuals such as khans often have 
an influential voice in the decision making process (Tapper, 1991). 
Upon Nadir’s arrival in Kabul he organized a Loya Jirga consisting of the local tribal and 
religious leaders throughout the Pashtun communities.  The jirga, the traditional venue of 
legitimization, appointed him the new ruler of Afghanistan (Rubin, 2002, 59).  The appointment 
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through this traditional system bestowed upon Nadir not only the crown but also more 
importantly, he became the newly appointed head of the Pashtuns. Without this legitimacy the 
monarchy’s power would be severely undermined and Pashtun subservience would inevitably 
surface  (Olesen, 1995, 178). 
 With the authority to rule in hand, Nadir’s first order of business was to create a new 
social contract with the Pashtun tribal and religious communities under the proclamation of a 
new constitution. The 1931 constitution was this new document that created a bi-cameral 
parliamentary monarchy coupled with a national Loya Jirga that clearly placated to the tribal 
organizations.   
The institutionalization of the Pashtun assembly system, the Loya Jirga (national 
assembly), was a legitimately powerful body and a true concession to the Pashtun tribes.  This 
assembly was scheduled to meet once every three years and would consist of the Pashtun tribal 
khans, religious leadership, and other relevant individuals.  All major reform measures had to be 
approved by this body, which included foreign policy decisions, tax laws, and amendments to the 
constitution. This essentially put the major concerns of the tribal communities in the hands of the 
tribal elders and khans.  Tax laws had always been viewed as unwanted government 
infringement, which often led to unrest.  Foreign policy as well was a particularly poignant issue, 
which was a major component of Amanullah’s downfall.  After three Anglo Afghan wars the 
unusually independent tribal communities now had the power to maintain their sacred 
independence    This created a new power dynamic within the country that put the tribal 
communities interests at the forefront.  It’s also important to note, with tax reform in the hands of 
the tribes the central government would need to find new sources of revenue to fund 
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development projects as well as to support a military. This would have to be done without 
obvious assistance from foreign governments (Gregorian, 1969, 305). 
 The institutionalization of the jirga also solidified Pashtun dominance in the country.  
The jirga was dominated by Pashtun tribal chiefs whom made up roughly 45% of the population 
at this time (Poullada, 1970, 2).  This gave the country a Pashtun ethnic character as opposed to 
the multi ethnic character for which it truly was (Gregorian, 1969, 305).  The Loya Jirga, 
comprised of both Pashtun and religious leaders convened to gauge support on pertinent issues 
and make decisions of national importance with the input of the tribes.  As the government left 
conscription and taxes in the hands of the tribes the primary use of the jirga was to settle issues 
pertaining to international matters.  The first jirga convened under this dynasty was in 1930, to 
crown Nadir as king, as previously discussed, the subsequent national jirgas were convened as 
follows. 
1941 -  During WW2 the governments of both the Allies and the Axis powers were vying for 
Afghan support.  The king called a Loya Jirga to determine the fate of the country.  The 
jirga, in true Afghan style, decided to maintain neutrality at all cost and would resist any 
further interference with military force.  At that point they expelled all diplomats from 
both Axis and Allied governments (Dupree, 1973, 482).   
1949 – A Loya Jirga convened to discuss the Pashtunistan issue. Pashtunistan refers to the area 
inhabited by ethnic Pashtuns who sat east of the Durrand line in, which became the 
country of Pakistan in 1947.  The issue became a heated debate in the country as the 
British exited the sub continent and gave the Muslim population the right to secede and 
create a new Islamic country, which is now Pakistan (and Bangladesh).  The issue that 
arose was the Pashtun society was only given the option to join India or join Pakistan, 
and not to create its own country or join Afghanistan.  This became a point of contention 
between the two countries, where Afghanistan believed the Pashtuns east of the Durrand 
should vote on the issue of succession in a referendum while the Pakistani government 
did not. The Loya Jirga agreed to abrogate all existing treaties relating to the 
establishment of the Durrand Line, specifically the 1919 Treaty of Rawalpindi that 
established the demarcation (Newell, 1972). 
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1955 -  Daoud convened a Loya Jirga in 1955 to approve the large scale Soviet military and 
development assistance as well as to reaffirm the hardline on the Pashtunistan issue.  This 
was in an effort to off set newly established American aid to Pakistan, whom had 
rebuffed an Afghan aid proposal (Reardon, 1969, 157).  The traditionally xenophobic 
Pashtun tribesmen clearly modified their stance due to their hardline on the Pashtunistan 
cause, and allowed mass foreign intervention in the form of aid.  This new relationship 
forged with the Soviet government would have major ramifications in Afghanistan’s 
future and independence (Dupree, 1973). 
Although the Loya Jirga only convened a handful of times during the period under analysis 
(1929 – 1963), it stands as a pillar in the decision making process as it relates to decisions of 
national importance.  It exists as a latent power as well.  Although the body never convened for 
issues outside of foreign policy, it still controls issues of taxation and other matters pertinent to 
government interference in tribal society.  The fact that other sensitive issues haven’t been 
pushed by the monarchy suggests that even though tribal influence rarely manifests itself, the 
power lays dormant but is no less real, and remains an important part of the patronage 
relationship with the tribes.   
  Coupled with the national Loya Jirga, Nadir implemented a bi parliamentary system 
consisting of an upper and lower house. The lower house was named the National Consultative 
Assembly (NCA) (Majlis Shura Melli) and the upper house was called the House of Peers (HOP) 
(Majlis Ayan).  The NCA was made up of 116 officials elected by Afghan males and the king 
appointed the HOP members.  The king also appointed the cabinet, could veto any bill, and held 
broad emergency powers (ibid, 302).  These two houses again, built upon the tradition tribal 
form of governance, the jirga. In the Pashtun communities members of the NAC were elected 
through the consensus of local jirgas overseen by government officials.  These government 
officials in conjunction with districts elders, known as white beards (muyisafidan), would 
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preselect candidates from the local community that the jirga could choose from (Wilber, 1962, 
150).  This political exercise is not necessarily democratic in the western sense of the word, but 
maintains tribal input through consensus and through the use of the traditional tribal structure, 
which in itself contributes to the legitimacy of the process.      
Local Government  
The Nadir government also reinforced the establishment of local governments throughout 
the provinces. What developed over time was a fairly robust political system.  By 1963 there 
were 16 provinces and the hierarchy of local government was broken down as followed.  
• Provinces 
• Sub Provinces 
• District 
• Sub District 
• Town and City 
• Village, Nomad Camp 
At each level of government, the officer in charge is appointed by the central government.  At 
the sub district level, the sub district governor is assisted by an advisory council consisting of 
government officials and local representatives.  The local officials are appointed through a local 
jirga of landowners and elders of the sub district.  This sub district council convenes a jirga in 
which to select one of its own to the district level.  The district level council, which assists the 
district governor, is made up of the informally elected sub district members as well as 
government officials.  This process continues as the district level council nominates one of their 
own to the sub provincial council and so on to the provincial level, where this council assists and 
advises the provincial governor (Dupree, Jan 1963, 5).  What’s important about this process is 
the use of the traditional tribal institution, the jirga, at each level of government.  This system 
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was essential created from the ground up, using local Pashtun customs as opposed to installing a 
foreign system, which had the potential of delegitimizing the process.   
 This description of official local government doesn’t fully reflect the state tribal 
dynamics that exist.  From the perspective of the local qawm, “the aim is to insert the qawm into 
the state institutions at a level which benefits their own importance.” (Roy, 1986, 24)  The local 
communities essentially see the state as an opponent in a constant tug of war with the qawm.  
From one perspective the state is viewed as an external body, which distributes resources and 
subsidies to the qawm.  From the reverse perspective, the state is viewed as a predatory agent 
looking to extract taxes and conscripts for its own benefit.  Under this dynamic the 
representatives of the qawm, khans and maliks, are given increased importance as the middlemen 
to the state, who gain access to government resources.  At the same time, state representatives at 
the local level such as sub district governors and police, represent the exploitive aspect of the 
state, and are to be avoided (Smith, 1973, 253).  
Khans are generally considered the leader of the tribe. In the Ghizai and eastern tribal 
areas, the khans representing the qawm are in a state of constant competition with other potential 
khans.  His authority rests solely in the hands of the jirga and the qawm at large.  This authority 
is predicated on his ability to “provide food for others, arbitrate in their disputes and be 
unflinching in the defense of the interests of his qawm in the clash with the state.” (Roy, 1986, 
23)  His authority is derived from maintaining patronage with his community either through his 
own resources or resources extracted from the state.  If he falters in this endeavor, a new leader 
will emerge who provides better patronage and who has proven himself worthy in the eyes of the 
qawm (ibid). The power of the khan often varies, in the plains were khans are generally large 
landowners they’ve historically been coopted (to varying levels) into government and maintain a 
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decisive amount of patronage and therefore power.  Khans in more mountainous areas like that 
of Loya Patkia, have less power due to the lack of resources and government interaction, which 
are necessary for patronage (ISAF, 2010).    The qawms in many of the Durrani areas tend to be 
less egalitarian and more hierarchal, which often resembles a feudal system.  The largest land 
owners are often designated as khans who act as middle men with the government (Giustozzi, 
2006).   
Maliks represent a different type of community leader but exhibits similar traits as the 
khan, depending on the community.  Normally, the maliks role is solely as a middleman between 
the state and community.  His patronage is derived from his access to state resources and favors 
from the state.  The maliks role is often necessary for the constituency he represents as well as 
the government (there may also be a khan in the community as well, although the malik 
generally represents a smaller constituency).  In a local village the government employees and 
offices are generally completely separated from the village itself.  Their ability to infiltrate the 
village is often stonewalled in the form of local bureaucratic courtesies (ie. Sitting down for tea) 
and other forms of procrastination, while village authorities become elusive, leaving government 
officials unable to deal with official business.  The malik is the bridge between these two groups.  
He represents the qawm to the government and the government to the qawm.  This creates a 
dynamic in which the government’s authority isn’t directly linked to the individual but to the 
community as a whole.  Therefore, in this case, the individual is not liable to pay taxes, the 
community is liable.  In the event of some form of transgression, the fines are imposed at the 
village level as opposed to an individual (Roy, 1986).  This relationship preserves the tribal 
structure where an individual adheres to community decisions via the jirga who conveys their 
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decision to the malik, as opposed to circumventing the structure and dealing with the government 
individually (Smith, 1973).   
The avoidance of the state by the Pashtun tribes should not be confused with the rejection 
of the state.  Nadir Shah’s legitimacy, and the subsequent rulers of the monarchy, in the eyes of 
the tribesmen rests on his ascension to power via the Loya Jirga, the religious communities 
acceptance of the king, and due to the king’s ipso facto authority.  For these reasons the tribes 
accept taxation and conscription, with the expectation that the king defends it’s interest 
specifically by fending off foreign influences (Roy, 1986).   
Within tribal society the jirga system dominates the communities daily decision making 
process.  The jirga holds administrative functions as well as judicial.   During the Musahiban 
monarchy roughly 75% - 90% of court cases were administered within the confines of the jirga 
as opposed to the government supported system which was primarily used for commercial and 
trade cases.  There is even an adjudication system between different tribal groups, where an 
outside tribe is brought in to arbitrate.  Specifically tribes, like the Ahmadzai Durranis, hold the 
role of intertribal judge and considered specialists in arbitration (Dupree, Jan 1963, 3).   
The jirga also administers the tribal self-policing unit called the arabakai. This self-
policing institution is strongest in Loya Paktia and surrounding regions as well as the Kandahar 
region (where it is call paltani).   The arabakai, in general, are authorized to “implement the 
jirga’s decision”, “maintain law and order”, and “protect and defend borders and boundaries of 
the tribe or community” (Tariq, 2008, 3).   The legal source is derived from the Pashtun code, 
Pashtunwali (ibid, 1).  Traditionally it was considered an honor to be a selected by the jirga to be 
part of the policing unit. They were not paid but given rations and weapons from the local 
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community (Ruttig, 2010). The arabakai is another example of the local institutions outside of 
the central government purview.  This autonomy from central government infringement, has 
historically been of central importance and a definitive part in the patron client relations.   
The tribal khans and elders were also given authority to designate conscripts to the 
military.  This conscription policy, known as qawmi (tribal), allowed the tribal leaders to 
designate the tribesmen to join the national army.  These tribesmen wouldn’t be separated and 
would be stationed in close proximity to their home village.  Amanullah had instituted a 
conscription policy known as nufus (population), which didn’t recognize tribal affiliation, 
thereby undermining the authority of tribal leaders as well as the tribal institutions as a whole 
(Edwards, 2002, 103).  Nadir reversed this policy, placating to tribal influence. In the case of war 
where lashkars would be needed, the tribal leaders would maintain authority over their 
respective lashkars.  This gave the tribal chiefs additional relevance and authority among their 
tribes and clans (Gregorian, 1969, 296).   
The autonomy of the Pashtun tribes is especially relevant to the tribes of Loya Paktia, due 
to their military lashkar support of Nadir during the initial invasion. The tribal groups making up 
the various lashkars, stemming from the various eastern tribes of Greater Paktia  (consisting of 
the provinces of Paktia, Paktika, Khost, and parts of Ghazni), were given special administrative 
status, which they maintained for the length of the Musahiban dynasty.  This included near 
autonomy from government control, which included exemption from taxes and conscription 
(TLO, 2010, 2).   
The newly formed patron client relationship between the Nadir monarchy and Pashtun 
tribes reflected a type of collective clientelism, which often enfranchised groups as opposed to 
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individuals (Claphan, 1982, 11).  The newly formed relationship benefitted the client tribal 
communities in such ways described above; in return the patron monarchy was given support and 
legitimacy.  This support gave the government the ability to collect taxes, create an army through 
conscription, as well withdrawing support from the eastern tribes and their harassment of the 
British (Olesen, 1995, 178).  This is another patronage relationship where the monarchy ceded to 
British interest in return for military and economic support. The Nadiri government supported 
neither the efforts of the Red Shirt movement (the non violent Islamic movement that was 
working with Ghandi and his efforts) nor the Pathan tribal revolts (the Afridi tribe in 1930 and 
the Mohmand tribe in 1933). Although he traditionally supported an anti British stance he saw no 
reason to instigate the foreign power and chose to receive nominal subsidies and aid in a quid pro 
quo for reining in the eastern tribes (Fraser-Tytler, 1967, 239).  
Within this new patronage relationship was an element of cooption of the tribal leaders, 
or clientelism at the individual level.  Nadir and future Musahiban leaders were able to appoint 
members to the upper parliamentary house, the House of Peers (HOP).  This allowed the 
monarchy to bring tribal leaders (as well as religious leaders) into the central government by 
appointing them members of parliament. This created a mechanism of cooption by appointing 
positions of prestige to loyal tribal leaders.  Tribal members were also heavily represented in the 
various ministries, specifically the Ministry of the Interior, which provided an additional 
mechanism to coopt tribesmen into government (Cervin, 1952, 402). Further more, these 
members as well as member of the lower house of the National Consultative Assembly (NCA) 
brought tribal and ethnic leaders to Kabul and away from their constituents during summer and 
spring months, which were seasons during which uprisings generally occurred (Olesen, 1995, 
182).    
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Political Clientelism and the Pashtun Religious Community 
In tandem with conceding to tribal powers Nadir renewed powers back to the Pashtun 
religious community, which had previously been stripped by Amanullah.  This group was at their 
height of power as they called for jihad against Amanullah in reaction to his secular reforms.  
Although Nadir was a modernist at heart, he understood social development couldn’t be rushed 
and the religious establishment’s support was necessary to maintain power.  For these reasons he 
granted the group new influential power and privilege, thereby creating new patronage networks 
and mechanisms for cooption. His first order of business was to reverse many of Amanullah’s 
reforms, which directly confronted the religious establishment.  This included closing down 
schools for girls, calling female student abroad back home, reinstating strict purdah (seclusion) 
of women (which included the burka) and reinstating polygamy laws (Gregorian, 1969, 295).  As 
these reforms were a clear nod to the ulama he would go further and institutionalize the ulama 
and solidify new broad powers into law via the 1931 constitution.  
Nadir formally institutionalize the ulama for the first time in Afghan history.  
Traditionally the ulama lacked any formal organization and constituted a class of well educated 
religious clergy.  Nadir created the Society of Ulama (Jamiat-i Ulama) that was called upon to 
interpret Islamic law and to advise on religious reforms in the country.  Initially, their new 
powers were real, as they quickly stripped women of many of their rights (including voting), and 
advised the king on other pertinent issues in education, politics, and other every day affairs (such 
as dietary reform, outlawing alcohol) (Olesen, 1995, 181).   
The constitution of 1931 was another mechanism to solidify the acquiescence of the 
religious community and a new venue for patronage.  The constitution heavily focused on the 
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implementation of Islamic law and the countries constitutional adherence to it, which is not just a 
nod to the ulama but the tribal establishment as well (ibid, 305).  The constitution sets the tone of 
the newly formed relationship between the central government and ulama by beginning as such, 
“In the name of Allah the most merciful.”  This is followed by Article 1, which continues to 
stress the importance of Hanafi Islam, and is translated below.   
Article 1.  --- “The faith of Afghanistan is the sacred faith of Islam and the official religion and 
that of the population in general is the Hanafi religion.  The King of Afghanistan 
should be a follower of this religion.  Followers of other religions, such as Hindus 
and Jews, who live in Afghanistan, provided they do not infringe the ordinary rules 
of conduct and propriety, also enjoy protection.” 
(Max Planck Institute, Constitution of 1931) 
This first article is in stark contrast to the first article in the prior 1923 constitution created by 
Amanullah, which declares that Afghanistan is a free and independent country (Max Planck 
Institute, Constitution of 1923).   This statement is brought back into the 1964 constitution with 
the addition of explicitly noting the constitutional monarchy of the country (Max Planck 
Institute, Constitution of 1964).  Under both the 1923 and 1964 constitutions the first article is 
void of the word Islam, Sharia, or Hanafi.  The point being, Nadir is clearly making efforts to 
placate and garner the support of the religious establishment by stressing the importance of 
Sharia and Islam in the country’s constitution.   
Articles 87-96 created an Islamic judiciary where the Ministry of Justice was to strictly 
enforce the Hanafi Islamic school of jurisprudence.  The law through out the land would be 
based on sharia law with some exceptions in commercial arbitration.  The relevant articles are 
stated below. 
Article  87 – General suits under Shariat law will be filed in the Court of Justice 
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Article 88 – Suits filed in the Shariat courts are dealt with in accordance with the principles of 
the Hanafi religion.   
Article 91 - Every person may plead in court any provision of Shariat law to protect his rights 
Article 92 - Courts of Justice may not delay the hearing and decision of cases, except as provided 
by Shariat law 
(Max Planck Institute, Constitution of 1931) 
Although other articles provide room for a more secular law for commercial disputes, the 
religious establishment unequivocally, according to the 1931 Constitution, is the adjudicator for 
the vast majority of court cases in Afghanistan.  Theoretically this had the potential to lay the 
groundwork to drastically increase the influence of the ulama.  The reach of the Ministry of 
Justice would eventually reach into nearly every single district, with roughly 171 lower courts, 
known as the Lower Court of Innovation (or mahkameh-i ebtideh) (Wilber, 1962, 162).  The 
judges, or qazi, are appointed by the Minister of Justice based off their religious expertise and 
leadership.  The qazi is assisted by the mufti and the mohtasib.  The mufti plays the role of 
religious counselor and prosecutor.  He’ll assist the court in citing the relevant religious 
precedent or fatwa the case relates too.  The mohtasib acts to essentially ensure proper religious 
custom is practiced throughout the proceedings and in the courthouse (ibid, 69).    
These new patron client relations not only increased the influence of religious community 
but established a mechanism for cooption as well.  As discussed the ulama was once an 
unorganized group of educated clergy, making it difficult for the government to confront the 
organization without a leader or hierarchy.   Now with the ulama under government control, the 
clergy morphed into government paid civil servants, dependent on the state.  The government 
now could address the leadership within the ulama and quell rebellious sentiment or confront 
issues that may have deleterious effects on the ruling establishment.  The installation of Jamiat 
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Ulama simply created an organization with an established hierarchy making it more 
accommodating to cooption, rather then having to coopt on an individual basis.  In other words 
creating a community clientelistic relationship rather then maintaining many individual 
patronage relationships (Olesen, 1995, 184).   
The strength of the relationship between the religious establishment and monarchy would 
be tested on a number of occasions in the decades to come.  Most notably was the government’s 
defense of the clergy during the Liberal Parliament era (1949 -1952).  The Liberal Parliament era 
was a result of the educated urban elite calling for more dramatic social and economic reforms.  
The government, under Nadir’s brother Mahmud, accepted a more aggressive push for reform 
measures, which included a free press and a more liberal parliament.  These liberals began to 
push the envelope by targeting the conservative clergy as the obstacles to progress. As the 
virulence rose the government quickly stepped in and shut down liberal newspapers and arrested 
liberal reformers (who were subsequently freed), and the country reverted back to the status quo.  
This is meant to illustrate how, the government as a rational actor, chose to defend the interest of 
the clergy rather then pursuing social reforms which it was ultimately striving for.  The threat of 
a religious backlash was still real and apparently wasn’t worth testing, although a decade later 
Daoud would again push the envelope but only after the sufficient weakening of the clergy 
(Dupree, 1973, 496).   
Nadir also placated to the local mullahs by reversing Amanullah’s law to institutionalize 
the madrassa system, which required that all madrassas be state run. Mullahs, ran both the local 
mosques as well as the local maktabs or madrassas.  They were often times the only literate or 
semi educated person in a village and was depended upon to provide education at the primary 
level, which centered on religious instruction. Amanullah, in an attempt to modernize the 
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education system, stripped the local mullahs of authority over the private madrassas that they 
ran.  Nadir reversed this by allowing mullahs to reopen their local madrassas without 
government interference. (Olesen, 1995, 185)  This was among his most notable reforms, which 
gave “recognition of the traditional mosque schools, which existed in every village, and in each 
street of the towns, as an integral part of the school system.” (Shah, 1939, 265) These local 
maktabs, traditionally financed through local donations, would also receive government 
contributions (ibid). The Ministry of Education would also assist the mullahs by often times 
supplying materials and textbooks, but would leave the curriculum in the hands of the local 
clergy (Wilber, 1962).  In addition to surrendering local control of education to the local mullahs, 
they further compromised with the religious community by banning Western language 
curriculum at the primary level (which was viewed as foreign ideological infringement) and 
closed down schools for girls.  The exception to this was the Malalai school for nurses and 
midwives, which essentially was the only school for girls in the early years of the monarchy, it 
wouldn’t be until the early 1950s that it would evolve into a true secondary school (Gregorian, 
1969).  Over the era of Musahiban leadership the government would avoid infringing on the 
mullah’s local authority but at the same time instituting a competing education and religious 
education system in an effort to modernize society and create a more nationalistic ideology.  The 
monarchy’s efforts in this arena will be discussed further on in the analysis.   
Conclusion  
The rational actor theory assumes “individuals have preferences and act instrumentally so 
as to achieve what they prefer.” (Uhlaner, 1986, 554) The actions of Nadir Shah exemplify this 
concept in which he placates to the tribal and religious communities, whose support was 
essential to maintain power.  Upon his ascension to the throne he created new reforms and 
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measures to placate to both of these communities, in doing so creating patronage networks in an 
effort to attain his goal of maintaining power.  Political clientelism dictates that the exchange 
between two parties is from unequal positions (Clapham, 1982, 4).  This is interesting to note 
due to the fact that Nadir was the weaker of the two parties upon his ascension to the thrown, his 
success was almost completely predicated on religious approval and tribal military support.  The 
creation of the 1931 constitution and the related reforms were based on this relationship 
dynamic, which inevitably created newly formed institution heavily influenced by the two 
groups.  As the analysis will demonstrate, the relationship dynamic will eventually transfer 
power from the religious and tribal communities back to the central government.  With the 
development of this new power structure, future Musahiban leaders will attempt to implement 
economic and social reform while maintaining their relationship with the religious and tribal 
communities via the various patron client networks.   
Part 2 – The Role of Development in the Pashtun Patronage Relationship 
In 1933 Nadir Shah was assassinated by a pro Amanullah supporter, ending his short 
tenure in power. Within the ruling clan, Nadir’s three brothers rallied behind his nineteen year 
old son Zahir, crowning him the new king and maintaining the continuity of the monarchy.  The 
three brothers maintained their position in government but were elevated in the power structure.  
Meaning, Mohammad Hashim Khan continued holding the position of prime minister, but would 
essentially rule the country (Dupree, 1973, 477). This period of avuncular leadership (where 
Zahir’s uncles would lead the country) lasted through Hashim’s abdication in 1946 and Shah 
Mahmud’s leadership from 1946 – 1953.   
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 The economic initiatives of the period are especially pertinent as it relates to the 
monarchies relationship with the tribal periphery.  Originally Nadir had embraced the idea of 
economic development, much as his predecessor Amanullah had done.  Although the Musahiban 
monarchy would pursue these goals at a much more gradual pace, one that was more in tune with 
society and wouldn’t threaten the Pashtun tribes.  In Nadir’s own words: 
“I am for a certain progress and for cultural reforms in the Western sense: but I want such 
reforms to be introduced with a slower pace than those adopted by Amanullah.  That fact 
that Amanullah’s reforms brought his downfall does not prove in any way that they were 
bad.  If in order to cure himself fast the sick absorbed a potion tenfold stronger than 
prescribed by the doctor, he certainly may become sicker.  That, however does not prove 
in any way that the medicine itself was bad.” (Gregorian, 1969, 293) 
These development initiatives, a primary element of the patronage relationship, would 
play an important part in the Musahiban’s relationship with the Pashtun periphery.  As the 
rational actor model suggest, an individuals goals can be ‘other regarding’ or altruistic, although 
are no less self interested (Riker, 1995, 37).  Meaning the development initiatives could be 
perceived as purely altruistic.  Although, more importantly, the development measures also 
support self serving values, along the lines of the ‘thick’ interpretation of the rational choice 
model, that of power (Green, 1994).  These development goals will distribute welfare to landless 
Pashtun peasants, and along with education reforms and creation of a modern army, will 
contribute to a national ideology and allegiance.  This will have an undermining effect on tribal 
influence, as the government becomes to be viewed as a provider of services as opposed to its 
traditional role of exploiter.   
An important aspect of the development reforms, relates to how these initiatives were 
funded. New tax revenues derived internally would enable the government to firstly function as a 
government but also implement these much needed economic and development reforms.  These 
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new tax revenues would also allow the monarchy to continue supporting the patronage 
relationships with the tribal communities.  Monies, derived internally, would have the following 
effects as it relates to the political clientelism in the country. 
1. Internal sources of revenue allowed the monarchy to maintain their patron obligations by 
maintaining low or nonexistent tax rates with the tribal communities, thereby maintaining 
their continued autonomy. 
 
2. Internal sources of revenue allowed the monarchy to avoid reliance on foreign sources of 
income to fund their development plans and operations of government.  Again, this 
allowed the government to preserve the existing patronage relationships with the tribes 
who have traditionally shunned any foreign interference. 
 
3. Internal sources of revenue were deployed to finance infrastructure and other 
developmental projects, which benefitted southern Pashtun communities. This gave rural 
communities the sense that government infringement wasn’t necessarily exploitive, as 
was the traditional point of view, which garnered new allegiances and supported a 
nationalistic ideology.   
 
Economic Reform and a New Source of Revenue 
This period would focus attention and resources on development initiatives.  In pursuit of 
these initiatives the government maintained a relatively isolationist stance as it relates to the 
international community, and would continually rebuff his powerful neighbor’s encroachment, 
highlighted in the fact both Russian and Britain trade missions were banned in the country. 
Although, Hashim would eventually accept assistance from other seemingly less threatening 
nations (Dupree, 1973, 478). This economic isolation coupled with the inability (or desire) to tax 
the rural tribes meant the country would have to grow organically and tax revenues would have 
to be derived from commerce (as opposed to agriculture, which was dominated by Pashtuns). 
This would coincide with replacing the merchant base whom was primarily Indian with capital 
and trade companies derived internally (Olesen, 1995, 200). With these intentions in mind the 
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Afghan government blessed a new privately held Afghan National Bank (Bank-I Milli) and the 
creation of joint stock companies that would monopolize the trade in various agriculture products 
(called shirkats) (Franek, 1949,431). 
Chartered in 1932 the Afghan National Bank was created by a group of Herati merchants 
financed by 7 million afghanis (the currency) (or roughly half a million dollars), an extremely 
large sum of money at the time (Cervin, 1952, 411).  The business was granted a comprehensive 
control of trade, the economy, and currency control.  Under this bank, shirkats (joint stock 
companies) sprouted up which monopolized various trade; Afghanistan’s largest exports were 
cotton, fruits/vegetables, grains, and karakul skins (Rubin, 2002, 59).  Over the next ten years 
more then a hundred shirkats would be established, the most important of which were the 
Karakul Company (established in 1934) and the Sugar and Petroleum Company (also established 
in 1934) (Franck, 1949, 431).  This was really the first time national companies had emerged in 
the country, and created new investment opportunities. The success of this model was 
remarkable. The capital of the National Bank increased to roughly 650 million afghanis by 1950 
(from 7 million in 1932) (Dupree, 1973, 362).   
The success of the Afghan National Bank and its joint stock trading company spin offs 
had multiple effects.  First the government benefitted enormously.  The government originally 
invested 2.1 million afghanis (or roughly $160,000) in 1935.  This investment returned 2.6 
million afghanis on top of the original investment by 1939 when the government withdrew their 
stake in the company.  The bank at this time, also lent the government a whopping 16 million 
afghani loan (ibid, 412).  The government also held stakes in the various joint stock companies.  
These were set up such that company monopolized the trade and light industry of a particular 
product (like sugar), but the government was given a 40 – 45% stake.  This gave the government 
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the capacity to control production on various agriculture products as well as provide income 
(Olesen, 1995, 200).   
The increase in Gross National Product during this time was substantial. With a GNP of 
2,493 million afghanis in 1935 and a GNP of 9,596 million in 1945, representing nearly a 300% 
increase in 10 years (Rubin, 2002, 63).   The exports of karakul, the countries leading export  
(making of roughly 40-50% of the total), more then doubled between 1935 and 1945 (Gregorian, 
1969, 368).  As the below chart demonstrates, overall exports accelerated drastically leading up 
to and through the Second World War. 
Fiscal 
Year 
Exports 
(million 
afghanis) 
Growth 
Rate 
1937 258 
 1938 411 59.30% 
1939 492 19.71% 
1940 444 -9.76% 
1941 461 3.83% 
1942 578 25.38% 
1943 734 26.99% 
  *The data used in creating this chart was derived from Vartan Gregorian’s The 
Emergence of Modern Afghanistan, page 369 
 The government of course, benefitted hugely from these dramatic increases, not only by 
partial ownership, but also indirect taxes.  With a hand in the various joint stock companies they 
were able to easily regulate the taxing of exports (Rubin, 2002, 59).   
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The significant increase in tax revenue allowed the government to avoid finding other 
sources of income.  This meant they could avoid possible confrontation with the tribal groups, by 
not pushing for higher land and livestock taxes, and also not have to depend on foreign countries 
for aid, thereby maintaining their highly cherished independence.  They managed to do this while 
at the same time implementing their own development polices with a focus on irrigation and road 
building.  The taxes derived from land and livestock (which would have most effect the tribal 
communities) would decrease for decades as a percentage of the economy. By 1953 land and 
livestock taxes accounted for just 14% of domestic revenue (40% came from taxing of foreign 
trade), by 1973 it would account for just 1% (Rubin, 2002, 61).  This focus on economic 
development created much needed revenue in order to avoid taxing the tribes thereby infringing 
on their autonomy, which could lead to possible confrontation.  The need to tax tribal 
communities was part of the reason for Amanullah’s downfall and created tribal warfare under 
Abdur Rahman (ibid, 60). It also created a means to actually contribute to rural societies 
livelihoods rather then playing the historical role as exploiter. Providing resources to the various 
Pashtun communities gave them the ability to supersede the tribal structure by providing welfare 
to individual Pashtuns, with the intention of creating national allegiance.   
Government Funded Development and the Helmand Valley Project 
 The formation of the various shirkats (or joint stock companies) and banks, the 
installation of roads, and the implementation of irrigation projects all meant to capitalize on the 
country’s primary economic strength which was agriculture.  The country’s development plans 
were initially laid out in the Overall Economic Development Plan of 1932-1938 and the Seven 
Year Economic Plan beginning in 1939.  These plans primarily focused on the improvement of 
agriculture through irrigation development and infrastructure as well as communication, 
 
 
62 
transportation, and hydroelectric power (Gregorian, 1969, 370).  These government funded 
projects would disproportionately benefit Pashtun tribal society.   
The implementation of a much needed road system (or a much improved road system) 
began under the reign of Nadir Shah.  He would connect the Indus and Oxus valleys, travelling 
over the Hindu Kush mountain range, by road for the first time (Fraser-Tytler, 1967, 213).  The 
geography of the country makes transportation difficult, which undermines not only economic 
progress but communication and government influence in rural areas as well.  Kabul itself sits at 
6,400 feet above sea level, but to travel west and you must travel as high as 10,000 and 14,000 
feet, making roadwork very difficult. To the east, by the Pakistan border, was almost impossible 
to create passable carriage (M.B, 1941, 1908).  Despite the topographical obstacles, the Afghan 
government between 1933 and 1946 built over 2,000 miles of road.  New roads connected the 
Chinese border and the Soviet border that housed a train station as well as roads connecting 
Kandahar, Kabul, Herat, and Mazir Sharif.  Along with the new road system trucking and bus 
companies emerged with a more productive postal service.  More then 1000 trucks were 
imported in the late 1930’s, which were badly needed as the export business emerged 
(Gregorian, 1969, 366). The development of roads would continue under the future government 
of Daoud as well.  Between 1951 and 1972 roughly 1,500 miles of roads were laid and 
completed (Rubin, 2002, 78), with more then half of the development funding being used for 
transportation and communication between 1957 – 1964.  The US financed the road built from 
Kabul to Kandahar (Daoud had been granted approval by the Loya Jirga to receive foreign aid 
from the US and USSR).  The Russian financed the road from Herat to Kandahar as well as 
Kabul to the Soviet Union via the Salang Tunnel. This created a national marketplace rather then 
various local markets, which reached into Iran, the Soviet Union, and Pakistan. (ibid, 79).   
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The majority of the road work focused around Pashtun dominated Kandahar.  These 
roads would predominantly benefit a relatively small community in Afghanistan, where the 
general population, for the most part, didn’t own cars and wouldn’t use the new road work.  Who 
did benefit from this newly installed road system was the trucking and smuggling industry.  The 
dominant players in this industry were the eastern tribes of Loya Patika as well as eastern Ghilzai 
tribes (ibid, 67).  As we’ll see, although these tribes benefited from the newly formed roadwork, 
they also became concerned with the perceived government interference.   
The crux of the development reform centered on the Helmand Valley Project (HVP) and 
other irrigation development projects.  Zahir Shah and his two prime ministers during the 
avuncular period decided rather to force industrialization onto an unsophisticated society they 
would initially focus their attention on agriculture reform which would breed more immediate 
benefits.  These irrigation plans focused north of the Hindu Kush in the plains between rivers 
leading up to the Oxus River  (Wilber, 1953, 488).  In the south they took on what would be 
known as one of the most ambitions plan in Afghan modern history, known as the Helmand 
Valley Project.  This project centers on the control and distribution of the Helmand River.  The 
Helmand River is the longest in Afghanistan running roughly 715 miles (1,150 km) originating 
in the Hindu Kush just west of Kabul, then runs south and west into Iran. The vast irrigation 
scheme was championed by the Afghan government in tandem with the American based 
company, Morrison Knudsen.  The initial estimate of the project was $10.7 million but ended up 
costing $63.7 million, clearly not a well executed plan. Although the project missed some 
expectations it still managed to irrigate 170,000 acres of land, which created new resources and 
contributed to the over all welfare of the rural community (Zakhilwal, 2010, 3).   
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A primary purpose for the HVP was not only to create a new source of government 
income by increasing agriculture production but also to raise the standard of living among the 
landless and nomadic (ibid, 2). Many nomads were no longer able to migrate into Pakistan (after 
Pakistan – Afghanistan relations deteriorated) and looked to settle.  The government assisted the 
nomads and landless peasants through subsidizing land, real estate tax, seed, and equipment.  
The settlement of these groups was a major component of the irrigation projects.  The plan was 
to allot up to 25 acres per family with an expectation of assisting nearly 20,000 different families 
(Franck, 1949, 426).  This effort on behalf of the government was truly unusual in Afghan 
history.  
It’s important to note the significance of creating irrigable land to distribute to landless 
Pashtuns.  As mentioned in the prior chapter, conflict in Pashtun society is often derived from 
zar, zan, and zamin (gold, women, and land) and an individuals’ access to them, especially as it 
relates to agnatic rivalries.  Land ownership, which is a primary indicator of one’s status, often 
leads to blood feuds, and generally breeds discontent (Poullada, 1970, 14).   By supplying 
landless Pashtun tribesmen land they can irrigate and live off, they’ve not only created a new 
form of economic stimulus but have potentially subdued future quarrels among tribesmen, this of 
course contributes to the over all stability of the group and the country.   
In the mid 1950’s families began to settle in the newly erected villages (complete with a 
mosque and bazaar) to farm the newly irrigable land.  The first of the villages to be settled was 
just outside the Helmand capital of Lashkar Gah, in a village called Nad-i Ali.  Here, between 
2,500 and 3,000 families settled.  The families were primarily Pashtun with roughly 1,200 of 
them nomadic. The Pashtuns were representative of the spectrum of clans, which included 
Ghilzai tribes, Durrani tribes, and eastern Pashtun tribes such as Afridi and Wardak (Dupree, 
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1973, 503).  Although, throughout all the settled areas the Popalzai, Barakzai, and Nurzai were 
the most widely represented of the new settlers who represented the largest tribes in Helmand 
(Stevens, 1965, 34).     
At Nad-i Ali the government supplied each family with the supplies and assets needed to 
start farming, which consisted of the following:  
 
Costs 
 
Afganis 
Land  30 Jiribs* 7,500 
Building Material for house 5,000 
One ox 2,000 
Farm equiptment 300 
Wheat seed and food 1,000 
* 1 jirib is roughly .5 acres,2000 sq meters, or 1/5 of a hectare 
Figure 2 – Description of Government Supported Financing and the Helmand Valley Project 
(Stevens, 1965, 50) 
Although the government directly subsidies much of the development project, these expenses 
were expected to be paid back.  A landowner was expected to make repayments each year for 
twenty years, at zero percent interest (ibid, 51).  On top of these generous terms, the government 
taxes on land and livestock were as low as one quarter of one percent (based off the value of the 
asset) (ibid, x).   
 The second area to be settled under the Helmand Valley Authority was in Marja in 1957, 
in Helmand province.  730 families made up the original settlers but almost 2000 more would 
join them in the next decade or so.  Of the original families, they would successfully put 55,000 
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jeribs (27,500 acres) under cultivation.  Again, the majority of these newly settled farmers were 
Pashtun ethnicity (Dupree, 1973, 504).   
 Other aspects of government involvement contributed to the livelihood of the newly 
settled farmers.  The HVA invested in a cotton gin as well as an alabaster plant.  The cotton gin, 
which is owned and operated by the government, is a source of cash to the farmers, whom sell 
cotton to the government which is ginned then sent either to export or used locally (Steven, 1965, 
62).  The government also initiated a project to evaluate the feasibility of modern machinery.   In 
conjunction with the Indian/American corporation, Indamer, the government operated and 
trained farmers on nine plows in the new established settlements (Dupree, 1960, 6).   
Conclusion 
The avuncular period marked the beginning of the moderate developmental reforms 
envisioned by Nadir Shah, under the leadership of Hashim, Mahmud, and the newly appointed 
king, Zahir Shah.  Under their leadership the Afghan government liberalized economic reforms, 
allowing a nascent merchant class to exploit the countries natural resources and created a 
national bank to finance the entrepreneurial endeavors.  This created new revenues for the 
Afghan government via tax income derived from the emerging merchant class and by partial 
ownership of the various shirkats.  These two forms of revenue allowed the country to avoid 
further interference from foreign countries (via aid) and avoid taxing the rural tribal societies, at 
the same time embarking on aggressive development initiatives. Traditionally the central 
government was viewed as an exploiter, and now “for the fist time in history, the Afghan farmer 
can feel that the government is concerned with his well-being.” (Wilber, 1953, 488)  This 
magnifies an important element of the Musahiban leadership.  As the rational choice model 
 
 
67 
suggests, the actions of an individual don’t necessarily have to be materially self serving, 
meaning they can be altruistic, or benefit others (Riker, 1995, 37).  The development and 
economic reforms in many ways exemplify this concept. They also demonstrate how the 
government utilized the welfare system to enfranchise the Pashtun tribal communities in an 
effort to further stability of the south by providing land to landless Pashtuns, as well as 
superseded the tribal structure to garner individual allegiances in support of the government.   
Part 3 – A Developing National Conscience; a Shifting Social Dynamic  
Prime Minister Mahmud stepped down in 1953 and was succeeded by Mohammad 
Daoud, while King Zahir Shah continued to maintain his position on the thrown. This period 
within the Musahiban dynasty marked a relative shift in the power dynamic between the central 
government and the Pashtun tribes.  At the emergence of Nadir Shah in 1929, the Pashtun tribal 
and religious communities were at their height of power.  By 1963, after years of gradual reforms 
and the inculcation of a national identity, coupled with a dramatic military build up, the 
government began pursuing more aggressive social and economic measures.  The creation of a 
national identity and allegiance to the state was instilled through the education and military 
systems.  Educational reforms, a primary focus of Musahiban initiatives, would also support a 
more progressive religious narrative, in an effort to create a more modern minded populace and 
to offset the conservative teachings at local maktabs and madrassas.  These reforms coincided 
with the government’s continuous build up of military forces, followed by accelerated military 
build up under Daoud with the assistance of the USSR and US.  A loyal and strong military 
force, coupled with the development of a more progressive religious and education system, 
created a relative shift in the power dynamic in the patron client relationship.  The patronage 
network still existed but the patron (the central government) had gradually become more 
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powerful, allowing them to resist Pashtun tribal and religious pressures, and as we’ll see, pursue 
more aggressive social reforms.   
Daoud was relatively young (43 years of age) when he ascended to leadership but had 
been groomed by his uncle Hashim for decades (Dupree, 1973, 498).  As the new Prime 
Minister, Daoud’s initial concern related to the Pashtunistan cause.  Daoud, who had studied in 
Germany, was influenced by the nationalistic agenda of Adolf Hitler. Hitler’s radical nationalism 
fit nicely into the current ideology of the Pashtun cause, which above all else pushed for the 
liberalization of the Pashtuns in the east of the Durrand line (Saikal, 2004, 112).   This cause 
garnered him support among the traditionally xenophobic Pashtun communities to seek foreign 
aid from both the USSR and the US.  This influx of aid allowed him to dramatically strengthen 
the military.  This, coupled with reforms in education, and the diminished influence of the 
clergy, created an atmosphere which allowed him to accelerate reforms and confront both the 
clergy and tribes.  Before delving into this new social dynamic, it’s worth reviewing the 
international atmosphere at the time.   
Aid and Military Development 
The 1947 British withdrawal of the sub continent created a power vacuum that was 
quickly filled by both the United States and Russia.  As the Cold War ensued the US established 
the Baghdad Pact (later in 1958 called the Central Treaty Organization or CENTO), which 
created a defensive alliance among the Middle East and Central Asian states of Pakistan, Iran, 
Turkey, and Iraq, in an effort to repulse Soviet influence (Saikal, 2004, 118).  This coincided 
with the deterioration of relations with Pakistan in 1955, due to the Pakistani policy of the ‘One-
Unit Act’, where the Pashtun dominated North West Frontier Province was consolidated under a 
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new West Pakistan province.  This immediately provoked a reaction among the Afghan Pashtuns 
who saw this as a move detrimental to the Pashtunistan cause.  Pashtuns attacked the Pakistani 
embassy and consulates throughout the country, which led to a suspension in diplomatic relations 
and trade (Hasan, 1962, 16).  
This turmoil was exacerbated by American approval of arms to Pakistan.  Daoud, whose 
request for American aid was rejected, would approach the Soviets to establish a new 
relationship predicated on increased military aid.  He would first consult a Loya Jirga for 
approval of the new relationship.  The Pashtuns jirga would modify their traditional xenophobic 
tendencies and approved the new relationship due to their hardline stance on the Pashtunistan 
cause.  This created an influx of foreign aid unseen in Afghan history.  This aid was coupled with 
American aid, who although chose not to compete with Russia as the primary patron of the 
country, did attempt to complement the Russian aid in an effort to diversify Afghan dependence 
(Reardon, 1969, 159).  The Soviets and its eastern European allies provided the bulk of the 
military aid, which from 1955 to 1960 totaled $215 million and American aid during this same 
period totaled $127 million (Dupree, 1960, 4).  Through 1965 Soviet aid nearly doubled U.S. aid, 
which stood at roughly $650 and $325 million, respectively (Eltezam, 1966, 95).  In addition, the 
Soviets also provided the spare parts and tools as well as training for military personal (Hyman, 
1984, 29).  The influx in foreign aid allowed for a dramatic increase in government expenditures, 
both military and developmental. Developmental expenditures jumped from 205 million afghanis 
in 1954 to 1,830 afghanis in 1963. At the beginning of Daoud’s term in 1953, defense and 
security expenditures amounted to roughly 280 million afghanis.  By the end of Daoud’s tenure 
in 1963 defense spending reached nearly 750 million afghanis, almost a three-fold increase 
(Rubin, 2002, 68).   
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The army’s goals during this time were twofold.  First, it was meant to create national 
allegiance, superseding tribal ties.  Second, create a force that could forcefully suppress internal 
unrest and fight in conventional warfare against another state. The creation of a modern 
professional army was a conscious effort beginning under Nadir in1929.  He had learned the 
lessons of Amanullah, who not only accelerated reform measures at such a pace to irritate the 
tribal and religious communities, but due to his focus on reform left the military to deteriorate 
which stood at a paltry 11,000 men strong at the end of his tenure (Jalali, 2002).  Nadir learned 
the lessons from his predecessor and allocated roughly half of government expenditures to the 
military, his successors would follow suit (Gregorian, 1969, 370).   The military eventually grew 
to roughly 98,000 men under Daoud (Jalali, 2002).  This was coupled with Russia and its allies 
providing tanks, M.I.G fighter jets, helicopters, small arms, and Ilyushin-28 jet bombers 
(Dupree, 1973, 522) and the construction of military bases and airfields, such as the Begram 
airbase (Reardon, 1969,158).  The massive influx of military support after years of government 
spending would fully shift military dominance of the state over the tribes.  This would come to a 
head as Daoud pushes for accelerated economic and social reforms, which will be discussed 
later.   
The other challenge the military was meant to over come was the tribal allegiances that 
superseded national allegiance.  The military structure was used as a venue to instill nationalistic 
ideology.  During the early years of the monarchy the government was heavily dependent on the 
tribal lashkars (solely dependent on them during the over throw of Amanullah), which operated 
as part time local militias, whose participation garnered them “tax breaks, land ownership, cash 
payment, or other privileges in return.” (Jalali, 2002, 75) Due to their independence these 
lashkars were viewed as both a support mechanism but also a threat, if they chose to turn on the 
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government (as they’ve done in the past).  The government, beginning with Nadir, attempted to 
counter this by creating a national army with an institutional identity.  Nadir reopened the 
Afghan military academy in 1930 and recruited among the Pashtun tribal aristocracy into its 
officer corps (ibid).  Daoud would open similar military boarding schools, which focused their 
recruitment among the sons of khans of the Ghilzai and eastern tribes.  The students would be 
separated from their families and qawms, and at a young age, trained to become officers in the 
army and indoctrinated into the state (Rubin, 2002).    This created another venue in which the 
tribes used to increase their own influence in government, but turned primarily into a venue in 
which to coopt future tribal leaders and further create national allegiance.  Overtime, the military 
structure became both a security force as well as a national education institute.  Recruits would 
receive, in conjunction with military education, literacy and civic lessons, meant to further 
integrate the Afghan populace into the national mindset (Jalali, 2002).  Daoud would further the 
education and professionalization of the army by sending thousands of officers to Russia and 
Czechoslovakia (Hyman, 1984, 29).  The army became the most “significant integrating 
institution” in Afghan society (Jalali, 2002, 80). This integration was also supported by 
progressive educational reforms. 
Progressive Educational Reform  
Reforms in education were meant to create a national identity and consciousness as well 
as “pave the way for people’s acceptance of social reforms.” (Gregorian, 1969, 307) The 
Musahiban monarchy would pursue these reforms at a gradual pace while at the same time 
coopting and placating to the religious constituency and the local mullahs.  As previously 
discussed, the government conceded local education to the authority of the local mullahs in the 
village maktabs, which accounted for the majority of primary education.  Coinciding with the 
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support of the local mullahs the government would create an alternative education system, albeit 
one still centered on religion.   
The reforms initiated in 1935 created government run schools which competed with the 
mullah run maktabs at the primary level (roughly ages 5 – 11), as well as created secondary 
schools and eventually higher level education and universities (Shah, 1939).  The primary 
schools (located in village and district centers) and secondary schools (mostly found in 
provincial centers), held enrollments of roughly 93,000 students by 1946 and nearly 400,000 by 
the end of the Daoud regime in 1963 (Rubin, 2002), although the vast majority (roughly 90% by 
1959) catered only to boys.   The secondary schools focused much of their education on 
curriculum such as math, science, language, history, and physical education, although religion 
was deeply imbedded in all aspects of learning.  The government’s goal, in addition to pursuing 
modernization reforms, was to create “good Muslims and staunch nationalists” (Gregorian, 1969, 
353).   In this effort to promote national consciousness the government created Pashtu speaking 
secondary boarding schools meant to cater to the sons of tribal leadership.  Two of which, the 
Rahman Baba and Khushkal Khan schools, catered to the eastern tribes on both sides of the 
Durrand Line, in an effort to promote national ideology among the most pugnacious of the tribal 
groups (Rubin, 2002).  Additionally elite secondary schools, meant for future Afghan leaders, 
were opened and run by various foreign countries, such as the Habibiya (American system), 
Istiqlal (French system), Nejat (German system), and Ghazi (British system), their graduates 
were expected to enroll in western universities and were among the elite of society.  Lastly, the 
foundation of what is now Kabul University was opened in 1932, again with support from 
outside systems (Olesen, 1995). 
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Initially the education system was often viewed as threatening especially among the rural 
villagers who viewed an education past the primary maktab level as foreign and not supporting 
of Muslim values (Wilber, 1962).  The rural elite viewed education as a potential threat to their 
own authority, but began to realize the graduates of the system became part of the central 
government bureaucracy, which would give them additional influence.   This again exemplifies 
the give and take, relationship of mutual benefit, where the villagers send their sons to 
government run secondary schools, where they become indoctrinated with a national 
consciousness, and in return they join the government giving the qawm or tribe added influence 
(Rubin, 2002).    
The Ministry of Education also created a more progressive religious school in an effort to 
create a more progress religious dialogue.  The Madrasa Ulum-i Sharia, located just outside of 
Kabul, was meant to establish a “modern and broad-minded class of priests which will be able to 
help in the general reform of the country.” (Wilber, 1962, 69)  Their progressive stance was 
exemplified when the government had requested the opinion of its teachers regarding the 
requirement of women and purdah.  The response from the school’s clerics was clearly a 
moderate position and would not deny the fact purdah was non-existent in the Koran (Wilber, 
1956, 107).  As we’ll see, this eventually led to the public unveiling of aristocratic women, 
which would cause a stir among the religious conservatives.  This emerging group, with its 
progressive ideology and access to the monarchy, clearly had an undermining effect on the 
conservative and traditional religious establishment.   
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Declining Religious Influence 
 Declining religious influence coincided with the educational and military reforms, which 
collectively would allow the government to push forward on more aggressive social measures.  
Their diminishing influence was due to three primary reasons; cooption of the ulama and 
religious authorities, implementation of competing judiciary, and as noted above, the 
implementation of a more progressive education system.   
“The importance of the Afghan religious leaders resides in their ability to arouse devout 
and suggestible followers on occasions when acts and policies of the government are regarded as 
offensive to Moslem faith and traditions.” (Wilber, 1962, 146)  The ulama’s ability to rouse the 
Pashtun populace by the end of Daoud’s reign was clearly in decline.  Over the period of the 
Musahiban monarchy the ulama would become ingrained and coopted into government.  The 
same religious authorities that had called for the over throw of Amanullah, that of the Jilani and 
Mujaddidi families (both Sufi pirs or leaders), would become embedded in the government 
establishment.  The Mujaddidi chief, Fazl Ahmed, became the Minister of Justice with his son 
appointed as deputy.  Other family members would become senators and diplomats. The 
religious families would often times solidify their relationship through intermarriage as well 
(Olesen, 1995, 186).  Younger generations of these families would become accustom to their 
stature in life, many of whom would become part of the educated class, creating a more 
progressive religious clergy (Wilber, 1962, 148).  Jamiat-i Ulema’s role, the religious authority 
meant to advise the government, would diminish significantly as its numbers dwindled to only 
fifteen members and was left leaderless.  The government’s avoidance of the group, exemplified 
by the fact they chose not to appoint new members, was an indicator of their declining influence 
(ibid, 67). The monarchy instead sought advice from more progressive religious leaders such as 
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the royal imam, Musa Shafiq, who held graduate degrees from al Azhar in Cairo as well as 
Columbia University in New York (Rubin, 2002, 72), or from the authorities at the government 
run, progressive religious secondary school, Madrassa Ulum-i Sharia (Wilber, 1962, 69).   
The judiciary exemplified another arena in which the religious authorities saw their 
influence deteriorate.  Although the 1931 constitution plainly stipulates Sharia law as the 
primary source of legal code, competing sources of law were gradually introduced.  Most notably 
was the implementation of statutory laws relating to commercial disputes. These laws were 
similar to western forms of jurisprudence as opposed to the Hanafi school of jurisprudence that 
was stipulated under the constitution (Olesen, 1995, 189).  Judges were appointed from Kabul 
University’s Faculty of Law (as opposed to Faculty of Sharia) and the appeals process took place 
outside the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Justice and reverted to a Board of Commercial 
Arbitration.  Other forms of law skirted sharia influence, the Ministry of Communication 
adjudicated issues arising from telecommunications and mail, minor infringements of the law 
were adjudicated summarily by police courts under the governor’s jurisdiction (Wilber, 1956, 
92), this is to say nothing of the informal jirga system that existed.   
 Over the thirty-year period under analysis, the religious authority never attempted to 
arouse its followers to take action against the government, an indication of both their diminished 
influence and cooption into government.   The religious incitation of the populace only 
materialized sporadically at the local level, primarily due to Daoud’s accelerated social reforms.  
Daoud was able to pursue these social reforms due to the reasons discussed; increased military 
buildup, cooption and diminished influence of ulama, and creating an allegiance throughout the 
country through military and educational reforms.   
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The Government’s Accelerated Reforms, a New Social Dynamic   
 After years of increasing the strength of the military, diminishing the influence of the 
religious establishment, and imbedding national solidarity through education and military 
reforms, Daoud began to pursue more aggressive reform measures.   This represented a marked 
shift in the dynamics of the patron client relationship.  As political clientelism represents a 
relationship among unequals (Clapham, 1982), the fulcrum on which this relationship rests has 
shifted towards the side of the monarchy. This shift represents the strengthening position of the 
monarchy, as the patron, since the time of Nadir. Daoud would harness this new position by 
pushing forward social and economic reforms and quelling unrest through military force or the 
threat thereof.  
The most important of the social reforms was the public unveiling of the female 
aristocracy during the celebration of Jeshn in 1959.  This was the first direct challenge to the 
status quo with the religious community since Amanullah attempted the same reforms, which 
partly led to his abdication. This unveiling (the women stood in public exposing their head and 
shoulders) signified to the public that it was a woman’s choice to cover themselves, which had 
been a religious tradition (purdah).  This created a stir among some of the more conservative 
local mullahs, who challenged the government’s decision. However, they were no match for 
Daoud’s new cadre of religious scholars and the authorities at Madrasa Ulum-i Sharia, all of 
whom supported the unveiling (Wilber, 1956, 107).  The confrontation dissipated as local 
mullahs lacked the intellectual capacity to confront the new religious leadership, and more 
importantly realized there was little public support for their cause (Dupree, 1973, 532). 
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 Religious agitation over the unveiling would arise again in Kandahar when the 
government began enforcing land taxes, which had been overlooked for decades. Each year 
Kandahari landlords and local officials would defy the governor’s call for taxes by marching to 
the local mosque and declaring bast, or sanctuary.  Traditionally the governor would cede to the 
local leaders demands and withdraw the tax request.  In 1959, the course of events took a 
different turn, instead of allowing local leaders to declare bast, police blocked the entrance to the 
mosque.  Religious leaders and landowners immediately roused the locals to protest and riot the 
governments actions.  The central government in Kabul quickly responded by sacking the local 
leaders and installing an army general as governor who utilized the military to subdue the unrest 
(ibid, 537). This would mark the first time in decades the central government dared challenge the 
tribal establishment or the religious authorities in the area.  Additionally, the lack of backlash 
from the tribal communities demonstrated that Pashtun’s acquiescence of central government 
authority.   
The military’s speed and reaction was again exemplified in Khost where Mangal and 
Zadran eastern tribes were fighting over land use.  Where, for among other reasons, the tribes 
were irritated over the installation of roads, which they viewed as government encroachment.  
They viewed the roads as threatening a source of revenue, which they derived from taxing 
caravan traffic (Reardon, 1969, 160).   Furthermore, these tribal groups had assisted Nadir Shah 
in his overthrow in 1929 and had traditionally been given near autonomy from the government.  
These roads were seen as breaking this thirty year old implicit agreement (Dupree, 1973, 534).  
A government official was sent to arbitrate the problem but was shot dead, reportedly by 
accident. Never the less, the government reacted by quickly mobilizing the military who sent 
thousands of Mangal across the border.  Although the confusion was quickly cleared up and all 
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Mangal tribesmen were given amnesty and allowed back into the country, it was the first time a 
tribal group had fled at the sight of the government’s garrisons without any sort of confrontation 
(and the Mangal tribe non the less, which was known one of the more powerful and pugnacious 
tribes (Wilber, 1956, 103)), again a testament to the strength of the military at this time (Dupree, 
1973, 534).   
 The development of the military as a new mechanism of coercion coupled with the 
emergence of a more progressive clergy has allowed the government to pursue economic and 
social reforms more aggressively than its predecessors.  With the support of these new 
progressive religious authorities coupled with the threat of military action, Daoud was able to 
directly confront the conservative ulama and local mullahs as well as the tribal establishment, 
which was met with minimal physical conflict. It appears the mere threat of military action has 
preemptively quelled minor eruptions in discord. This rebalancing of the patron client 
relationship has now allowed the government to give less (or in this case pursue social and 
economic reforms at a quicker pace) but expect the same support from a now relatively weaker 
religious and tribal establishment.   
Conclusion 
By playing to Pashtun nationalistic concerns, Daoud, through a Loya Jirga, managed to 
garner approval for foreign aid that substantially increased the size and professionalism of the 
military.  Coupled with this, the Musahiban monarchy had created an educational system, which 
taught a more progressive view, as a counterweight to the maktabs of the rural villages, as well 
as instill nationalistic ideology. As a rational actor, the Musahiban monarchy was able to 
strengthen their own patronal position via increased military spending, at the same time 
weakening the positions of the clergy through a competing educational system.  Additionally, the 
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monarchy promoted nationalistic ideology and allegiance through the education system, military, 
and development programs.  The patronage relationship between the two groups hasn’t broken, 
only tilted further in favor of the monarchy.  
Through the era of the Musahiban monarchy (1929 – 1963), the government realized the 
importance of garnering Pashtun tribal and religious support as a prerequisite to stay in power 
and maintain stability. Nadir solidified the central government’s relationship with the Pashtuns 
through his initial policies, specifically the 1931 constitution.  The constitution absorbed and 
utilized the tribal structure throughout government, and ceded control of issues of especial 
importance to the Pashtun communities through the Loya Jirga.  In the same fashion, the Pashtun 
religious community was absorbed into government and policies placating to the group were 
implemented.  At the same time, the Musahiban government pursued gradual economic and 
development initiatives.  These reforms included irrigation and cultivation schemes that 
benefitted landless Pashtuns, while avoiding increasing the burden of taxes on the Pashtun tribal 
communities.  Only after decades of building allegiance among the Pashtun tribes via the 
educational system and military, coinciding with the creation of a progressive religious narrative, 
did the Musahiban monarchy attempt to challenge the religious and tribal communities.  Further 
analysis of this era is to follow under the last chapter, ‘Comparative Analysis’.   
This concludes the first era under analysis starting from Nadir’s ascension to the thrown 
in 1929 to Daoud’s abdication in 1963.  Daoud’s accomplishments would not over shadow his 
obstinacy relating to the Pashtuninstan cause, which ultimately pushed the royal family to call 
for his resignation.  King Zahir Shah would take the reigns of the country and lead the nation 
into a new era, marked by the dissolution of the 1931 constitution and the creation of a new 
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constitution in 1964.  This new era would mark the beginning of a chaotic time for Afghanistan, 
eventually leading to decades of war.   
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CHAPTER 4 
HISTORICAL INTERLUDE 
New Democracy Era (1963 – 1973) 
 The New Democracy period, under Zahir Shah, began with a new constitution in 1964 
and parliamentary elections in 1965.  Although political parties were banned from the election 
process, unofficial parties were formed, most notably the People’s Democratic Party of 
Afghanistan (PDPA).   The PDPA was essentially rival elements of the various communist 
orientated factions, consisting of the Khalq faction (the masses) led by Nur Mohammed Taraki 
and Hafizuallah Amin, and the Parcham faction (banner) led by Babrak Karmal (Fitzgerald, 
2009, 106). These communist groups would call for secular reforms which emboldened the 
religious right led by the Mujaddidi family and other new more reactionary groups. These left 
and right wing groups would drastically overshadow the liberal reformers whom had fought for 
the new constitution. PDPA protests would eventually challenge the authority of the king who 
responded by using live ammunition to subdue the protestors, hundreds were injured and three 
dead.  The religious community also began to protest the government’s modernizing policies, 
revolts emerged in the various parts of the Pashtun south and southeast, something the religious 
establishment refrained from participating in for decades (Hyman, 1984, 61) This growing unrest 
culminated in the overthrow of Zahir by his cousin Daoud and the support of left leaning military 
officers in 1973.  Daoud would declare the country a republic, thus ending the Musahiban 
monarchy (ibid, 64).   
The Second Era of Daoud (1973 – 1978) and the Saur Revolution 
 Daoud’s bloodless coup d’état was generally welcomed by Afghan society many of 
whom yearned for the less chaotic days before the New Democracy.  Daoud began his reign by 
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alienating the leftists whom had brought him to power then aggressively subduing Islamic 
fundamentalist groups, many of whom fled to Pakistan. As Daoud continued to alienate the 
leftists groups, the Parchamis and Khalqis continued to infiltrate and recruit members of the 
military and civil servants, which would lead to another coup d’état in 1978.  This effectively 
ended the Musahiban dynasty after nearly fifty years of leadership. 
The Saur Revolution took place on April 27th 1978 (Saur meaning April), was more or 
less a coup d’état then a revolution due PDPA’s lack of popular support. The Khalq leader 
Taraki would become the president, and implement drastic new land reform measures and social 
reforms (education for women and regulation of bride prices), which were met with outright 
hostility among the tribal and religious communities, eventually leading to war.  The violence 
began in Herat in 1979, when the religious community rebelled against the communist campaign 
of women’s education, which eventually led to nearly every province in a state of rebellion. This 
eventually led to Soviet intervention who installed Karmal as the new leader in 1979 (Hyman, 
1984). 
Soviet War in Afghanistan (1979 – 1989) and the Mujahedin  
The outcome of the Soviet invasion was utter chaos and destruction. An estimated 1.5 
million people died and 5.5 million became refugees in either Pakistan or Iran, which is roughly 
a third of the population (Kaplan, 2001, 11).  Over 1800 schools were destroyed as well as over 
40 hospitals and health centers (Loyn, 2009, 157).  In one year alone over a quarter of the 
irrigation system was destroyed and half of farmers’ fields were bombed and their livestock 
slaughtered (Kaplan, 2001, 12).  The country would also become a hotspot of international 
interest as the American government sought to undermine Soviet influence in the arena, the 
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Saudi government sought to undermine communism and atheism, and the Pakistanis built an 
Islamic ideological base to counter Pashtunistan nationalism. What emerged from this chaos 
were Islamic reactionary militant groups.   
Islamism in Afghanistan largely stems back to the 1950’s at Kabul University, where 
professors of theology taught the messages they brought back as students at Al Azhar in Egypt, 
specifically the teachings of Sayyid Qutb and Hasan al Banna of the Muslim Brotherhood. They 
preached Islam as a political system and the Koran as the dominant tool of interpretation, as 
opposed to the ulama traditionalists whom participate in other sources of interpretation and 
authority such as qyas (reasoning by analogy) and ijma (the consensus of religious authority), 
and traditionally haven’t participated in politics. Politics, the traditionalists believe, are derived 
from a Muslim society, which dictates the various aspects of the state.  Islamists essentially view 
the state and politics from an opposing point of view; “the nature of society is predetermined by 
the nature of the state.” (Roy, 1986, 80)  
 After Soviet invasion the Islamists and traditional ulama would reorganize in Pakistan 
and form various mujahidin groups, seven of which would be the primary clients of Pakistani 
support.  The group of seven was made up of three Islamist groups and four traditionalist groups.  
The Islamist groups would prove to be much more organized and effective in fighting the 
Soviets, then subsequently fighting themselves following Soviet withdrawal.  The most 
prominent of these groups was Hizb-i Islami led by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar.  Hekmatyar was an 
engineering student know for his radical Islamic point of views which included dousing 
inappropriately dressed women with acid and even spent two years in prison on accusations of 
murdering a Maoist student (Jones, 2006, 20). Hizb drew its influence from the southern Pashtun 
area particularly among intellectuals (Roy, 1986, 111).  Jamiat-i Islami was the other major 
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Islamist party.  Jamiat was led by Burhanuddin Rabbani  and Ahmed Shah Massoud, both of 
whom were Tajik. After Soviet withdrawal Jamiat and Hizb were the primary forces vying for 
power in what turned into a bloody and chaotic civil war.   
Pakistan during this period would have the most to risk if the Soviets successfully 
implemented a communist state. The country had only recently come under new leadership after 
a successful coup attempt by Mohammad Zia ul Haq in 1977.  Zia would turn to Islam to unify 
the country and to counter the nationalistic tendencies of the Pashtuns, which was strengthened 
under the communist movement (Nojumi, 2002, 128). He proclaimed Pakistan an Islamic state 
and promoted a religious mentality throughout the military and other government agencies (Coll, 
2004, 62).   Creating an Islamic bloc would also strengthen his position against India, with whom 
there was ongoing hostilities (Marsden, 2002, 28).  This promotion of Islamic ideology created 
by Zia, in offsetting Indian supremacy and Pashtun nationalism, would eventually create an 
atmosphere where Islamic fundamentalism would thrive and the Taliban would eventually 
emerge.   
Post Soviet Withdrawal and Civil War (1989 – 1996) 
After Soviet withdrawal in 1989 they would leave President Najibullah at the mercy of 
the mujahidin commanders who would take back power in April 1992.  Jamiat Islami (Islamic 
Society), an ISI sponsor, would take control of Kabul which would lead to an ugly civil war.  
Jamiat Islami was led by Burhannudin Rabbani, who would become president and his key 
commander Ahmed Shah Masoud would become defense minister.  Masoud had been a key 
force in the fight against the Soviets, fighting from the Panjshir Valley in the northeast; he was 
given the nickname “the lion of the Panjshir”.  He was also a bitter rival of Hekmatyar (Marsden, 
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2002, 29).  Hekmatyar started launching rockets indiscriminately into Kabul, and a second civil 
war would break out.  Much of the civil war was inspired by the fact that Rabbani and Masoud 
were Tajik and not Pashtun.  Pakistan, aware of these ethnic divides would continue to back 
Hekmatyar, but with hesitation.  His failure to take Kabul would push the ISI to look for new 
clients (Rashid, 2001, 21).   
 During this period warlords took over the provinces and bandits took over the highways, 
it was a dizzying act of violence as various factions would align together then turn on each.  The 
country turned into a lawless state as bandits and warlords ransacked and raided homes and 
villages. From this chaos and violence emerged a pious group of religious students known as the 
Taliban (ibid, 21) 
Taliban Government (1996 – 2001) 
 The Taliban movement began seemingly as a meaningful group of rural madrassas 
students attempting to bring an end to corruption and bring peace to a war ravaged country.  
Their initial goals, simple and innocuous, were to take control of Afghanistan to end the civil 
war, disarm the militias with force or otherwise, and enforce Islamic law. Many believe the 
Taliban first came about when a neighbor of Mullah Omar had asked him to free two teenage 
girls that had been abducted, and assumed to be sexually mistreated by local warlords.  Omar 
collected his colleagues, a group of students and teachers (talibs and mullahs) and set out to free 
the girls, which eventually left the warlord hanging dead off the barrel of a tank (Rashid, 2001).  
In the early days of the Taliban existence stories like this were many, they would help the needy 
and ask for nothing in return, they were viewed as noble and unselfish, a stark contrast to the 
other militants.  
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The Taliban’s emergence was also spurred by Pakistani influence and specifically the 
influence of the Jamiat-e Ulema Islam (JUI).  The JUI held little clout until the 1993 elections, 
but were allowed to build madrassas without interference from the government.  President Zia 
allowed madrassas of all variations of Islam during his reign from 1978 to 1988.  During this 
period nearly 32,000 new madrassas were built.  The JUI built madrassas along the Northwest 
Frontier Province (NWFP), where they would educate underprivileged Pakistanis and Afghan 
refugees (Rashid, 2001).  The JUI and its madrassas taught the Deobandi variation of Islam 
which in general has an anti modernist tilt.  These madrassas taught the future Taliban leaders 
and became the recruitment ground of Taliban warriors (Rashid, 2001). 
 As the Taliban emerged from the madrassas along the Pakistani border, Afghanistan was 
falling into virtual chaos.  The country was split up amongst the various ethnic groups and their 
corresponding warlords.  At this time in 1994 the Tajik run Rabbani government controlled 
Kabul and the northeast section of the country, the Tajik warlord Ismael Khan controlled Herat 
and the surrounding provinces, Pashtun Islamist Gulbuddin Hekmatyar controlled a small area 
east and south of Kabul, Uzbek warlord Rashid Dostum controlled six provinces in the north, the 
Hazaras controlled areas in central Afghanistan, and various Pashtun warlords controlled the east 
and south of the country. With the help of eager jihadists and support from their Pakistani 
patrons, the Taliban went on to take over the country and run the Masoud and Rabbani out of 
Kabul, sending them fleeing to the north where they would control roughly 10% of the country 
through the Taliban era (Rashid, 2001).   
As the Taliban movement took charge of various provinces of Afghanistan they began to 
enforce strict religious laws, abiding by their version of Sharia, which they’ve become 
notoriously known for.  Women were told to cease going to work and school and were forced to 
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stay at home with the exception of travel with a male blood relative and only while wearing the 
burka which covered the entire body including the face and eyes.  Men were forced to grow 
beards and go to mosque five times a day. Nearly all sources of vice and entertainment were 
banned this included movies, tv, music and photography to name a few. New draconian rules on 
punishment were enforced which included public stoning to death of adulterers, amputations of 
thieves, and public forums of execution for more serious criminal activity (Nojumi, 2002).  The 
Taliban treatment of the Hazaras was especially brutal.  The group committed numerous 
massacres against the Hazaras community, the largest of which occurred in Mazar Sharif then 
again in the Hazarjat with the blessing of Mullah Omar (Rashid, 2001). Even within the Pashtun 
communities (Durrani and non Durrani alike) divisions emerged.  The Pashtuns originally had 
welcomed the pious group whom were thought to be able to bring peace to the country, but as 
war persisted and strict observance of Sharia law was enforced these divisions deepened.  This 
strict observance of Sharia law created unease within Pashtun urban areas such as Kabul and 
Herat, which were traditionally relatively liberal communities (Rashid, 2001). Pakistani and 
Arab presence under Taliban auspices also had a very alienating effect on the Afghan people.  As 
Pakistani and Arab fighters had filled Taliban ranks during the original revolt under the Taliban, 
now this foreign presence was becoming a peculiarity to a country that spent ten grueling years 
fighting against another foreign presence, the USSR (Tomsen, 2000).  Osama Bin Laden and his 
055 Brigade had training camps set up throughout Afghanistan and had instigated military strikes 
in the form of United States cruise missiles (Coll, 2005).  
The ideological background of the Taliban is a unique mixture of Pashtunwali and the 
Deobandi school of religious thought, it’s worth noting their ideology due to their relevance in 
modern day Afghan politics and conflict.  Their ideology stems from numerous influences yet 
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stands as a unique movement unlike any of the ideological platforms it’s derived from. The 
group is generally made up of Pashtuns, which traditionally follow Pashtunwali and their 
religious beliefs stem from the Deobandi madrassas they attended.  These two culture 
characteristics are coupled with the Arab Wahhabi influence in the region.  But by and large the 
Taliban are the offspring of a war torn country, “literally the orphans of the war, the rootless and 
the restless.” (Rashid, 2001, 32)   
The Deoband movement subscribes to the Hanafi school of law within Sunni Islam.  This 
group originated in Deoband India in 1866 under British rule.  The movement arose to counter 
western ideology as religious leaders believed their society was losing its identity to the British.  
The movement eventually developed into a forceful political organization called the Jamiat 
Ulama Hind, to challenge British authority.  This organization would evolve into the Jamiat 
Ulama Islami  (JUI) in Pakistan (Reetz, 2008).  The JUI, as mentioned above, was given the 
authority to freely build madrassas throughout the Pakistan Afghan border which would 
eventually house Afghan refugees and become the ideological birthplace of the Taliban 
leadership (Rashid, 2001).  The Deoband school represents a conservative religious ideology in 
that it applies traditional jurisprudence to modern day problems and applies a strict interpretation 
of Islam.  This strict interpretation suggests a limited role for women and a deep revulsion 
towards Shiites (Rashid, 1998).  
 It’s unclear what the potential longevity of the Taliban government was.  Many analysts 
cited the on going alienation and subjugation of the various minority groups and the growing 
displeasure among the Pashtuns themselves, suggesting the Taliban’s position in power was 
beginning to wane.   In any event, the United States invasion of the country, in retaliation to the 
attacks on September 11th 2001 by Osama bin Laden and his Al Qaeda network, would end the 
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Taliban reign in the country and a new government led by Popalzai Durrani, Hamid Karzai 
would be installed.  Although, this did not mark the end of Taliban influence in the country as 
they continue to agitate American forces and disrupt and attack government installations as well 
as terrorize the population in general.  This era under Karzai is the second era under analysis and 
the focal point of this thesis. 
 Since the reign of Nadir Shah, the power and patronage of the Pashtun south and east has 
evolve.  Nadir consolidated his power through the support of the Pashtun tribal and religious 
communities.  Over the period of the Musahiban dynasty tribal relations with the monarchy 
remained strong while the religious community was sufficiently coopted and their power would 
deteriorate.  Much would change following the New Democracy era in 1964, communist parties 
and reactionary Islamists would emerge. The communists would eventually take over the country 
leading to a state of chaos and Soviet intervention.  This set the stage for emergence of Islamic 
radical warlords and supra tribal tendencies, mujahidin jihadists who fought the Soviets and the 
communist elements of the country.  These warlords, through the support of their Pakistani, 
American, and Saudi patrons, would emerge as the new regional leaders superseding the 
traditional tribal structure.  As the communists fell and civil war broke out among the various 
mujahidin factions, the Taliban would emerge with the support of their Pakistani patrons, and 
consolidate power in the country.  This created a new power dynamic in Afghanistan, where the 
warlords lost support of their patrons and many were forced to flee the country.  Local mullahs 
and ulema were given newfound influence in the newly formed ultra conservative republic, while 
many of the Pashtun tribal areas were left to their own devices.  The societal structure would be 
upended by the US invasion in 2001.  The emasculated warlords would reemerge as a tool to 
topple the Taliban and track down al Qaeda. This would result in a newly formed societal 
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structure which supported warlordism and emasculated the religious community. This is the 
societal structure under examination today, supported by the current Karzai government and its 
US patrons.  The forthcoming analysis, is meant to illustrate how, under the current societal 
structure, Pashtun tribal and religious communities have become alienated and have led many to 
join the insurgency, leading to further instability.   
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CHAPTER 5 
THE KARZAI GOVERNMENT; AN ERA OF INSTABILITY 
The second part of this analysis is meant to highlight the role the Pashtun communities 
play in the current conflict in Afghanistan, the importance of this role, and why Pashtuns are 
participating in the conflict and joining the insurgency. Furthermore, the analysis will 
demonstrate the complexities of the insurgency, in an effort to demonstrate how the conflict isn’t 
simply predicated on discord between a radical strand of Islam and secular forces.   Similarly to 
the previous period under analysis, the Musahiban period (1929 – 1963), the Karzai government 
in tandem with the US and other international participants, has embarked on numerous social and 
developmental initiatives.  However, in stark contrast to the Musahiban period, Karzai has 
created disenfranchised Pashtun communities, who have become the primary source of conflict 
and insurgency in the country. This chapter will utilize the rational choice theory as well as 
political clientelism in analyzing the reasons behind Pashtun discontent and why they’ve become 
the backbone of the insurgency.  The chapter is broken up into three sections.  First, an analysis 
of the initial US invasion and the creation of a new government, highlighting how US actions 
during the invasion have supported the re-emergence of warlordism, which is further supported 
by the electoral process, as well as generally alienating the Pashtun communities at the national 
level.  The second section will discuss how these warlords have undermined the traditional 
Pashtun tribal structure and have thrived and contributed to the on going conflict.  The last 
section will examine other primary reasons contributing to the Pashtun’s support the insurgency. 
This includes economic deprivation, disproportionate military targeting of the Pashtun 
communities, and the role religion plays.  The following chapter will compare the two periods, 
the current Karzai government and the Musahiban monarchy, in an effort to demonstrate the 
importance of the Pashtun role in the insurgency and why the current dynamic exists.   
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Before going forward, it should be understood, the primary difference between the two 
eras under examination is the existence of a foreign occupation. This occupation, led by the 
United States and its NATO allies, and supported by the United Nations, is a primary component 
of the chaos that ensues today. In essence the conflict is a rejection of these forces, in similar 
fashion to the Pashtun rejection of British forces during the three Anglo Afghan wars and the 
Russian forces through the 1980s. With that said, the analysis will examine how the patronage 
structure stemming from the United States and its support of Karzai, has exacerbated the 
rejection of the central state and foreign forces, which in turn, has led to the conflict and chaos 
that exists today. 
Part 1 - The US Invasion and the Emergence of a New Government 
 Macdonald’s rational choice definition posits that “actors will select the behavior that 
provides them with the most subjective expected utility from a set of possible behaviors.” 
(Macdonald, 2003, 552) The subjective nature of the definition provides an applicable 
framework in which to analyze both American actions during the initial invasion of Afghanistan 
in 2001, as well as Karzai’s support of these actions.  As will be discussed, American policy was 
to track down al Qaeda and dismantle the Taliban government as quickly and efficiently as 
possible.  They utilized emasculated Tajik and Uzbek warlords with little cost or military 
commitment.  This strategy was effective in the short term, but would have a negative impact on 
stability in the long term.  Karzai, after ascending to power, would continue to support the new 
power structure and utilize this dynamic to support his own position. The following analysis will 
discuss the power dynamic that emerged, which was ultimately supported by the electoral 
system.   
 
 
93 
Initial Invasion, Reemergence of the Northern Alliance 
After the September 11th attacks it quickly became apparent that the US military was 
unusually unprepared for military involvement in Afghanistan.  Afghanistan had historically 
been a place where super powers, like Russia and Britain, had drastically underestimated the 
tenacity of Afghan fighters as well as the impact of mountainous terrain on military operations.   
These unbearable fighting conditions coupled with a historical lack of US interest in the area 
contributed to the unprepared nature of US military forces (Woodward, 2002).  The American’s 
would initially depend on the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), who had been involved in the 
area providing military and financial support to warlords fighting the Soviets.  They would lead 
the operations but would be heavily dependent on Afghan militias, specifically the Tajik and 
Uzbek dominated Northern Alliance (NA) (Coll,2005).  
A CIA team, saddled with millions of dollars to disperse to militias, entered Afghanistan 
on September 26, 2001, roughly two weeks after the September 11th attacks. This team was 
placed in the Panjshir Valley of northern Afghanistan near the NA/Taliban front lines.  Gary 
Schroen, the leader of the CIA team, advocated the bombing of the NA/Taliban frontlines which 
would drastically improve the position of the NA and inevitably allowing them to take the capital 
Kabul (Schroen, 2005).  This strategy would be the quickest in terms of military movement and 
displacing the Taliban, but it would leave the power in the hands of the NA whom were made up 
of minority groups of Tajiks and Uzbeks as well as notorious warlords whom had contributed to 
past atrocities in the country. The alternative to this was waiting for Pashtuns to mobilize, who 
were far behind the NA militarily.  This assessment, although a more logical path, required 
patience; patience that the administration didn’t have.   
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As the rational actor model suggests, the actor attempts to maximize the utility of their 
actions (Green, 1994). As it relates to this case the American government, specifically the 
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and President George Bush, they initially pursued goals 
meant to show gains in the ‘war on terror’ at a minimal cost (which excluded any sort of nation 
building (Woodward, 2002)); both in terms of American military lives and financial cost.  This 
gave way to the ‘light footprint’ approach which minimized American ‘boots on ground’, and 
utilized a sustained bombing campaign coupled with supporting Tajik and Uzbek warlords of the 
NA to take Kabul, and to a lesser extent Pashtun warlords in the south. The US “delivered 767 
tons of supplies and $70 million, sufficient to equip and fund and estimated 50,000 militia men.” 
(Giustozzi, 2009, 88) By the end of 2001 these northern mujahidin commanders would rearm 
and remobilize their foot soldiers, eventually totaling a ‘few hundred thousand’ men under their 
command (ibid. 89). 
This strategy led to a break in the Taliban line and General Fahim, the commander of the 
NA, taking control of Kabul on November 14th, 2001. With Kabul firmly in the hands of the NA 
and Pashtun resistance still largely in disarray, negotiations of future governments would be 
largely tilted in the favor of the ethnic minorities of the NA and its warlords (Dobbins, 2008).   
Prior to the American invasion major warlords in the north had significantly loss their 
base of power, which had reached its pinnacle during the civil war.  The major commanders in 
the north consisted of Ismael Khan, Abdul Rashid Dostum, Mohammad Mohaqqeq, and 
Mohammad Atta; commander of the NA General Fahim occupied Kabul after the Taliban regime 
had been overthrown.  Ismael Kahn was a Tajik warlord and commander within Jamiat-i Islami 
(the group formerly led by Masoud, and now Fahim) who enjoyed autonomy in his area of 
control, which included various provinces of the west bordering Iran, centered around his 
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homeland of Herat.   Dostum was an Uzbek and commander of Junbesh-I Milli Islami, who had 
joined the NA in an effort to fight the Taliban.  His area of concern was in the northern provinces 
bordering Uzbekistan, centered around Balkh province and its capital Mazar-i Sharif.  Mohaqqeq 
was a prominent Hazara commander within the ethnic groups largest militia, Hizb-i Wahdat, 
where it mainly operated in central areas of the country where large majorities of Hazaras lived, 
such as Bamiyan and Uruzgan provinces. Collectively these commanders had handedly been 
defeated by the Taliban but would reemerge with the help of US support (Giustozzi, 2009).  The 
various Pashtun warlords, discussed later in the chapter, were even less relevant prior to US 
invasion; due to Taliban monopolization of power in the Pashtun dominated south and east, but 
would soon reemerge.   
With Kabul firmly in the hands of the Northern Alliance, the United States quickly 
pressed for an agreement among the factions to create a new and representative government.  
This was a difficult proposition due to the fact the it wasn’t a peace agreement between warring 
factions, but a collective agreement between members of the anti Taliban coalition, whom held 
little to no authority in the country prior to US involvement.  This would create an agreement 
among once hostile minority factions without consideration of the historically dominant and 
largest ethnic group in the country, the Pashtuns (Harpviken, 2002, 877).  Regardless of the lack 
of popular legitimacy, the anti Taliban coalition met in Bonn Germany, under the hospices of the 
United Nations (but primarily influenced by the United States), in December, 2001.   
Bonn Process 
The primary objective of the Bonn Conference was to map out a plan towards popular 
elections, elect a leader for this transitional period and his cabinet. The international community 
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was led by James Dobbins, a US career diplomat and Lakhdar Brahimi, a well regarded Algerian 
ex foreign minister. The international community also had representatives from Pakistan, Iran, 
and Russia.  The international community tended to focus their attention on maintaining 
territorial integrity, installing the basic structure of a government, and moving towards popular 
elections, rather than with legitimacy and proper representation (Starr, 2005). The Bonn 
conference established just this; they created the Afghan Interim Authority, which would govern 
for six months.  During that time an Emergency Loya Jirga would convene to create a 
Transitional Authority, which would presumably be more representative then the former.  The 
Transitional Authority would govern for two year at which time a Constitutional Loya Jirga 
would convene to create a new constitution.  The Transitional Authority would cede control after 
the implementation of popular elections (Jalali, 2003, 176).   Below is a time line to illustrate this 
process. *Taken from Thomas Johnson’s article published by Strategic Insights (Johnson, 2006) 
  
 
The task of finding a leader capable but also unconnected to the Taliban or other 
infamous warlords proved difficult.  The most obvious solution was to reinstall the former king 
of Afghanistan, Zahir Shah currently residing in Rome. Unfortunately, the Shah in his old age 
(nearly 90 at this point) no longer had political ambitions and chose to act as a symbolic figure 
Figure 3 – Bonn Process Timeline 
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and in support of the future government. Hamid Karzai emerged as a name most parties accepted 
and heavily promoted by the Americans (Johnson, 2006).  He was the debonair, well educated 
son of Abdul Ahad Karzai, an ex Deputy Speaker of Parliament and Senator, arguably the head 
of the Popalzai Durrani tribe (a royalty linage, the same tribe as Ahmed Shah Durrani), and 
supporter of the royal family. Karzai, now a leader within the Popalzai tribe, also participated 
during the Soviet occupation where he had worked in a non military capacity with the National 
Front (Sebghatullah Mujadeddi, one of the smallest Peshawar based groups) (Misdaq, 2006). He 
was appointed a Deputy Foreign Minister with the mujahidin government and asked to work as a 
UN liaison for the Taliban, which he decline.  In fact, after his initial support of the Taliban he 
quickly soured to their brutal and radical beliefs.  As the US invaded Afghanistan, Karzai 
contacted the US embassy in Islamabad to inform them he intended to enter southern 
Afghanistan, rather callously, by motorbike and rally his fellow tribesmen against the Taliban.  
After he entered the country the CIA installed a team to support his efforts, as well as US 
military aerial weaponry (Berntsen, 2005, 82).  
Karzai’s nomination to lead the Interim Authority garnered support from all parties, most 
importantly of which the Americans.  The Iranians, Russians, and Pakistanis all viewed Karzai as 
acceptable and a person with little ties to the Taliban government.  Zahir supported the choice 
also, for Karzai came from a prominent family, which had always been loyal supporters of the 
monarchy.  The NA found him at the very least tolerable, Karzai had not taken much part in the 
mujahidin fighting post the Soviet withdrawal, therefore had not cultivated enemies on the battle 
field (Misdaq, 2006). This would commence Karzai’s reign as head of the Afghan government.    
With an interim head picked, now came the much more difficult task of creating a 
representative government.  The Northern Alliance, with US support of its warlords and control 
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of Kabul had little reason to relinquish any authority. Of the 29 different portfolios, 16 were 
distributed to NA members and the most powerful ministries went to the NA Tajik leadership.  
Commander of NA forces, General Fahim, received the Defense portfolio as well as a vice 
chairmanship.  NA representative of the negotiations and Massoud protégé, Yunus Qanooni, 
received the Interior Minister positions.  Lastly Abdullah Abdulllah, a senior representative of 
the NA, received the foreign ministry portfolio.  This solidified NA’s control over internal 
security, allowing them to maintain their militias in Kabul and strengthen their position in the 
central government (Dobbins, 2008).   
 The conclusion of the Bonn Conference was internationally acclaimed as a success and 
the beginning of new hope in Afghanistan.  In reality there was flagrant flaws relating to the 
under representation of the Pashtun communities and the disproportionate representation of 
northern warlords.  Although Pashtuns still had high hopes leading into the Emergency Loya 
Jirga, which was to create the Transitional Authority. “(T)hey expected that he (Karzai) would 
make far-reaching changes, work closely with Afghanistan's Pashtun former monarch, reduce the 
power of regional warlords and build a new government that reflected Pashtuns' numerical 
strength.” (Constable, 2002, A01) Unfortunately this wouldn’t come to fruition.   
The jirga was to convene with 1450 members throughout the country who would choose 
a new leader and its cabinet.  1051 of the delegates would be selected among local leaders in the 
intelligence personal and warlords, the Human Rights Watch reported as follows: 
“At the first and second stages of the selection process, Human Rights Watch 
documented several cases in which local warlords directly or indirectly intimidated 
delegates through threats and the heavy presence of armed troops. Delegates complained 
of a widespread and systematic pattern of intimidation and threats by warlords and 
regional leaders, covert and overt surveillance by intelligence agents allied with the 
Tajik-dominated Northern Alliance, and a general failure by the loya jirga commission, 
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relevant U.N. officials, and other international actors to enforce provisions in the Bonn 
Agreement and the loya jirga procedures that were meant to sideline Afghan military 
leaders and Afghans with records of serious human rights abuses.” *HRW – 
Afghanistan’s Bonn Agreement One Year Later (HRW, 2002) 
 The jirga did reinforce the legitimacy of Karzai as leader, who garnered the support of 
the Tajik mujahidin government president (in the early 1990’s) Rabbani, and more importantly 
Zahir Shah back Karzai as well.  This led to a near sweep, continuing Karzai’s leadership role.  
In terms of the make up of the Transitional Authority’s administration, Pashtun’s increased their 
membership from 11 to 16 (which was clearly an attempt by Karzai to placate to Pashtuns and 
rectify the Interim’s Authority under representation of the group), but the security positions were 
still controlled by the Tajiks.  The more relevant newly appointed administrative positions are 
listed below. (Johnson, 2006).   
Transitional Authority Position Name Ethnicity 
   President Hamid Karzai Pashtun 
Deputy President Mohammaed Fahim Tajik 
Deputy President Karim Khalili Hazara 
Deputy President Abdul Qadir Pashtun 
   Special Advisor on Security Yunus Qanooni Tajik 
Defense Minister Mohammed Fahim Tajik 
Foreign Minister Abdullah Abdullah Tajik 
Finance Minister Ashraf Ghani Pashtun 
Interior Minister 
Taj Mohammed 
Wardak Pashtun 
Justice Minister Abbas Karimi Uzbek 
Education Minister Yunus Qanooni Tajik 
 
  
 
Figure 4 – Transitional Authority Cabinet Composition 
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Pashtun resentment began to simmer as they viewed this as a missed opportunity by Karzai to 
rebalance the ethnic imbalance.  This was exacerbated by the sideling of those aligned with Zahir 
Shah, and giving Zahir virtually no role in government.  The backhand to Zahir was apparently at 
the behest of US; apparently American unbridled support of Karzai left no room for a second 
Pashtun leader (Jalali, 2003, 178).  This has left Pashtuns feeling “rapidly disillusioned by a 
series of developments that have reinforced the power of rival ethnic Tajiks and militia leaders, 
left the former king politically sidelined… and subjected Pashtun villages to lethal US air 
strikes.” (Constable, 2002, A01).  This was a missed opportunity by both Karzai and his 
international backers.    
Elections 
During the two year period of the Transitional Authority a 502 member Constitutional 
Loya Jirga convened to debate and review a draft constitution presented by the government.  
They approved a constitution with a strong central government headed by a president elected by 
popular majority (every 5 years, limit of two consecutive terms), as well as two vice presidents.   
To balance presidential power a bi cameral legislative house was created; the lower house, 
Wolesi Jirga (House of People) and the upper house the Mesharano Jirga (House of Elders).  The 
two houses held similar responsibilities comparable to western democracies such as “promulgate 
laws, ratify treaties, and approve budgets” (Johnson, 2006, 10).  The lower house was elected 
directly by the people while the upper house was selected from provincial and district councils 
and a third was appoint by the president (ibid).     
 The structure of the legislative elections were particularly undermining to the traditional 
Pashtun tribal structure and the promotion of warlordism. First, since voting laws do not require 
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disclosure of financial sources warlords and drug lords had a disproportionate advantage (ICG, 
2005, 12). Second, the Karzai government chose to use a single nontransferable vote (SNTV) as 
opposed to a party list system.  The SNTV has a number of effects; first, it dramatically 
undermines political parties and creates a fractured parliament.  Second, because it creates a 
fractured parliament and undermines political parties, it reinforces the central powers of the 
president.  Third, it supports warlords whom only need a very small percentage of the vote to be 
elected.  Under this system vote buying and intimidation have an amplified effect, due to the 
small amount of people that actually need to vote for a candidate. Lastly, it creates a system 
unrepresentative of the people voting, due to the fact that the majority of votes will go to losing 
candidates (Rubin, 2005).  The international community at large, including the UN, opposed the 
SNTV system due to the above undermining effects on democracy (they supported the party list 
system as a more representative alternative).  The only parties to support the SNTV system were 
the United States and Karzai.  The US clearly didn’t want the power of its primary client in the 
country undermined (ICG, 2005, 10).   
 The SNTV system is simple.  If a province is allotted 5 representatives to the Wolesi 
Jirga (lower house of parliament) than each individual voter will have one vote.  The top five 
candidates will win the election.  To further illustrate the problem lets look at the 2005 
legislative elections for Kabul province, the most populous in the country.  In this case 387 
candidates were running for 33 seats.  The top three candidates received 13.2, 7.8, and 7.7 
percentage of the vote, respectively.  The next 30 winning candidates all received less then 3% 
each (with the bottom 20 candidates each receiving less the 1% of the vote).  Collectively the 
winning candidates throughout the country received roughly 35% of the vote, which leaves an 
astounding 65% of the vote distributed among the losing candidates. In the Kabul case, three of 
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the winning candidates won .4% of the vote each; essentially a candidate could win by stroke of 
luck (ibid, 20).   
 What added to this problem was the lack of party affiliation or banners on voter cards, as 
ruled out by Karzai.  With some candidate registries nearly 40 pages in length, and without 
political party affiliation, people reverted to whom they knew.  Individual candidates were given 
random symbols as a useless way to identify candidates; a section of a voting card is shown 
below.   
 from Thomas 
Johnson’s article, ‘Prospects of Post Conflict Taliban’, from Strategic Insights, (Johnson, 2006) 
Figure 5 – Voting Ballot 
 Predictably, warlords sustained a large presence in both houses of parliament.  In the 
2005 Wolesi Jirga (lower house) elections ex-mujahidin commanders established the largest 
block with 133 of the 249 seats, in the Mesharano Jirga (appointed by president and provincial 
councils) the warlords consisted of 34 of the 102 seats (Ghufran, 2007, 87).  The 2010 legislative 
elections were more of the same, as “former mujahidin leaders and their allies have won in 
almost all the constituencies,” (Shamel, 2010) marking another five year term dominated by 
warlords (Nordland, 2010).   
Presidential Elections; 2004, 2009 
 The 2004 presidential elections were essentially a Hamid Karzai rode show sponsored by 
American resources.  As the primary client of the United States, Karzai utilized private American 
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security firms to make appearances at the opening of development projects, delayed to open in 
the midst of campaign season, as well as other campaign related outings.  He allocated $30 
million dollars to promote registration among refugees in Pakistan whom were mostly Pashtun, 
dipped into government coffers to entertain tribal delegates, as well as freely utilized the 
airwaves, radio waves, and news media.  Other presidential hopefuls, who didn’t have US 
support, obviously were at a great disadvantage (Shahrani, 2004). 
 With the clear advantage Karzai won 55.4% of the vote, enough to avoid a run off.  The 
election was declared a success internationally and overlooked the complaints of “voter 
intimidation, voting procedures, and allegations of multiple voting and irregularities” (Johnson, 
2006, 13), to say nothing of the fact that 11.5 million people were registered among a pool of 9.8 
million eligible voters (Shahrani, 2004).  These problems would be exacerbated in the 2009 
elections.   
 The 2009 presidential elections were essentially a ‘battle of budgets’ amongst the main 
contenders. “(W)hat would constitute large scale fraud in western context meant little more to 
them (the Afghans) than the usual haggling over chick or vegetables in market.” (Abdul-Ahad, 
2009) Although 700 occurrences of fraud were reported it seemed that it was systematic across 
the entire country, where each of the main contenders men (primarily Abdullah Abdullah and 
Karzai) were positioned in a poll station, stuffing ballot boxes and paying people for their ballots 
(ibid).  As this was a battle of financing and establishing patronage with the local communities 
and its leaders, Karzai with the support and patronage of the Americans, again came out on top.   
 The point here is to illustrate the how the office of the presidency does not derive its 
legitimacy in the western sense of popular elections, but through patronage networks.  This is 
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supported by the fact that statistically the Afghan electorate votes nearly exclusively by ethnic 
lines, which created an atmosphere where “no candidate received significant support outside of 
their particular ethno-linguistic group.” (Johnson, 2006, 13) As most Pashtuns see the election 
process as a foregone conclusion, which they view is derived from the international patronage of 
Karzai, their support during election time should not be construed as true popular support among 
the Pashtuns for Karzai.  Without a perceived legitimate alternative in Pashtun leadership, 
Pashtuns will likely take their payment for their votes while possibly at the same time joining the 
insurgency.   
Conclusion 
 The American strategy of utilizing Northern Alliance warlords and militias in an effort to 
combat the Taliban would create the building blocks for the re-emergence of warlordism and the 
disproportionate influence at the national level among the Tajik and Uzbek Northern Alliance 
members.  Their influence was reinforced by the SNTV voting system.  The system also would 
support regional strongmen in the Pashtun south and east.  These strongmen, or warlords, would 
utilize the electoral system as a mechanism to garner legitimacy, which was easily done with 
their ability to buy votes and intimidate voters.  The next section will examine how the 
emergence of warlords alienated Pashtuns at the national level and undermined the tribal 
structure at the regional level, both of which furthered instability and promoted conflict.   
Part 2 - Warlordism and Society 
Under Taliban rule, warlords and local militias in the Pashtun south and east would 
become a thing of the past, while the influence of Tajik and Uzbek warlords like Ismail Khan, 
Dostum and Massud in the north and west, would drastically be reduced.  These groups would 
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reemerge as Karzai and the US established new patronage relations with the various warlords. 
The reemergence of warlordism would impact the Pashtun communities in a number of different 
ways.  The warlords in the Northern Alliance, whom now controlled government would seek 
retribution for past grievances on various Pashtun communities and generally harass Pashtuns 
which created a sense of disenfranchisement among the group.  Additionally regional Pashtun 
warlords in the south and east would emerge, creating an atmosphere of conflict and predation, 
both of these new dynamics will be discussed here.   
 As rational actors, the US seemingly had little interest other then tracking down al Qaeda 
and insurgence.  To accommodate these goals the US perceived the various warlords, especially 
the regional militia leaders of the Pashtun east and south, as the best way to quell internal unrest 
and track down insurgence.  Karzai would further support these patronage bonds by bringing 
various local Pashtun warlords into government as they often controlled the votes in their 
respective areas and were potentially too dangerous to ignore.  The support of the warlords may 
support the agenda of the US and Karzai but have had a negative impact on stability.  These 
warlords would permeate the central government down to the local level, creating an 
atmosphere, which thrives on conflict and weakens the legitimacy of both the Karzai government 
and international forces in the eyes of the disenfranchised populace.   
Before going forward it’s necessary to define what a warlord is.  In the Afghan situation 
it’s not always obvious what constitutes a warlord.  Afghan insurgency analysts Michael Bhatia 
breaks down the various militias into three groups; political-military organizations (like that of 
Jamiat Islami, the primary player in the Northern Alliance), community militias (such as the 
arbakia), and warlords and strongmen (whose strengths are derived from patronage and 
charisma, and exist at the national, regional, and local levels) (Bhatia, 2008, 73).  Antonio 
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Giustozzi, a leading expert in warlordism, defines the word in reference to the warlords of the 
north (Dostum, Ismael Khan, Masoud) as the following; 
“a legitimate, charistmatic, and patrimonial military leader with autonomous control over 
a military force capable of achieving/maintaining a monopoly of large scale violence over 
a sizeable territory.  This definition has two major implications: the warlord has little or 
no political legitimacy but nonetheless he exercises patrimonial political power over such 
territory, where central authority has either collapsed or has weakened or was never there 
in the first place.” (Giustozzi, 2009, 5) 
The Giustozzi definition pertains more to the warlords of the north who continue to operate 
under the government umbrella as well as these members that have since joined the central 
government, such as General Fahim (of the Northern Alliance).  The Bhatia definition better 
encapsulates the atmosphere in the Pashtun south where he admits clear overlaps (between the 
three definitions) exist.  A warlord could derive his strength from a tribe, as a private security 
company (PSC) operator, from government links, or illicit activity.  In all, as of 2008, there are 
roughly 1,800 strongmen (used synonymously with warlord) commanding roughly 120,000 
militia footsoldiers.  The vast majority of these warlords and soldiers are not part of the 
insurgency or trying to overtake the government (such as the Taliban or Haqqani network), an 
analysis of these groups is forthcoming (Bhatia, 2008, 16).    
 The government, for their part, with the assistance of the international community 
publically promoted the idea of demilitarization.  The primary pillars of demilitarization were the 
Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintergration of Former Combatants (DDR), the 
Disbandment of Illegal Armed Groups (DIAG), both of which fall under the Afghan New 
Beginnings Program (AFBP).  The AFBP, managed by the UNDP and the GoA, fielded some 
success.  The DDR program disarmed roughly 64,000 former officers and soldiers whom were 
now part of the Afghan Military Force (AMF) (the AMF was the formal recognition at the Bonn 
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Conference of the anti Taliban militias assisted in the American invasion) (Sedra, 2008, 130).  
This program, which ended in July of 2005 still left an estimated 1,800 militias armed, that were 
not part of the AMF (globalsecurity.org), which prompted the creation of the DIAG. DIAG was 
meant to disarm ‘illegal’ militias, which again was met with some success; according to the 
UNDP from 2005-2010 759 armed groups were dismembered and 54,138 weapons were 
collected (UNDP, 2010).   
 These achievements were offset by hypocritical policies of the international community 
(military forces as well as development agencies), the Afghan government, and Karzai’s own 
personal endeavors.  Each of these entities supported the use of warlords and their militias for 
their own means.   
Pashtun Warlords of the South and East 
 The strength and legitimacy of the Pashtun warlords is largely predicated on conflict. 
Although they may often also provide services and patronage to communities similar to a 
traditional khan, there are discernable differences. A khan derives his influence through the 
distribution of patronage, which garners him the authority to influence decision-making and 
mediate in internal conflicts and disputes.  Warlords will often try to portray the image of a khan, 
which may include solidifying support among the local elders and jirga.  The difference is the 
warlord’s primary tool of influence is through force or violent coercion or the threat thereof, and 
not patronage.  Because these strongmen derive revenues from outside the local community in 
which they control, his strength begins to supersede the traditional counter balances to the khan, 
that of the jirga and local elders.  This eventually creates an atmosphere where the villagers are 
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in a sense held captive to the warlord. As his power grows the traditional aspects of the tribal 
system become less relevant, allowing him to become more exploitative (ibid, 86). 
 Traditionally, Pashtun khans have had to compete for authority with other khans.  Their 
ability to provide patronage and hospitality, keys aspects of Pashtunwali, are the determining 
factors in maintaining their position.  Their authority ultimately rests in the hands of the qawm 
elders and jirga, meaning their authority is predicated on the approval of the tribesmen.  This 
traditional ground up approach has been undermined with the emergence of Pashtun warlords.  
They extract power from outside the qawm and force their authority on the community.  
 A typical local command hierarchy of a warlord and his militia includes close family 
members as the commanders’ bodyguards, a special force of close allies that are used for 
enforcement (the nezmi-has), and common foot soldiers consisting of the local community.  The 
nezmi-has are the loyalists who police the actions of the foot soldiers and force recruiting.  As 
one villager in Ghor province describes; 
“We stayed by force, because we couldn’t stay in our home peacefully.  If I didn’t go they 
came by force and would take my cows, money and everything in my home.  They would 
hurt us and put us in prison.  A big commander has a special force to control his own 
soldiers, also to bring new soldiers from families.  If they told us to fight, we were 
fighting.  When the commander became more powerful/rich, he never listened or 
respected the old people from the community.” (ibid, 87)   
 As these warlords feign legitimacy through the tribal structure they gain actual legitimacy 
through the implicit and explicit relations they have with the government and international 
forces, which are often indistinguishable in the eyes of the public.  Their association with the 
government furthers the perception within the public eye of the government’s inefficiency, 
corruption, and exploitation.   
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The warlords and power brokers in the upper echelons of provincial and district 
government in the Pashtun areas of southern and eastern Afghanistan have benefitted 
enormously by contracting out their militias for international development and military 
operations. While much of the financial information relating to these contracts is undisclosed, 
one estimates suggests 10-20% of all reconstruction is spent on security (which would amount to 
roughly $300-$600 million per year), not including military, state department and NGO security 
(Sherman, 2009). As of 2011, Brookings Institute estimates roughly 18,000 local private security 
contractors (PSC) were employed (Livingston, 2011), 90% of whom were employed or 
subcontracted with the US government (HRW, 2011). These militias, often operating with 
impunity, derive revenue from contracting with international and government agencies, narcotics 
smuggling, general predation, and controlling of major highways.  Human Rights Watch 
describes the PSC atmosphere as follows. 
“Private security companies have provided a vehicle for may former warlords and some 
entrepreneurial newcomers to establish a lucrative hold on armed men and territory.  
Many of these companies, particularly in conflict areas, are allegedly responsible for 
serious human rights abuses, including extrajudicial killings, arbitrary detentions, 
beatings, rapes, extortions, and smuggling.  Often this may be little more than the abuse 
of their power to settle scores and attack local rivals, or to protect their illicit business 
interest.   
Both the Afghan government and US government bear a heavy responsibility for the 
corruption and impunity of these forces, many of which have become so intertwined with 
the war economy they are now hard to dismantle.” (HRW, 2011, 50) 
 Matiullah Khan provides a case study in how one warlord extracts enormous benefit from 
controlling highway, supporting the drug trade, working with US forces and development 
agencies. He controls the highway connecting the capital of Uruzgan province, Tirin Kot, to 
Kandahar and Helmand provinces.  New York Times Afghan expert, Dexter Filkins, describes 
Matiullah as follows.  
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“It is Matiullah Khan, the head of a private army that earns millions of dollars guarding 
NATO supply convoys and fights Taliban insurgents alongside American Special Forces. 
In little more than two years, Mr. Matiullah, an illiterate former highway patrol 
commander, has grown stronger than the government of Uruzgan Province, not only 
supplanting its role in providing security but usurping its other functions, his rivals say, 
like appointing public employees and doling out government largess.” (Filkins, 2010) 
His story also reflects the interconnectedness of provincial warlords and their relations with the 
Karzai family.  Matiullah was the nephew and enforcer of Jan Mohammad Khan, the governor of 
Uruzgan from 2002-06.  Jan, an ex janitor turned mujahidin commander, led one of seven minor 
mujahidin groups to support Karzai in his initial involvement in Afghanistan (in 2001).  After the 
fall of the Taliban, Karzai appointed his loyal cohort governor of Uruzgan province, who quickly 
and ruthlessly labeled his rivals Taliban, and tipped off US Special Forces (USSF). This would 
often times push the other tribes, specifically the Ghilzai, to join the insurgency (Rutting, 2011).  
Jan also had his own lieutenant and enforcer, his nephew Matiullah.  Matiuallah was reported to 
have “led the hit squads that killed stubborn farmers who did not surrender their land, daughters, 
and livestock to the former governor (Jan Mohammad).”(Reuter, 2009) Matiullah went on to 
head the Highway Police in Uruzgan, which was shut down after allegations the department was 
nothing but a drug smuggling ring (Filkins, 2010), but Matiuallah continued to control Uruzgan 
highways, essential to foreign military and development agencies.  Today he controls a militia of 
2,000 men strong, known as the Kandak Amniante Uruzgan (KAU), and charges various 
contractors with the US government $1,500 - $3,000 per vehicle to pass (making roughly $4 -$6 
million USD a year).  This toll, which is totally outside government jurisdiction, is less for 
protection from other forces, but from Matiullah’s forces themselves, a form of extortion 
(Tierney, 2010).  His abusive behavior did not go unnoticed, the Dutch refused to take part in the 
ISAF-NATO mission in Uruzgan unless Jan Mohammad was dismissed as governor (which 
happened, and was subsequently assassinated by a suicide bomb), and refused to work or even 
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recognize Matiullah.  With that said Matiullah had support elsewhere, from the Karzai 
government, and most importantly USSF, who worked hand in hand with Matiullah’s militia 
(Filkins, 2010).   Matiullah’s acts of predation and exploitation led one Dutch diplomat in 2010 
to say “if we appoint Matiullah police chief, probably more than half of all people in the Baluchi 
valley would run over to the Taliban immediately.” (Reuter, 2010) Which, ironically, happened 
in early 2011 via appoint by Karzai himself (Scheidle, 2011). 
 General Abdul Razik exhibits many of the same traits as Matiullah; they are both 
supported by US forces and the Karzai government, have positions in government, maintain 
militias which control certain areas, traffic drugs,  derive millions in revenue from tolls as 
contractors, and exhibit violent and predatory behavior on much of the populace outside of their 
patronage networks; his example provides an additional case study.  
 Raziq is both the Border Police Chief and the Kandahar Provincial Police Chief 
controlling a militia of roughly 3,500, who reportedly takes in roughly $5 -$6 million a month 
through his control of Spin Boldak, an important opium and smuggling depot bordering Pakistan 
(Tierney, 2010).  His rise from a lowly shopkeeper prior to 2001 to one of the most powerful 
warlords in the south was attributed to a number of fortuitous circumstances but largely due to 
vast smuggling (including narcotics) revenues and US support (smuggling into Pakistan is big 
business due to the duty free agreement between Pakistan and Afghanistan, because Afghanistan 
is a free port and Pakistan has extremely high custom duties, this creates an opportunity for 
smuggling (Aikins, 2009)).  US forces have praised his combat prowess in his assistance in 
fighting the Taliban, while at the same time turning a blind eye to his drug trafficking and reports 
of bloody retribution massacres (often colored over as Taliban raids) (Aikins, 2011).  Karzai is a 
vocal supporter as well, who appointed the commander a general and police chief of Kandahar 
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after a successful raid with USSF.  Razik, in return, is a loyal supporter of Karzai; in the latest 
presidential election Spin Boldak tallied 8,341 votes for Karzai, his main competitor received 4 
(Aikins, 2009).  One unidentified Kandahar official summed up Razik’s exploitive leadership in 
the area, “When you go to an area controlled by Commander Razik, you will see the people’s 
hatred of the government, Razik is the representative of the government out there, but he’s a 
forced representative of the people. The people don’t like him, but they are forced to accept 
him.” (Peter, 2010) 
 To the east, in the provinces of Paktia, Logar, Paktika, and Khost, Padsha Khan Zadran, 
emerged as the most powerful pro-government warlord post Taliban fall.  For his initial support 
of Karzai he was given the position of governor of Paktia in the Interim government. After he 
was dismissed in the following government he began attacking government forces, killing a 
number of women and children in a Khost bazaar (Burns, 2002) and firing missiles at the new 
government in Gardez Paktia killing 36.  At the same time, 600 of his 6000-man militia were on 
US payroll to hunt down the last remnants of Al Qaeda (Fisher, 2002).  The US backed away 
from Zadran following these events and Karzai called for his arrest on murder charges, although 
there were still reports of US military utilizing Zadran’s men for intelligence (Bennet, 2002).  
Today, he controls the main checkpoints and tolls in Khost and Paktia provinces and with his 
three sons provides security for military and development convoys (charging the going rate of 
roughly $1500 per vehicle).  He was eventually pardoned by Karzai and is currently a member of 
parliament (Tierney, 2010).   
 Examples similar to the those just cited abound.  Other high level warlords in the Pashtun 
east and south include Sher Mohmad Akhundzada, Commander Ruhullah, Abdul Wali Khan, 
and Arif Noorzai.  Akhundzada and Noorzai are two of the countries top drug traffickers both 
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with substantial militias; Akhundzada was the governor of Helmand province and Noorzai held 
multiple posts including the Minister of Tribal and Frontier Affairs and was elected a member of 
parliament in 2005 (Forsberg, 2010).  Commander Ruhullah, through his relationship with the 
Popal brothers (cousins of Karzai) has monopolized control of the critical passage from Kabul to 
Kandahar charging $1500 per vehicle to pass, making tens of millions of dollars a year.  
Ruhullah’s forces, heavily infiltrated by Taliban, have been known to attack convoys that choose 
not to pay (which seems to be the norm) (Tierney, 2010).  Lastly Abdul Wali Khan, known as 
Koka, before becoming a district police chief in Helmand province, he was held for 14 months 
by US forces for insurgency activity.  As a police chief in 2006 he earned $20,000 a day 
skimming of the opium trade and was known for his ruthless killings and robberies among other 
abuses, at which time the UK forced his removal.  After Karzai insisted he be reinstated, the 
British caved and Koka continues his acts of predation as police chief, as well as operating a 
successful PSC, protecting international convoys (Tierney, 2010).   
As rational actors, these warlords have no desire to seek stability. Stability would mean 
no more lucrative PSC contracts, developers could come into the country and help farmers grow 
something other than opium, and the authority on which they are based, that of the militia, would 
disappear. As self-interested actors they have no incentive to change the chaotic atmosphere in 
the country.  The above analysis has described some of the major Pashtun warlords, but smaller 
milita groups, often associated with the commanders discussed, also exist and operate in a 
similar fashion but on a smaller scale.  Many of these smaller (as well as larger) strongmen 
utilized the Afghan National Police (ANP) to legitimize their militias, discussed below.   
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Afghan National Police (ANP)  
 The inability of the government to maintain professional security forces has created an 
unstable atmosphere and undermined the government’s legitimacy, especially in the south and 
eastern Pashtun regions.  The police, in particular, whom are often the only government officials 
in daily contact with villagers, have been especially corrupt.  As the international community 
focused their attention on the national army, the Afghan National Police was left to strongmen 
and their militias, a spoil of war. These spoils initially left a disproportionate amount of policing 
and its authority in the hands of Tajiks, which “provided an ideal way for factional leaders to 
accommodate, legitimize and eventually pay for their militia groups,” (Wilder, 2007, 3).  This 
began at the top level where Yunus Qanooni and General Fahim were designated Interior 
Minister (police fall within this department) and Defense Minister respectively.  The day-to-day 
foot soldiers were also disproportionately Tajik, in 2003 an estimated 90% of the Kabul Police 
Academy student body was Tajik, in 2007 they were still roughly two thirds (ICG, 2007).  The 
control of the ANP by the Tajiks and the harassment of Pashtuns, contributed to the overall sense 
of powerlessness and disenfranchisement among the Pashtun communities.  
Various incidences of Tajik police harassment of Pashtuns were reported throughout the 
country.  Small business owners in Ghazni reported Tajik intel officers shutting down stores and 
imprisoning the owners, only to be released after substantial bribes were paid.  In city centers 
such as Ghazni City and Kabul Pashtun men wearing turbans or beards (which represented 
Taliban style of dress) were targeted for mistreatment. For example, one man recounts a story of 
taking a bus to Kabul for medical treatment, while wearing his turban, as he always had.  At the 
checkpoint leading into Kabul, he was pulled out of the bus and interrogated as the bus left 
without him.  The police took all the old man’s money and sent him on his way; he had to 
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borrow money for medicine and bus fare from distant relatives living in the city.  Although their 
lacks hard data on Pashtun harassment, especially as it relates to mundane daily tasks, numerous 
examples like the one described have been reported, and undoubtably adds to Pashtun resentment 
of the central government (Reuter, 2009, 102).  
As the government began to rebalance the ethnic composition of the ANP (by adding 
more Pashtuns) and the insurgency grew stronger in the south, the government instituted local 
police mechanisms to assist the inefficient ANP.  The local policing mechanisms again brought 
Pashtun local militias into government, giving them funds, arms and further legitimacy, and 
completely contradicted the policies of the DDR and DIAG disarmament programs.  In 2006, the 
government created the Afghanistan National Auxiliary Police (ANAP), focusing on 124 high 
risks districts in the turbulent Pashtun south.  The recruits were given 10 days of training and an 
AK-47 (Wilder, 2007).  The ANAP, with a seemingly negligent amount of training, was met 
with near universal disapproval from the international community, with the exception of the 
United States.  General Esmatullah Dawlatzai, a senior member of the MoI, described it as 
follows, “It was made for the warlords. They were given uniforms and salaries, but they were the 
same people, committing the same crimes, with more power.” (HRW, 2011, 20) 
The ANAP, which dissolved in 2008, was eventually replaced by the Afghan Local 
Police (ALP) in 2010, meant to fill the security gap in the Pashtun south.  An ALP force was 
created upon community request and theoretically it’s members chosen from the village elders 
and jirga. The system is drastically undermined as numerous accounts suggest local strongmen 
either made the request on behalf of the jirga or controlled the jirga itself, leading again to the 
legitimization and rearming of local militias (Oxfam, 2011).  By 2010 there were numerous local 
policing units under various different names and acronyms, these groups eventually fell under 
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the umbrella of the Village Stability Operations (VSO), supported by the United States.  Each of 
the programs under this umbrella attempted to ingratiate local militias into the formal 
government structure.  One of particular interest was the Community Defense Forces (CDF), 
meant to increase security in the Pashtun south during elections time, which was a time of 
increased violence.  Karzai instituted this force, charging Mohammad Arif Noorzai to run the 
operation.  Noorzai a family friend was also one of the countries biggest drug smugglers and 
maintained his own militia. These local militias, although in many cases were able to maintain 
security were also accused of numerous electoral abuses and inevitably secured Karzai additional 
votes (HRW, 2011). 
The local defense force initiatives often times attempted to utilize the tribal arabakai but 
did so with flaws.  The government essentially created new lines of patronage either with the 
local warlord or with the individual militiamen.  From the perspective of the jirga this has an 
undermining effect. As one tribal elder describes, “in the king’s time it was an honor to be a 
member of an arabakai.  Its members were provided with rations, weapons, and ammunition by 
the jirga.” (Ruttig, 2010, 10).  Under Karzai and US influence, the jirga has been sidelined by 
the local district commander who pays these local forces.  “To pay the arabakai means to render 
it uncontrollable when payment stop” (ibid, 10).  This leads to security breakdowns when the 
arabakai isn’t paid, many of which went unpaid for months. More importantly this undermines 
the traditional tribal structure, which has been successfully utilized in the past in maintaining 
stability.  Additionally, the jirga is supplanted by local strongmen, providing them with 
additional legitimacy and authority.   
Afghan National Army (ANA) 
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 A large part of the nation building initiative was centered around the creation of a 
functioning and professional armed forces.  This is especially pertinent today due to the 
importance of having a security force to replace US forces after their planned withdrawal in 
2014.  Unfortunately, the current ANA has a myriad of problems, which don’t seem likely to be 
fixed anytime soon.  Part of the problem is due to the fractional nature of the army, which has 
become another venue of ethnic tug of war and patronage.   
 The ANA was established shortly after the Bonn Conference and was expected to 
eventually play a role in stabilizing and securing the country.  The Americans took the role of 
training the newly formed army but left the recruitment up to General Fahim, the Tajik NA 
commander, and Minister of Defense.  This initially created a Tajik dominated force, which 
consisted of roughly 55% of the officers of Tajik decent by 2004.  After pressure by the 
international community to create a more balanced force, ethnic quotas were established. 
Although today, there exists relative ethnic representation there still lacks a national character 
due to the ethnic rivalries that permeate the system.  “This is the result of the existence of rival 
patronage networks inside the army, who tend to recruit on ethnic or regional bases.” (Giustozzi, 
2009, 39) The largest of these networks centers on the chief of staff Bismillah Khan, a Tajik 
(associated with the NA), who holds the loyalty of six of the eleven brigade commanders.  The 
Minister of Defense Wardak, a Pashtun, hold the loyalty of one commander, the Hazaras 
patronage is derived from one brigade commander, while four commanders are associated with 
Uzbek General Dostum that caters to the Uzbek patronage networks.  This has created a 
fractured ethnic divide that is particularly concerning due to the importance of the institution post 
US withdrawal.  At the highest level Bismillah isn’t even on speaking terms with the MoD 
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Wardak, at the lowest level superiors rarely confront subordinates from different ethnicities due 
to problems of escalation and desertion (ibid). 
 Unlike the compulsory conscription under the Musahiban monarchy, the ANA is a 
volunteer force. Originally, under the Bush administration, the goal was to create a 70,000 man 
strong ANA.  As insurgent activity increased the Obama administration has raised the bar to 
240,000 by 2014 (currently it stands at roughly 170,000 strong).  Due to the low level of 
patriotism throughout the country and increased pressure to grow, the ANA has had to accept 
recruits from the lowest echelons of society, creating an army with a 90% illiteracy rate (the 
other 10% graduated primary school).  Many of these recruits have problems with drug use (80-
85% of recruits in some areas by one report) and alcohol, or have been sent by their community 
due to bad behavior.  These personal problems become more relevant as the ANA is forced to 
leave the barracks and participate in lengthy deployments, stemming from pressures to 
professionalize before US withdrawal.  This increased contact between the ANA and populace 
has led to a corresponding increase in acts of predation and corruption, which has started to 
mirror the notoriously corrupt national police force.  These acts of corruption include, illegal 
taxation and road blocks, theft, and other such abuses (ibid). 
 The lack of national cohesion and professionalism in the ANA could potentially be a 
cause of great concern.  If the American forces truly leave the Afghans to their own devices in 
2014, the ethnically fragmented and unprofessional ANA would most likely not only fail to 
defend against the growing insurgency but also potentially exacerbate the problem by the 
emergence of ethnic divisions similar to that of the mujahidin period.   
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Warlords of the North and West Pay Retribution 
 Although the Pashtun population is primarily located in the south and eastern part of 
Afghanistan, small Pashtun communities exist sporadically throughout the north and west.  
These communities became the target of reprisal among the Tajik and Uzbek militias now 
dominating those areas. Their experience is worth briefly recounting following the days after the 
fall of the Taliban government, as it adds to the general sense of Pashtun distrust and alienation 
from the government.   
 After the initial invasion countless numbers of acts of murder, rape, and looting 
have been document by various human rights organizations in northern Afghanistan, largely due 
to the perceived association of Pashtun communities with the Taliban.  It should be noted, the 
backlash against the northern Pashtuns was not official policy of the Karzai government who had 
given amnesty to all Taliban who laid down their weapons (Tarzi, 2008, 287), but there was 
certainly no protection given to the group.   Seemingly all major ethnic groups and their 
corresponding warlords in the north and west participated in the Pashtun atrocities.  Abuses by 
the Hazara Wahdat militia were documented by Human Rights Watch shortly after the US 
invasion.  They had visited the north central provinces from Faryab to Baghlan where they 
recorded over 150 incidences of criminal abuse, targeting Pashtuns.  This abuse included mass 
execution of 30 Pashtun men, raping of mother and daughters, and the regular occurrences of 
looting entire villages and beating its inhabitants (HRW, 2002).  In the west where Ismail Khan 
regained his power, many of the same atrocities against Pashtuns were reported (IRBD, 2004).  
Uzbek commanders under Dostum sent Pashtuns fleeing northern areas under their control in 
fear of reprisal, emptying villages near the Turkmenistan border.  A UN official summed up the 
anti Pashtun campaign by saying, “it has been systematic and wide scale.  Rapes are far more 
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common than killings, but the serious looting is very pronounced.  With the change in power, it 
is time to settle old scores.” (Bearak, 2002) This targeting of Pashtuns sent many fleeing out of 
the country or to other areas as internally displaced people.  By mid 2002 roughly 120,000 
northern Pashtuns had left their homes in fear of their safety (Baldauf, 2002).   
Conclusion 
 This section was meant to highlight the effect of the emergence of warlordism on Pashtun 
society and its impact on stability.  Generally speaking, there are two primary effects.  First, the 
emergence of Tajik and Uzbek warlords, primarily associated with the Northern Alliance, have 
targeted Pashtun communities, causing disenfranchisement and further alienating them from the 
government.  Second, regional Pashtun warlords of the south and east have undermined the 
traditional tribal authorities and have become the primary beneficiaries of the conflict, due to 
their patronage relations with both the Karzai government and international (primarily US) 
forces.  As rational actors, these regional Pashtun warlords have no incentive to contribute to a 
stable environment and have continually pushed other Pashtun communities towards the 
insurgency.  An examination of why Pashtuns are joining the insurgency is discussed in the 
following section.   
Part 3 - The Insurgency: Who They Are and Why They Fight 
 By May of 2003 US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld announced “the end of major 
combat operation” in Afghanistan (Katzman, 2008), as the US began focusing their attention and 
resources on Iraq. At this time there were roughly 10,000 US troops and 5,000 foreign troops 
deployed in the country, coupled with 6,000 Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) 
(Livingston, 2011). Rumsfeld’s announcement wasn’t all that far fetched at the time.  The 
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Taliban government had disintegrated and al Qaeda was on the run.  The remnants of al Qaeda, 
the Taliban, and militant groups like Hizb-i Islami led by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar (HIG), all fled 
into Pakistan into the bordering Federally Administered Tribal Area (FATA). The FATA area 
was home to sympathetic Pashtun tribesmen, in an area with little government control and rough 
mountainous terrain, making for good cover.  This was also an area where many Taliban and 
HIG had studied in the various Deoband madrassas and had many contacts with in the Pakistani 
government, especially it’s intelligence unit, the Inter Services Intelligence (ISI).  The Pakistan 
government, who had assisted the US invasion, would further assist the US in their hunt for al 
Qaeda militants and other foreign fighters, but as a top CIA official noted, the Pakistani 
government “made it clear that they didn’t care about targeting the Taliban.” (Jones, 2009, 101) 
Neither did the US, for that matter, as the same CIA official continued, “The US considered the 
Taliban a spent force.” (ibid, 101).    
 At the time international presence was roughly 1.6 per 1000 Afghan citizen, “translating 
into on of the lowest levels of troops, police, and financial assistance in any stabilization 
operation since the end of WWII.” (ibid, 118)  The inadequacy of the ‘light footprint’ presence, 
coupled with the unwillingness of the top US military commanders to either send US 
peacekeeping forces outside of Kabul or even have US forces working with ISAF (International 
Security Assistance Force, mandated by the UN in 2003) translated into an opportunity for the 
insurgency (especially the Taliban) to regroup.   
 2006 was the year the insurgency really began to reemerge.  ‘Force multipliers’ such as 
improvised explosive devises (IED) and suicide bombing were now being used (lessons learned 
from the Iraqi insurgency).  Prior to 2005, suicide attacks were nearly nonexistent, in 2005 22 
attacks took place, 2006 there were 139 attacks, and 2007 160 attacks (Williams, 2008).  2006 
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saw over a 100% increase in IED attacks (from 783 in 2005 to 1,677 in 2006) and armed attacks 
nearly tripled to 4,542 from the prior year; the brunt of these attacks took place in the Pashtun 
south, in particular Helmand province (Jones, 2009).  This would mark the beginning of a lethal 
campaign by the Taliban and other insurgency groups; the chart below illustrates the increase in 
insurgent activity through 2010. 
 
 
  
By 2009 security environment had sufficiently deteriorated, with a number of districts in the 
south under complete Taliban control.  The threat level, according to the United Nations 
Department of Safety and Security, was at ‘high risk’ in 133 of the country’s 356 districts, nearly 
all of which were in Pashtun dominated areas.  An illustration of the risk assessment is shown 
below (Talt, 2009). 
Brookings Institute 
Figure 6 – Insurgent Attacks by Week 
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Today the insurgency has grown to an estimated 25,000 strong, and seemingly only getting 
stronger (Katzman, 2011).  The following analysis is meant to highlight the major elements of 
the growing insurgency; that of the Taliban, Haqqani network, and Hizb-I Islami Gulbuddin 
(HIG), and why Pashtuns are joining. 
The Insurgency 
The Taliban 
 The Taliban, as was briefly summarized in the preceding chapter section, was a 
radicalized Islamic movement with support from Paksitan, which took control of the country in 
1996.  After the US invasion the group fled to Pakistan and eventually it’s top commanders 
including Mullah Omar, settled in Quetta Pakistan near the Afghan border, where they continue 
to maintain close relationships with the ISI and Pakistani Islamic political groups. The group has 
evolved into a guerrilla organization, centralized in some aspects, and decentralized in others, 
one insurgency expert describes the group as a ‘network of networks’ (Ruttig, 2010, 1).  At the 
Reuters 
Figure 7 – Risk Assessment Map 
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highest level of the centralized system is the Supreme Leadership Council, led by Omar, which 
presides over four different shura councils; the Quetta Shura (which controls the area of greater 
Kandahar, all the way to Herat in the west), the Peshawar Shura (controlling eastern 
Afghanistan), the Haqqani led Miram Shah Shura (controlling Loya Paktia), and a northern 
Shura (for northern Afghanistan) (Ruttig, 2009). 
 This central authority has also implemented a ‘shadow government’ or local Taliban 
administration.  In some areas of the Pashtun controlled south, they are effectively the 
government in charge.  Recently the WHO and UNICEF have utilized the Taliban administrative 
structure to receive permission to administer the polio vaccine (using an intermediary as UN 
agencies are banned from negotiating with the Taliban) in areas of the south and east, where the 
government essentially had no authority (Trofimov, 2010).  In other areas the shadow 
administration is largely symbolic but still a venue for tribal competition as they attempt to have 
their members appointed, to better position themselves after US withdrawal. Depending on the 
location of the government, it can also impact where development aid is directed, effect taxes 
and the school system. The most practical, day-to-day aspect, of these shadow administration is 
their court system.  Often times local mullahs are given authority to mediate or arbitrate conflict 
(Bilert, 2009).  There is also so the mobile ‘desert court’ where Taliban members come from 
outside the community to settle a dispute.  They’ve developed a reputation as an effective and 
quick way to solve conflicts, often where government courts are too corrupt or don’t exist and 
the jirga system has become tainted by warlord influence (Alizada, 2011).   
 This vertical hierarchal network, centered around Mullah Omar and the Leadership 
Council in Quetta, has distinctly different characteristics then the loosely affiliated horizontal 
networks which comprise of the day to day fighting.  The central leadership tends to be more 
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political then the foot soldiers, in that they are essentially fighting to regain power, as the foot 
soldiers may have a multitude of reasons for joining the insurgency.  This is reflected in their 
perceptions of Pakistan, where the ‘political’ Taliban have close patron relations with various 
parts of the Pakistani government, the ‘fighting’ Taliban often hold very negative views of their 
supposed patron, and the vast majority don’t recognize the Durrand Line (historically a divisive 
issue between the two countries) (Smith, 2009).  There are also important distinctions related to 
the tribal aspect of the fighters and political Taliban.  Mullah Omar and the political Taliban tend 
to be more supra tribal in that they view their Islamic ideology as the dominant identity trait.  
Among the foot soldiers, the tribal structure is much more relevant and rooted in their decision 
making (Ruttig, 2010). 
 The organizational structures at the local level, the Taliban fighters, are more or less a 
collection of decentralized groups whose members are drawn from some form of relations 
(blood, tribal, village, madrassa).  These groups can emerge as a small group of three or four 
who operate at their own discretion (Elias, 2009), or an operating commander can essentially 
apply with the Taliban, much the same way they would with the government.  These local 
commanders may receive some support from the Taliban core, such as arms, but the daily 
operations fall within their own authority, this often leads to settling tribal disputes in the name 
of the Taliban.  To reduce the amount of friction between communities, Taliban commanders 
tend to only operate in their local community, if there is no Taliban presence in a community a 
Taliban agent will be deployed to build support among the local villagers.  Without a local 
support base, the Taliban generally refrain from attacking government or international forces 
(Giustozzi, 2009). Although in the event a larger scale operation, higher-level commanders will 
be brought in (Bilert, 2009).  
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 Once some sort of Taliban militia is in place they introduce different administrative 
structures to gain additional influence.  This includes the implementation of a shadow 
government, a judiciary, and creating more organization among the various militias, often 
creating a hierarchy of commanders.  Once international and government forces have sufficiently 
withdrawn the shadow government will began operating more effectively by creating permanent 
administrative institutions and collecting taxes (Elias, 2009). 
Haqqani Network 
 The Haqqani network is a regional insurgent group located in the Loya Paktia region.  
The group, generally considered a network under the Taliban umbrella, has in recent years 
gained international attention due to their high-profile attacks and ruthless tactics.  It’s leader, 
Jalaluddin Haqqani (although his son Serajuddin has been taking over in his father’s old age) 
was a prominent mujahidin commander against the Soviets (a CIA favorite and unilateral asset), 
a cabinet member of both the mujahidin and Taliban governments, and led the Taliban forces 
against the US (during the initial invasion) (Ruttig, 2009). The Haqqani network, easily the most 
powerful in Loya Paktia, operates out of the Miram Shah Shura out of North Waziristan, with 
roughly 5,000 -15,000 members under its command (Mazzetti, 2011).  The group is known for 
having a close relationship with foreign/Arab Islamic fundamentalists such as al Qaeda, as well 
as strong links to elements within Pakistani intelligence.  The ISI has been accused of waging a 
proxy war through the Haqqani network, which has focused a number of attacks on Indian 
contractors and most notably the Indian Embassy attack (killing 41 people) in July 2008.  Over 
the past few years the network has extended its operations outside of Loya Paktia and into 
surrounding provinces including Kabul.  Most recently they led the high profile attack on the US 
Embassy/NATO headquarters on September 12th 2011, where 16 people were killed (Dressler, 
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2011).  Their brazen attacks often utilize IEDs and suicide bombers, seemingly without 
consideration of innocent civilian collateral damage.  These types of tactics draw stronger 
similarities to al Qaeda tactics then the Taliban leadership in Quetta, whom have condemned the 
civilian bloodshed (Ruttig, 2009). 
 Haqqani, a traditional Islamist and a product of the Deoband madrassa system, has 
managed to create an environment conducive to Taliban influence in an area which is typically 
less conducive to religious influence.  As previously mentioned, due to the rugged terrain of 
Loya Paktia and the special administrative status under prior governments, there has traditionally 
been little government infringement, which has created strong tribal structures.  Typically there 
exists an inverse relationship between the strength of the tribal organization and the strength of 
the mullahs and religious networks. Tribal law and tradition, Pashtunwali, supersedes sharia law 
and religious authority in these areas, giving the mullahs a status below that of the tribesmen.  
Haqqani has resisted this trend by building a vast network of traditional madrassas, through Arab 
financial support, which has created the necessary conditions for religious networks to supercede 
the tribal system, thereby creating the conditions for increased Taliban support (Strives, 2006). 
The area of concern does not apply to all of Loya Paktia but specifically Haqqani’s tribal home, 
the Zadran Arc (the Zadran Arc consists of 9 district at the border triangle of Khost, Paktika, and 
Paktia provinces, home of the Zadran tribe) (Ruttig, 2009).  
Lastly, it should be noted, that although there is a tribal element to the Haqqani network 
(Haqqani is a member of the Zadran tribe (which neither a member of Durrani or Ghizai 
Pashtuns) Mezai clan)) it is a more regional insurgency.  The network includes other 
disenfranchised Loya Paktia tribes, students at the various madrassas, and foreign fighters 
(Gopal, 2010).  Other Zadran Mezai leaders, especially Pacha Khan Zadran (previously 
 
 
128 
mentioned) have been fierce adversaries and have utilized US forces to target the Haqqanis 
(Dressler, 2010). 
Hizb-i Islami Gulbuddin (HIG) 
 Gulbuddin Hikmatyar is head of Hizb-I Islami (not to be confused with Hizb-I Islami 
Khalis), which primarily operates in north and eastern provinces surrounding Kabul (Kunar, 
Nuristan, Kapisa, and Nangarhar provinces).  He was once the primary recipient of aid from 
Pakistan and the United States prior to the Taliban’s emergence (Katzman, 2010). HIG doesn’t 
have the support structure of the Taliban or Haqqani network and tends to be more open to 
working with Karzai but are adamant against a continued US occupation.  In March of 2010, 
Hikmatyar’s top lieutenants met with Karzai where they presented a 15-point peace plan 
centered on US withdrawal.  As many top HIG commanders have joined the government, the 
militancy of the group has dissipated since its height during the mujahidin civil war.  HIG, which 
is entirely separate from the Taliban, have often worked in concerted effort due to the similarities 
in their cause and ideology, although as US withdrawal draws near the various groups have 
tended to become more confrontational (ICG, 2011).   
The Influence of Pakistan; The Patron of Insurgency 
 The primary patron of the insurgency groups discussed above is Pakistan.  Ironically 
enough, Pakistan is also an ally of the United States, its mission in Afghanistan, and the ‘war on 
terror’ in general.  As President George Bush stated in a speech in July of 2004, “Today the 
government of the United States and Pakistan are working closely in the fight against terror… 
Pakistan is an ally in the war on terror and the American people are safer.” (Rashid, 2008, 236) 
Pakistan, for its alliance with the US, initially received (in 2001) multiple layers of sanctions 
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removed, $3 billion in debt forgiveness, and military supplies.  In later years they would receive 
hundreds of millions of dollars in aid packages.  Arguably more importantly than financial 
benefits, the country maintained its ally status with the US which counter balanced the influence 
of India and avoided becoming a terrorist pariah state (ibid).  
 Pakistani foreign policy is largely influenced by a powerful army and intelligence 
service. These organizations have strong ties with Islamic parties in the country and have links 
with roughly 40 different Islamic extremist groups.  Their ties and support of Islamic extremism 
is central to their foreign policy goals.  Paramount of which is countering Indian hegemony in 
the region by supporting the Kashmir (disputed territory between Pakistan and India) agenda and 
safeguarding their nuclear arsenal (both Pakistan and India became nuclear states in 1998).  The 
support of Islamic extremist groups has become an essential tool in the Pakistani arsenal.  They 
are used to combat India, without using the official apparatus (the army), and were used to 
counter what is perceived as pro Indian influences in Afghanistan. This began during the Soviet 
occupation where they supported various mujahidin militias, then focused their support on Hizb-i 
Islami Gulbuddin during the subsequent Tajik led mujahidin government. When Gulbuddin 
failed to topple the Tajiks, they supported a new client, the Taliban.  Today, they support the 
insurgency due to the perceived pro Indian support and the secular nature of the Karzai 
government (ibid). 
 The conflicting policies of supporting the US agenda as well as the insurgency, is 
accomplished through paying lip service to the Americans and only taking action against 
insurgence when American pressures can’t be diffused with rhetoric.   Under Bush, this could be 
accomplished by solely focusing on al Qaeda, while allowing the Taliban to regroup.  Although 
in actuality, the Pakistani military allowed foreign militants, including al Qaeda, to escape 
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American forces by entering into Pakistan through the Federally Administered Tribal Areas, 
specifically North and South Waziristan (two of the seven tribal agencies).  The Pakistani army 
denied their existence while the ISI was known to have a presence in the area, meeting with 
militia leaders.  During this time the Taliban leadership was situated in Quetta, where foreign 
militias and al Qaeda were banned, as to avoid US targeting of the area (ibid).  Today, the 
Pakistani –American relationship has severely deteriorated due to the now common knowledge 
of Pakistani support of the insurgency (although the support isn’t universal), which has led to 
American strikes in Pakistan territory, and more recently a USSF mission in Abbottabad (just 
north of Peshawar), which killed Osama Bin Laden.   
Why They Join: The Disenfranchisement of the Pashtun Populace 
US and International Military Involvement 
 As of September of 2011, there were roughly 98,000 American troops (comprising of 
both NATO-ISAF troops and troops participating in Operation Enduring Freedom) and roughly 
another 40,000 other international troops deployed in Afghanistan (Livingston, 2011).  A 
majority of these forces are situated in the Pashtun south and east, as you can see from the below 
troop disbursement chart. 
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The military focus on the Pashtun areas of the country, due to the level of insurgency activity in 
these areas, has led to a disproportionate amount of collateral damage in the form of Pashtun 
civilian deaths. A break down in civilian deaths is illustrated in the chart below. 
 
 
Brookings Institute 
Brookings Institute 
Figure 8 – NATO-ISAF Troop Distribution 
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Although the majority of civilian deaths are attributed to insurgency attacks, civilians on the 
ground often have a very different interpretation of events.  This could be due to the localized 
nature of the insurgency, where many Taliban (or other insurgence) are part time soldiers and 
part of the community, often indistinguishable from other villagers, or often times civilian 
casualties simply go unreported (Gaston, 2011). According to a recent report by Open Society 
Foundation, regardless of who was at fault, Afghans are blaming the international forces who 
they perceive as “violent, abusive, and sometimes, deliberately malevolent in their conduct and 
nature” (Wood, 2010).  The report went on to say that "Many (Afghans) were even suspicious 
that international forces were directly or indirectly supporting insurgents” (ibid).  This is not 
surprising due to the high level of support various warlords receive from both Karzai and 
international forces. 
This collateral damage has been exacerbated by the often indiscriminate use of aerial 
bombings, which not only take human lives but also destroy homes. These aerial bombings have 
dissipated to a certain extent due to the appointment of General McChrystal as commander of 
ISAF and US forces in Afghanistan (in 2009, then released in 2010) whose counter insurgency 
policies focused on minimizing civilian casualties in an effort to win back their support 
(Hastings, 2010).  Prior to his appointment aerial attacks had steadily increased as the insurgency 
strengthened, as illustrated below. 
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These aerial bombings as well as night raids have led to countless incidents of civilian casualties 
often times of women and children.  These military activities disproportionately focused on the 
Pashtun east and south has furthered the alienation of the tribal groups, who often see the Karzai 
government and US military actions as indistinguishable. Leading Afghan anthropologist, Akbar 
Ahmed, argues US military action has been perceived as a war on the Pashtuns and Islam at 
large, and sees the Taliban as a champion for their cause even in light of their violent activity.  
This is especially prevalent among the nang Pashtuns in the mountainous eastern border.  He 
remarks, “Mutilating Pashtun bodies, desecrating the Quran, dropping bombs from 30,000 feet, 
and killing women and children fed the perception that Americans were not people of honor, and 
it invoked the code of revenge” (Ahmed, 2011). 
 Studies done by daring journalists have supported this notion, that Taliban insurgence are 
joining the ranks due to family, friends, or other civilian deaths cause by international forces.  
Graeme Smith, a Canadian journalist, conducted interviews with local Kandahari Taliban 
Brookings Institute 
Figure 9 – US Military Combat Flight Distribution 
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insurgence and found that roughly a third had joined the ranks after a bomb had killed a family 
member, while many cited civilian deaths among their reasons (Smith, 2009).  Other reports cite 
local mullahs invoking jihad in daily sermons due to bombs and other indiscretions (Reuter, 
2009).  This fact isn’t lost on international forces, as General McChrystal noted when describing 
his “insurgent math”, “for every innocent person you kill, you create 10 new enemies,” 
(Hastings, 2010, 4).   
Development 
 International development in Afghanistan, post US invasion, has been fraught with 
problems and underfunding. “Despite billions of dollars in aid, state institutions remain fragile 
and unable to provide good governance, deliver basic services to the majority of the population 
or guarantee human security.” (ICG, 2011) Development in the country was largely underfunded 
during the Bush administration that focused on anti terrorism rather than national building. In the 
first five years of the war per capita aid in the country was roughly $292 as compared to $1,528 
in Iraq and $585 in Bosnia (Ibid). This was eventually corrected to a certain extent, due in part to 
President Obama’s focus on counter insurgency (as opposed to counter terrorism), but flaws still 
exist. 
 Foreign aid and international assistance has largely excluded local resources and 
productivity, undermining the potential for organic growth and self-dependency. This problem 
was most apparent during the first years of the war, during the Bush administration, where they 
focused on tracking down militants rather than assisting in the national building process. Basic 
infrastructure, such as roads and an electrical grid, hadn’t been rebuilt or improved after decades 
of war, crippling local producers. This problem was exacerbated by cheap products from Iran 
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and China being dumped in the local economy, as well as the US Army that has ignored local 
production, leaving Afghanistan’s primary industry, agriculture out of its supply chain (Rashid, 
2011). 
 The implementation of development programs by international aid agencies has also 
undermined local involvement. Between 2001 and 2008 nearly $15 billion in assistance reached 
Afghanistan, although this number doesn’t reflect the actual amount that reaches the local 
community. Estimates suggest roughly 40% of aid eventually leaves the country. This is largely 
due to high paid foreign workers. The largest US distributor of aid, USAID, depends on five 
large US contractors which employs high paid expatriates, who earn $200,000 - $500,000 
annually.  These donor agencies have also generally excluded the Afghan government in 
assisting with development initiatives, leaving line ministries ineffective (Oxfam, 2008). 80% of 
aid funds bypass the government, diminishing the importance of the Karzai administration 
(Jones, 2009). At the same time, foreign aid agencies publicly promote their support of creating 
an efficient and strong government. This also applies at the provincial level where provincial 
governments manage the development process through the various Provincial Development 
Committees (PDC).   PDCs have by and large been sidelined in the development process, only 
recently has efforts been made to include them in the process. Even still, they’ve only played a 
small role. For instance less than half of Herat Province’s PDC development projects found 
donor funding in 2011, in Balk Province roughly 10-18% of development aid is channeled 
through the PDC.  The lack of government and local involvement will become a more apparent 
concern in the near future when US forces start their planned withdrawal, which will likely 
coincide with a drawn down in aid as well (ICG, 2011). 
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 As Obama shifted the Afghan strategy from counter terrorism to counter insurgency, a 
renewed focus was placed on winning over hearts and minds. A prominent aspect of this strategy 
was implementing development projects, with a focus on the turbulent Pashtun south and east.  
With the majority of the Pashtun inhabited areas insecure, NGOs and USAID generally have a 
minimal presence unless accompanied by military personal. Due to the insecure atmosphere, 
foreign forces have relied on Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT). PRTs are hybrid 
development-military groups, meant to secure an era then provide aid. 26 PRTs exist in the 
country, 14 of which are led by American forces who primarily operate in the conflict areas of 
the east and south. The hybrid operations have caused many to voice concern. The very nature of 
its hybrid function begins to blur the line between military operations and development 
operations. As the two groups have become indistinguishable, militant groups have begun 
targeting aid workers. This additionally restricts access to aid workers, even when not operating 
under the military umbrella. This hybrid approach has also prioritized military needs over 
developmental, which makes the disbursement of aid not on a needs basis and tends to create 
very short influxes of aid without long-term agendas (ICG, 2011). Especially relevant in the 
Pashtun south, these projects are often political in nature and tend to be very small in scale. Part 
of the problem is due to a lack of community involvement, which ultimately produces unused 
and unsuitable projects (Oxfam, 2008).  Oxfam International summarizes the primary problem 
with PRTs.   
“Given the historic suspicion of foreign intervention, such efforts to win ‘hearts and 
minds’ are naïve. It is unsurprising that the huge expansion of PRT activities has not 
prevented the deterioration of security. The development process needs to be owned and 
led by Afghan communities, which is essential for sustainability. PRTs are no substitute 
for long-term development work.”  (Oxfam,2008) 
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In the Pashtun south and east, delivering aid has been especially problematic due to the 
atmosphere of insecurity. During the first years following the US invasion, Pashtun areas were 
largely ignored and the slowest to receive development assistance (Rashid, 2006). Eventually, as 
the development component took center stage, international aid agencies found it difficult to 
operate in the turbulent Pashtun east and south. For instance, Helmand province in 2004, a 
USAID contractor, Chemonics International received $130 million in development contracts, the 
project was quickly terminated after five employees were killed. This left aid deliver in the 
province to a PRT.  The Helmand PRT was allotted $9.5 million and 300 men; a relatively paltry 
amount for a province of its size (Coghlan, 2009).  The minimal amount of aid contributing to 
Pashtun development in the south and east is a problem in itself, but is exacerbated by the 
government policies on a primary Pashtun staple crop, opium.   
Opium  
The largest industry (arguably second to smuggling) in Afghanistan is the production of 
opium, which directly employs roughly 14% of the country (Rubin, 2008).  Opium poppy is the 
plant used to produce the illicit drug heroin.  The opium crop, which was outlawed in the latter 
years of Taliban rule, has seen accelerated cultivation over the post Taliban years, reaching it’s 
pinnacle of 193,000 hectares in 2007.  The below graph illustrates the growth. 
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At its height, Afghanistan produced roughly 92% of the world’s heroin (van Ham, 2007), 
Helmand province on its own produced 50% (Coghlan, 2009).  Due to the drastic increase in 
opium production the Afghan government and western forces have spent hundreds of millions in 
poppy eradication, executed by Afghan Security Forces.  The issue of poppy eradication is a 
substantial one.  As seen from the below map, opium production is most prevalent in Pashtun 
dominated provinces, especially Helmand. 
Brookings Institute 
Figure 10 – Poppy Cultivation by Year 
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This is an especially relevant issue as it pertains to individuals joining the insurgency. In various 
interviews conducted in Helmand province 80% of the insurgence interviewed grew poppy, half 
of which had their poppy destroyed, many suggesting outright that poppy eradication was a 
major influence in joining the insurgency (Smith, 2009). Many of these farmers participate in 
salaam financing, where a trafficker will pay below market price during the winter for a certain 
quantity of opium produced in the summer.  This gives the farmer a source of income during the 
winter months.  Problems arise when the farmers can’t produce the given amount of poppy, 
which puts them in debt to the trafficker, creating a vicious cycle of increasing debt and 
dependence.  Eradication is one way a farmer might find himself in this sort of debt, and be 
forced to extreme measure like exchange a daughter for debt forgiveness (Peters, 2009) 
Rueters 
Figure 11 – Poppy Cultivation Map 
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 Leading Afghan expert Barnett Rubin argues alternative sources of income need to be put 
in place prior to any eradication.  He suggests, contrary to US and UN assertions, that poppy 
cultivation is the result of, not the cause of insecurity.  These subsistence farmers need an 
alternative to poppy cultivation, often times other crops such as wheat don’t suffice to maintain 
just the basic elements of living.  Eradicating fields often only puts these farmers into debt, 
thereby become more dependent on opium production (Rubin, 2008). 
 Heroin is an inelastic product, when prices go up demand tends to change little, both 
empirical and theoretical evidence would support this notion (ibid).  Therefore eradicating poppy 
farms only increases the prices, benefitting traffickers, and laying the burden solely on the 
subsistence farmers.  This is an important concept as it relates to who the US and Afghan 
governments are supporting.  As previously discussed both entities have supported warlords for 
various reasons.  Many of these same warlords are making millions off trafficking of opium with 
the support of the US and Karzai.  The biggest ones of which are Arif Noorzai and Abdul Raziq 
as well as numerous members of government and key US contractors.  This completely flies in 
the face of logic; as the US and Karzai attempt to eradicate poppy, they alienate they very group 
most susceptible to joining the insurgency (disenfranchised Pashtuns), while creating an 
environment that enfranchises the very people rooted in the creation of insecurity.  This only 
further alienates the already disenfranchised, who inevitably look for other sources of political 
authority outside the Karzai government. 
The Tribal Nature of Warlordism and Insurgency 
 The tribal structures, in many ways, have become a venue in which “political competition 
takes place,” (Ruttig, 2010, 24) this applies to both warlords and the insurgency.  As Karzai 
 
 
141 
emerged to power he was supported by various Pashtun anti Taliban strongmen in the south and 
east.  These same warlords would become clients of Karzai as well as US and international 
forces.  As the warlords solidified the patronage networks with the US and Karzai, their own 
localized patronage networks grew stronger.  These local and regional networks utilized personal 
relationships within tribal networks and allied tribes to increase their influence.  These Pashtun 
warlords, settled old grievance and abused various tribes for their own benefit.  This would often 
lead to alienated tribes joining the Taliban as a source of protection and an alternative political 
venue.  
 Tribal alliances with either the government or insurgency aren’t universal; all tribes have 
at least some members in both the insurgency and government positions, although it’s apparent 
that regional conflicts among tribes often create dividing lines between pro government and pro 
insurgency forces.  Although, with this said, the Zirak Durranis (making up the royalty lineages 
consisting of the Barakzai, Polpozai, Alokozai, and Achakzai) tend to be more pro government 
then the Panjpai Durranies (the non royalty lineages of the Durrani tribal confederation) and 
Ghilzais.  This is especially apparent among the Polpozai Durranis, which the Karzai family is a 
member of. This Polpozai relationship is most evident in the south in the greater Kandahar area, 
where the power structure was centered around Ahmed Wali Karzi (AWK)  (AWK was recently 
assassinated in July 2011).  AWK, together with the ex governor Gul Agha Shirzai (a Barkazai 
mujahidin commander who assisted Karzai during the US invasion), monopolized industry, 
maintained private security companies, and monopolized the international development contracts 
which they used as patronage for the various militias. In doing so they’ve alienated other tribes 
from the lucrative patronage networks pushing them towards other political venues such as the 
Taliban (to say nothing of the effects of predation on these communities).  This is precisely what 
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happened to the Alokozai tribe whose leadership was pushed out of government, especially 
within the police force.  They had once protected their district of Arghandab from Taliban 
infiltration, but today it’s in the hands of the Taliban (Forsberg, 2010).   
 In the east of Kandahar in Spin Boldak, the warlord Commander Razik (previously 
discussed), of the Achakzai tribe of the Adozai clan, for his military support of Gul Agha Sherzai 
he was given control of the Spin Boldak border which was traditionally controlled by the 
Noorzai Panjai tribe. After targeting Noorzai as Taliban utilizing USSF, the Noorzai in the 
region have nearly all become Taliban (Aikins, 2009).  Although Arif Noorzai, another Noorzai 
warlord has held multiple seats in government, controls the smuggling route in the south of 
Kandahar, and is an in-law with the Karzais, needless to say he’s a close ally. In general, of all 
Kandahari Pashtuns involved in the insurgency there is a lack of Popalzia, Barakzai, and 
Achakzai, but a disproportional amount of the Panjpai tribes and Ghilzai tribes and more recently 
the Alokozai tribe. (Smith, 2009). 
 In Helmand the divide is relatively more extreme as the governor Sher Mohammad 
Akhundzada of the Alizai Panjpai tribe, and Helmand Intelligence Chief and legislature, Dad 
Mohammad Khan of the Alokozai tribe, have ruthlessly abused and targeted the Ishaqzai Panjpai 
tribe, which stemmed from old tribal and drug related conflict (Rubin, E., 2006).  The Ishaqzai 
eventually assassinated Dad Mohammad and killed 40 of his family members.  This slaughter 
could be attributed as a Taliban insurgency attack, a result of a tribal conflict, or part of a drug 
war, but it’s most likely all three intertwined (Coghlan, 2009). 
 Karzai has also utilized the various tribal relationships in an effort to solidify his own 
power.  It’s often argued that the central government has little authority outside of Kabul (often 
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referring to Karzai as the Mayor of Kabul), this isn’t entirely accurate.  Although many local 
villages see little government involvement in their communities, Karzai through various 
patronage networks has utilized local powers to support his own base.  His power base in the 
south, in many ways, is derived from the various Pashtun militia strongmen that supported him 
and the US invasion, as well as his close family and friends.  These commanders included Gul 
Agha Sherzai (Barakzai Durrani), Mullah Naqiib (Alokozia Durrani), Amir Lalai (Popalzai 
Durrani), Hajji Ahmed (Achekzai Durrani), Ustad Halim (Noorzai Durrani (of the lesser Panjpai 
sub confederation), and Habibullah Jan (Alizai Durrani).  Absent among these commanders are 
any Ghilzai Pashtuns and only one Panjpai Durrani, which have disproportionately made up the 
ranks of the insurgency.  Sherzai, arguably the most powerful among the Pashtun warlords (due 
to being a member of the Barakzai clan, normally recognized as the dominant royalty lineage 
over the Popalzai), has been both a rival and strong supporter of Karzai.  He was once the 
governor of Kandahar (2001 – 2005), currently the governor of Nangarhar province, and was the 
dominant power broker in the south along with AWK.  Sherzai has his own patron network, 
which inturn supports Karzai, most notably Commander Razik who controls Spin Boldak and its 
smuggling industry.  Further west the smuggling route is controlled by Arif Noorzai whose sister 
married into the Karzai family, securing their relationship.  This smuggling route extends into 
Herat in the west which is controlled by Ismail Khan, a major commander in the Northern 
Alliance whose held multiple posts in government and considered a loyal adversary (Forsberg, 
2010).   
 Karzai’s primary base of power centered around his brother AWK (until his recent 
assassination) and other family members.  Hashmat Karzai, the president’s cousin, runs Asia 
Security Group, which has an estimated 10,000 security personal, which employs various smaller 
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militias providing security and logistics for international agencies   This creates a vast patronage 
network which begins at Karzai himself (through his client Hashmat) to low level commanders 
throughout the southern provinces.  The Watan Group, run by two other Karzai cousins (Ahmad 
and Rashid Popal) run similar operations.   These two organizations largely benefit from the 
relationship with AWK who has essentially monopolized security contracts and has close 
operations with international NGO and US military forces.   AWK’s role as head of the 
Kandahar Provincial Council also allowed him to appropriate land as well as other exploitations.  
In general his control of international contracts, government resources, and connection with US 
military has made him the prime power broker in the south, which in turn solidifies Karzai’s own 
power (ibid).   
The Role of Religion 
The role of religion plays an important part in the current conflict and the motivations of 
those joining the insurgency.  Media commonly emphasizes the role of religion and how it often 
exacerbates the conflict.  Some of the recently publicized issues include, American soldiers 
desecrating Afghan bodies, American military’s accidental burning of the Koran, and the 
intentional burning of a Koran by an American minister. These well-publicized stories highlight 
the religious aspect of the discord, but don’t necessarily describe the role religion plays in 
government or the alienation of religious authorities, especially in the local villages. The role and 
power of these religious authorities in society, that of the mullahs and ulama, has changed 
throughout modern Afghan history. Over the reign of the Musahiban monarchy, the religious 
community was placated too, brought into government, and eventually coopted.  The influence 
of the group drastically increased during the jihad against Soviet occupation and the subsequent 
leadership under the Taliban.  Under the Taliban the mullahs were invited “to consult on the 
 
 
145 
implementation of Sharia, the role of the government and other prestigious issues” (Wardak, 
2007, 18).  Today their authority has drastically diminished due to the secular nature of foreign 
governments assisting in the nation building process and the skepticism of American military 
forces who essentially invaded the country in an effort to combat Islamic extremism. Afghan 
scholar Prakhar Sharma summarizes it here.   
“The active role that mullahs played in the Taliban government led the Karzai 
administration and the international community to view them with concern. The mullahs 
are seen as pro-Taliban, or “extremists” whose views are incompatible with the ideals of 
democracy, freedom, and the integration of Afghanistan into the international 
community.” (Sharma, 2009, 35) 
The alienation of the Pashtun religious community, especially that of the village mullahs, has 
excluded a local leader from the decision making process and marginalized a figure who’s 
influence rests in their ability to call their constituency to jihad. Many of these mullahs, without 
any clear incentive to support the government, have turned to the alternative political venue, that 
of the Taliban who in the past have empowered the religious community.   
 “The legitimacy of Afghan governance is derived from two immutable sources: dynastic 
sources, usually in the form of monarchies and tribal patriarchies, and religious sources. This 
problem of legitimacy is especially acute at the local and village level of rural Pashtun society.” 
(Johnson, 2010, 43)  The importance of local religious authorities lies in their ability to 
disseminate information, this is especially relevant in southern Pashtun societies where many 
can’t read and largely depend on the local mullah, who operates as both an educator and 
impartial arbitrator between the local society and foreign bodies, including the state.  Their 
primary venue of information dissemination is at the local mosque, and particularly the Friday 
sermon.  By western standards, the sermons are not wholly focused on religious matters; political 
issues in this society are intertwined with the religious narrative. It is here that the local mullahs 
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advocate to their constituency of supporting the insurgency or the government.  In many ways, 
the current conflict is predicated on information dissemination, and the local mullahs are a 
primary body in which information is distributed (ibid).   
 The importance of religious authorities, especially at the local level, has largely been 
overlooked by the international community and Afghan government. In the debate on “peace 
building and development in post-Taliban Afghanistan, religion is hardly ever mentioned, and 
religious actors and institutions are rarely included in policies or programs.” (Borchgrevink, 
2007) Rather than strengthen bonds with the local community through religious inoculators, the 
government and international community has sidelined the local mullahs and ulama in debate 
relating to various community related issues such as education and development.  In the sphere 
of development, its been reported that most mullahs support development initiatives, but donor 
organizations and NGOs have largely excluded them from the process. Many of the current 
donors have little experience in involving religious organizations into their delivery process; they 
tend to depend on services providers, which are secular in nature (ibid).  Other NGOs and 
foreign agencies are simply prohibited from working with religious bodies, or in many cases, 
have negative perceptions of the religious institutions, therefore exclude them from the process 
(Wardak, 2007).   
 Education reform has also added to the alienation of local religious authorities.  
Education in Afghanistan is divided among those accepting a secular based system and those 
supporting the religious based system. The secular system is supported by the Afghan 
government, with the assistance of foreign donors including the United States. The religious 
system, the madrassas run by local mullahs, has largely been ignored and underfunded (Sharma, 
2009).  During the Taliban era, madrassas were built with foreign funds funneled from Pakistan 
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or Arab countries, today this channel of support has been dramatically stymied forcing many 
madrassas to close down or work with a shallow support base. This has forced many young 
students to travel to Pakistan for education, which is heavily supported by government, but often 
teaches a more radicalized interpretation of the religion (Wardak, 2007).  Generally speaking, the 
Pashtun communities and Afghan society at large, at the very least supports a religious 
component in education (Sharma, 2009).  Although, if the government had effectively 
implemented the secular based system they may have been able to mobilize supporters to push 
for societal acceptance.  This has not happened.  The Ministry of Education, and the educational 
system at large, has proven to be corrupt and a venue to disburse patronage for political support.  
This has led to hiring drastically under qualified teachers, a lack of supervision, poor facilities, 
and demoralized professional educators (an estimated 70% of trained teachers find work outside 
the education system). The government’s failure to implement an effective education system has 
had two detrimental effects.  First, the original advocates of the system who could have 
generated additional support in society have lost faith and enthusiasm.  Second, it marginalized 
those that were against the secular system, with nothing to show for it (Giustozzi, 2010). 
 Arguably the most important aspect of the government’s relationship with the local 
religious community is the government’s complete lack of defense of mullahs even among those 
who support the government.  Those that support the government are targeted by the insurgency 
and those holding a middle ground are attacked by both the insurgency and the government 
(Borchgrevink, 2007).  Extending this logic, there’s seemingly no benefit to supporting the 
government, while supporting the insurgency will garner them support among the Taliban and 
political relevance in the shadow government or a future Taliban regime.   
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 This alienation in itself doesn’t necessarily drive local religious authorities to support the 
insurgency, but as “the current administration has done little, if anything, to seriously integrate 
the religious leaders into the political process” (Sharma, 2009, 35) they have no venue to discuss 
concerns or vent frustration with the government.  This dialogue could potentially quell the 
contempt over military operations in Pashtun communities.  Instead mullahs sermonize about 
civilian deaths, unnecessary military actions, and generally the perceived un-Islamic disposition 
of the government and international involvement.  Examples abound of mullahs calling their 
constituencies to jihad and support of the insurgency, predicated on these reasons (Reuter, 2009).  
This has led to near universal disapproval of military presence among local clergy 
(Borchgrevink, 2007), and animosity towards foreign presence and the government in general in 
southern Pashtun districts (Zabulwal 2009). 
  The ulama, who constitute the educated class of religious clergy, are mainly a 
disorganized group of roughly 2,000 alim (singular of ulama).  They make up the Shura-i Ulama, 
the consultative body to the Afghan government created at the Bonn Conference, and various 
other provincial shuras, the most prominent of which is the Kandahar shura.  The ulama are also 
prevalent in the Supreme Court and Ministry of Justice. The group is generally considered 
moderately conservative and relatively pro government, which is partly due to the ostracism of 
religious leaders associated with the Taliban.  Although most Taliban were given amnesty in 
2003, and all Taliban were given amnesty in 2005 (established under the Independent Peace and 
Reconciliation Commission) (Stanekzai, 2008), these declarations didn’t permeate at the local 
level where various warlords took retribution for past grievances with the group (Zabulwal, 
2009). 
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 The ulama’s influence is minimal, largely due to the secular reforms supported by foreign 
governments, evident in the constitution. The constitution is pluralistic in character, combining 
various Islamic and western laws into one body, which has watered down its conservative nature.  
For instance, the preamble cites the observation of the UN Charter and the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights, article two declares Islam as the official religion of Afghanistan although 
doesn’t identify which sect and allows other religious followers free of Islamic oversight, articles 
131 and 132 cites both Hanafi jurisprudence and Shia jurisprudence and to rule “in a way that 
attains justice in the best manner.” (afghanembassy.com) The collective nature of the 
constitution drawn from different sources of jurisprudence creates possible contradictions, which 
by and large, has allowed secular influences to push for a more liberal agenda (Wardak, 2007).  
 The judiciary is the most evident venue where secular and conservative forces have 
positioned themselves.  The establishment of a Supreme Court was headed by Fazel Hadi 
Shinwari, the Chief Justice.  Shinwari, a strict conservative, led a conservative bench that issued 
various fatwas and decrees on hot button issues rather then attempting to professionalize the 
department.  Western forces, specifically those of Italy and the US who were charged with 
reforming the judiciary, focused on professionalizing and implementing western mores as it 
relates to human rights, especially rights of women and minorities, deemphasizing the Islamic 
role (Suhrke, 2008). The differences in Islamic and western ideology were exacerbated during 
two controversial cases that highlighted the confrontational ideologies. The first, a case of a man 
converting to Christianity, faced the death penalty under their interpretation of sharia law. The 
second, a journalist was accused of blasphemy for criticizing Islam in the judiciary. The 
Kandahari ulama called for his execution if he did not repent.  The outcome of these cases was 
telling indications of the influence of western powers, which was not lost on the religious 
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communities or the Pashtun villagers at large.  Under pressure from western groups, the 
Christian convert was expelled to Italy and the journalist was given a short prison sentence (later 
commuted).  Shortly thereafter, under pressure to ‘professionalize’ the court, Karzai began 
appointing less conservative judges; subsequently Shinwari lost the Supreme Court Justice seat 
in 2006 (ibid).   
 The obvious foreign intervention was not lost on the Pashtun communities (ibid).  The 
promotion of western ideals of human rights, with especial focus on women’s rights, has further 
alienated many within the local Pashtun religious community.  Clergy at the local level “believe 
laws relating to human rights and women are the government’s main concern and other laws are 
not deemed important.” (Wardak, 2007, 42)  Additionally, it’s estimated roughly 75% of local 
religious leaders believe the constitution isn’t compatible with sharia law, which is damaging to 
the government’s legitimacy in a society so religious (ibid).   
 The policies of the central government have by and large alienated the religious 
community, especially relevant at the local level, and have contributed to the legitimacy of the 
insurgency.  In interviews with Taliban fighters, the vast majority cite religion, or the un-Islamic 
nature of government and western forces, as an aspect of their decision to join the insurgency.  
It’s also worth noting the religious nature of the conflict isn’t necessarily attributed to radical 
Islam or support of the Taliban. In fact many Taliban foot soldiers that have indicated religion as 
a reason for their participation in the insurgency don’t support the policies of the past Taliban 
government, nor do they recognize the leadership of Mullah Omar, the group’s leader.  They’ve 
utilized the Taliban as an alternative political venue and as a vehicle to join the insurgency 
(Smith, 2009).  
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Conclusion 
 As discussed the Pashtun insurgency is predicated on a number of factors, which include 
an economic aspect, the rejection of foreign forces, a tribal aspect, and a religious component. 
Contrary to the commonly accepted narrative, the conflict is more dynamic than simply a war 
between secular forces and a radical strand of Islam.  The dynamic is multifaceted but predicated 
on the general alienation of the Pashtun communities. This alienation has pushed Pashtun 
communities to find alternative political venues, found in the Taliban. The rational behind those 
joining the insurgency will be discussed further in the next chapter.  This concludes the analysis 
of the Karzai regime and it’s relationship with the Pashtun communities.   
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CHAPTER 6 
SUMMARY AND COMPARTATIVE ANALYSIS 
 This analysis is meant to examine the Karzai government’s relationship with the Pashtun 
communities and the impact this relationship has had on the growing insurgency. The analysis 
has demonstrated that the conflict is more complex than simply discord between secular forces 
and radical Islam, but also includes various tribal, economic, and religious dynamics. To help 
illustrate the reason behind the current turmoil this thesis has utilized a comparative approach; 
comparing the relationship between the government of Afghanistan and the Pashtun tribal and 
religious communities during the Musahiban Period (1929 – 1963) and the Karzai government 
(2001 – present). The hope is to illustrate the reason behind the current turmoil in the country by 
comparing the current chaotic period to a period of relative stability, that of the Musahiban 
monarchy. This analysis will highlight the goals of the relevant actors, through the use of the 
rational choice framework, which will be complemented by emphasizing the patron client 
relations and how these patronage relationships have changed. The analysis will focus on three 
primary differences of the social dynamic, during the years of the Musahiban and Karzai rule 
that have affected stability.  These differences are described below. 
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Patronage, Pashtun Tribes, and Warlordism 
 The patronage networks of the Karzai government that support his regime lay in stark 
contrast to the networks under the Musahiban leadership. The rational choice theory, specifically 
the ‘thick’ version of the concept, the rational actor strives for power (Green, 18, 1994). The 
various leaders of the Musahiban monarchy represent rational actors driven to consolidate power 
in Afghanistan. As we’ve seen in the past, the Pashtun tribal society and the associated religious 
community were essential in maintaining power and preserving stability. As this was apparent to 
Nadir, he created new patronage relations with these groups in an effort to consolidate his rule.  
The patronage relations with the Pashtun tribal communities utilized the traditional tribal 
institutions of the khan, malik, jirga and its elders. The individual authority, that of the khan and 
malik, was predicated on their ability to provide patronage to the qawm, gain access to 
government resources, and protect the qawm from government infringement. Their position in 
leadership was counter balanced by the jirga and elders whom their authority was derived from.  
Daily interaction with the tribes took place between central government officials and khans and 
maliks. These khans and maliks operated as middlemen creating space between the government 
and tribe. This create a political atmosphere where the tribe or qawm was often viewed as one 
Musahiban Monarchy (1929 – 1963)      Vs 
• Patron client relationship with tribal society, one of 
mutual benefit 
• Coopted and placated religious community via 
patronage relationship 
• Building national allegiance via welfare and 
development, national army, and education 
o Army also used as an enforcement 
mechanism or threat thereof  
Karzai Government 
• Patronage structure revolving around 
warlordism (with NA members dominating 
government) 
• Alienated religious community, influenced by 
secular western ideology 
• Alienating Pashtun community through opium 
eradication, lack of development, and 
disproportionate military targeting 
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single constituency as opposed to governing each individual tribesmen, thus maintaining the 
autonomy of the tribe.  
 The Musahiban monarchy utilized the government structure to bring in the tribal 
communities which distributed power to the tribes and acted as a means of cooption. The 
government was viewed as the tribal representative to the outside community and acted on there 
behalf. The government was also viewed as an external agent which could distribute resources 
and power. The government utilized its resources and distribution of power by bringing tribal 
leaders into government as a means of cooption.  This was a give and take relationship, a one of 
mutual benefit. The government gave the tribes influence in the central government and 
resources, while maintaining tribal autonomy, in return were given tribal loyalty, taxes, and 
conscripts.   
 The official government structure also utilized the jirga system at each level of local 
government. At each level (the sub district, district, sub province, ect) a jirga was convened to 
decide who would represent the body at the next highest level, thereby maintaining tribal 
integrity. At the central level, the government instituted a Loya Jirga, which convened on issues 
important to the nation, summarized below. 
1955 – Convened to build consensus on the Pashtunistan issue. The jirga gave its support to 
approach the Russians and to secure military armaments.   
1949 – Convened to abrogate all existing treaties related to the Durrand Line, including its 
origination in the 1919 Treaty of Rawalpindi. 
1941 – Convened to discuss the nations neutral stance during WW2.  The jirga approved 
neutrality and expelled foreign diplomats 
1930 – Called to confirm Nadir Shah’s ascension to thrown 
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The Loya Jirga consolidated powers of taxation and foreign relations in the hands of the 
Pashtuns. These powers were real, if not latent, as the government kept extremely low tax rates 
on agriculture and land (and many tribes in the eastern region were wholly excused from 
taxation) and asked for tribal support on pertinent foreign relations issues. A summary of the 
political clientelistic relationship is summarized below. 
 
 
 
Clientelism and the Tribal Communities under Musahiban Leadership 
  
• Tribal Autonomy at Local Level 
o Tribes of Loya Paktia given near autonomy  
 Maintain authority over lashkars (militia), arabakai (police force), excluded from paying taxes and conscription 
o Pashtun khans and maliks acted as middlemen between state and tribe.  
 Local authority in conscription 
 Qawms taxed at community level 
 Local jirgas continue to function as a local judiciary and administrator 
 
• Implementation of traditional Loya Jirga structure throughout government 
o Each level of local government supported by a jirga of the local elders 
o Parliamentarians elected via local jirga  
o Central government supported by Loya Jirga of predominantly Pashtun tribesmen 
 
• Pashtun Participation in the Central Government 
o Creation of Loya Jirga 
 Authority over taxation  
 Authority over foreign policy – maintaining non interference policy 
 Authority over amendments to constitution 
 Generally providing input on major decisions 
 
• Bicameral Parliament 
o Created a consultative, jirga style, assembly, which included tribal and religious leaders  
 
 
Figure 12 – Tribalism and the Tribal Communities, Under 
Musahiban Leadership, Summary  
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Today the power dynamic has changed. Minor Pashtun warlords who had assisted Karzai 
during the US invasion would emerge as the new power brokers in the Pashtun east and south.    
These warlords, who often represent themselves as khans and leaders of qawms or tribes, base 
their authority on the militias that they control. Traditionally a khan or malik’s authority is 
derived from patronage and support among tribal elders and the jirga, only through these bases 
of support would a khan preserve his position. Warlords transcend this relationship by imposing 
their authority primarily through the control of militias and the implied threat of violence.  
Rather than competing for patronage among their fellow tribesmen, they’ve monopolized the use 
of force instead. That’s not to say the warlord doesn’t provide some patronage to the qawm, but 
in many cases this patronage is simply in the form of protection from other warlords. His 
influence and power is also derived from resources stemming from outside the tribal 
communities illustrated in the patron client diagram below.  
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working with USSF, PSC, which 
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Figure 13 – Patronage Flow Chart  
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As the diagram describes both the Karzai government and the US acts as patrons to the warlords 
by delivering resources and influence, leaving the tribal communities relatively outside the 
patronage network. This has broken down the mutually beneficial relationship under the 
Musahiban monarchy between the tribes and government, where the warlords act as independent 
and powerful middlemen.  In turn, this creates an atmosphere where the tribe, which lies 
relatively outside of the patronage network with the government seeks other venues such as the 
Taliban where their influence maybe more pronounced.   
Furthermore, warlords thrive and derive their influence in an atmosphere of conflict. As 
rational actors, whose presumable goal is to attain power and wealth, their interests lie not in 
stabilizing the country but maintaining instability. Without conflict PSC companies wouldn’t 
exist, contracts with USSF would no longer be necessary, and development workers could assist 
farmers in producing crops other then opium. As rational actors maintaining an unstable 
atmosphere is in their best interest as it is their source of revenue and influence.  
Warlordism also creates a tribal aspect of the insurgency. As various warlords have 
relationships with Karzai and the US, they’ve exploited their position by predating on tribes not 
in the government’s patronage network. This is most evident in the drug trafficking business and 
controlling highway tolls, where powerful warlords target rival tribal groups who threaten their 
lucrative businesses. As dominant warlords target rival groups, these less powerful (or not in the 
good graces of the US military or government) tribes seek an alternative political vehicle in the 
Taliban. Karzai plays an important role in the tribal nature of warlordism and the insurgency.  
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Karzai, by influencing the flow of patronage from both the state and international sources, has channeled 
these sources to his brother AWK and cousins, who in turn, distribute patronage regionally. Karzai’s 
patronage extends well beyond his immediate family to other areas of Afghanistan. Warlords in each 
district receive government positions and lucrative contracts in exchange for loyalty and votes. Tribes 
alienated from this network turn their support towards the Taliban, who garner them influence.   
Development and National Allegiance 
Development was a primary focus of the Musahiban monarchy. Up until 1955 when 
Daoud convened a jirga to accept foreign aid, development was largely derived from internal 
revenue sources. This would be done without increasing taxes on the Pashtun tribes, which was a 
staple pillar of the patron client relationship, and was also controlled by the tribes in the Loya 
Jirga. The government under Prime Ministers Hashim and Mahmud would create a new 
merchant class through the creation of a national bank and its shirkats (trading companies) spin 
offs. This created an economic base to support development goals while maintaining their 
agreement relating to taxes with the tribes. From the perspective of the rational actor these 
development measures could be viewed from two angles. From the ‘thin approach’ encapsulated 
by Riker, the idea that goals may simply be altruistic or ‘other regarding’ (Riker, 1995) the 
implementation of development reforms such as the Helmand Valley Project could be viewed 
simply as public-spirited intentions to build a better society. The project irrigated vast expanses 
of land and allowed landless Pashtuns to settle in the area under extremely favorable financing. 
This is particularly relevant within the Pashtun communities who see land ownership as a 
reflection of ones self worth and has historically been a primary reason for intertribal conflict. 
From the ‘thick approach’, which suggests motives are driven by power and wealth, these 
development reforms could be construed as a mechanism to undermine tribal authority (Green, 
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1994).  These reforms create a favorable view of the government, which has historically been 
viewed as an exploiter, and also creates a dependence on the state, which perpetuates national 
allegiance and undermines tribal allegiances. This creation of national identity was also a 
primary component of both the educational and military reforms, which would become more 
relevant during Daoud’s leadership.    
The Musahiban government also utilized the military apparatus to increase national 
allegiance as well as to create a mechanism of coercion in an effort to create a stronger state.  
The military institution recruited from the tribal aristocracy which created another mechanism of 
coopting the tribes into the state, while the tribes viewed the military as another venue to 
increase tribal power. Today the institution has become a fragmented institution where alliances 
to various warlords, stemming primarily from non Pashtun Northern Alliance members, creates 
an institution of little national allegiance and only contributes to the fragmentation of the 
country.   
Today the government under Karzai and his American patrons have taken a dramatically 
different approach to the enfranchisement of the Pashtun communities. The Pashtuns of the east 
and south have largely been the target of US military operations while development projects 
have done little to contribute to the well being of society. The projects that do exist are often 
done sporadically without a long term focus and are executed through international agencies, 
rather the Afghan government. This ultimately undermines the creation of allegiance to the 
government. More importantly the government has actively eradicated the southern Pashtuns 
primary cash crop, opium. The GoA nor the international community have attempted to provided 
an alternative source of income before the wholesale eradication of a farmers livelihood. The 
eradication creates higher prices for the traffickers and warlords who are the primary 
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beneficiaries of the policy, but does little to help the Pashtun farmer who can’t survive on 
alternatives crops. This creates the perception that the government has little interest in bolstering 
the livelihoods of Pashtun locals and continues to support exploitive warlords.  
The Pashtun communities were generally alienated from the central government from the 
onset of the US invasion. The initial US strategy of utilizing ex mujahidin warlords of the 
Northern Alliance, allowed the non Pashtun warlords (mostly Tajik and Uzbek), to take control 
of Kabul. This inevitably led to a Tajik dominated central government initiated at the Bonn 
Conference. The disproportionate amount of ethnic minorities stemming from the NA would 
permeate into the army and police force, which from the start targeted and harassed the Pashtun 
communities. Each successive government where this misrepresentation wasn’t corrected, was a 
missed opportunity for both Karzai and the US, and would exacerbate the general feeling of 
alienation among the Pashtuns.  
Comparative Relations with the Religious Community 
The religious dynamic between the two eras has also changed significantly as well.  
Under the Musahiban monarchy, the religious community, due to their ability to arouse their 
religious followers, were also given newfound influence in the government. At the highest level 
they were consolidated under the Jamiat-i Ulema, controlled the MoJ, and the constitution of 
1931 was predicated on Islamic law. The religious leaders were also members of the Loya Jirga 
and the national assembly. At the local level the mullahs were given autonomy by reversing the 
laws under Amanullah, which had created government jurisdiction over all private madrassas 
and maktabs. These newly created powers at the highest level and autonomy at the lowest level 
were the basis of the patronage relationship between the government and religious community.  
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The government would solidify this relationship after coming to the defense of the religious 
community during the era of the Liberal Parliament. A summary of the government’s 
relationship with the religious and tribal communities is illustrated here.   
Daoud continued to maintain the patron client relationship between the monarchy and 
religious community but was able to change the power dynamic between the parties. After 
decades of educational reform, cooption of the religious establishment, and military reform 
which was bolstered by an influx of military support from the Soviets, Daoud was able to 
become independent of tribal lashkars and was also able to push social measures, the same 
measures that had led to Amanullah’s downfall, without creating public unrest, due to the 
clergy’s lack of desire or influence to arouse the community. Their diminished influence was due 
to the gradual cooption of the religious ulama into government and the gradual implementation 
of a competing more progressive religious education.   
Clientelism and the Religious Community under Musahiban Leadership 
Figure 14  
• Local level reforms and reversal of Amanullah era reforms 
o Closed down local government funded madrassas, (viewed as government infringement) 
o Closed down girl schools, calling female abroad students back home 
o Reinstated strict purdah of women, which included the burka.  Stripped women of voting rights 
o Reinstated polygamy laws 
• Created Jamiat-i Ulama 
o Institutionalized the ulama, religious clergy 
o Advised king on all issues relating to religion 
o Assisted courts in interpretation of sharia law 
o The preeminent religious authority 
• Ministry of Justice 
o Creation of Islamic Judiciary, abiding to Hanafi school of jurisprudence 
o Religious courts extends to all corners of the country 
o Religious leaders appointed leadership positions in organization 
o Religious scholars appointed judges 
• Constitution  - Stressing Islamic character of state 
• Defended religious clergy when attacked during the Liberal Parliament era.  Subsequently dissolving parliament and 
shutting down critical newspapers 
• Allowed local mullahs to operate private madrassas/ maktabs without government infringement 
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Contrary to the Musahiban policy of placating to, coopting, and absorbing the religious 
community into government, the Karzai government and its international support has largely 
excluded religious influence, especially relevant at the local level.  Local mullahs, who are an 
influential authority and primary disseminator of information among the community, have been 
nearly universally left out of the local decision making process. Traditionally a primary source of 
consultation and arbitration, the mullah has been sidelined due to government and international 
suspicion of the local religious community, who once played a prominent role under the Taliban 
government. The local mullah has been further alienated as one of his primary sources of 
authority has been additionally undermined, that of the local madrassa, which the government 
and international agencies have largely ignored, leaving them underfunded without public 
support. Arguably the most important aspect of the relationship is the lack of protection pro-
government mullahs receive. If they support government measures they are attacked by the 
Taliban, if they hold a middle road they are targeted by both the Taliban and government. 
Extending this logic, it’s clearly in the best interest of a local mullah to support the Taliban 
nullifying one source of potential attack, while also garnering political influence within the 
group.   
 The other religious authority, the more educated ulama, more prominent at the national 
level, have largely been ineffective in promoting Islamic policies and countering western secular 
ideals. This is partly due to the ostracizing of many religious figures who were once associated 
with the Taliban, as well as the influence of foreign forces. Secular influence is prominent in the 
constitution, judiciary, and education. This dynamic isn’t lost on the local Pashtun community 
that rejects the idea of total secularization and feels western mores such as women’s rights 
dominates policy making, overlooking cultural and religious norms.      
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 The un-Islamic nature of the government has proved to be an influential force in pushing 
local Pashtuns towards the insurgency.  This is further aggravated by the local mullahs, with no 
voice in the public dialogue to vent or discuss foreign and government infringement, they’ve 
instead promoted the idea of jihad, and the rejection of the government and its foreign 
inoculators. 
 The religious motivation that has pushed many towards insurgency does not necessarily 
mean they are supporters of a Taliban government. The Taliban represent the primary alternative 
political venue to the Karzai government.     
Comparing Stability 
As discussed, the reasons for joining the insurgency are many fold, often involving overlapping 
interests, as illustrated in the bullet points below. 
 
 
 
  
Religious Reasons 
• Perceived secular or 
immoral nature of 
government 
• American occupation and 
military action encourages 
jihad 
• General alienation of 
religious community 
• Historical support of 
Taliban 
Economic Reasons 
• Lack of development initiatives 
in Pashtun areas 
• Destruction of opium crops, 
especially relevant to the 
Pashtun community 
• American military operations 
contributing to economic 
deprivation 
Warlordism 
• Predating activity both within 
and outside their patronage 
networks and tribal association 
• The perceived corruption and 
exploitation of the government 
derived from government’s 
support of warlords  
• The tribal effect, where a 
warlord imbedded with the 
government targets and 
alienates rival tribes 
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This has fueled an insurgency, which clearly has contributed to the instability of the country, as 
highlighted by the number of attacks on government and international forces and agencies 
illustrated below.   
 
 
The instability and attacks on the government during the Musahiban monarchy under 
analysis (1929 – 1963), was comparatively less.  The major disturbances targeting the 
government are summarized below.  
Frontier Uprisings – Mohmand, Shinwari, Sulayan Khel and the Shami Pir Revolt (Late 
1930’s) 
Eastern frontier tribal uprising on the Afghan Pakistan border.  The tribes threatened both the 
Afghan monarchy as well as the British government.  The most threatening uprising in 
Afghanistan was the Shami Pir revolt led by an Iraqi named Sayyid Mohammad Saadi. His 
political ambitions were to bring Amanullah back to the thrown. He eventually ended his 
campaign against the Nadiri monarchy when the British paid him off and sent him back to 
Baghdad. (Dupree, 1973, 479) 
Rebellion of Safi Tribe (Late 1940’s) 
In the mid 1940’s the Hashim government changed its conscription policies as it relates 
to the Pashtun Safi tribes of the Kunar province of eastern Afghanistan. Previously Nadir had 
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reinstated the qawmi (tribal) style of conscription, where tribal leaders would supply a certain 
amount of their young tribesmen for military conscription. These young men would serve 
together and stationed near their home. Hashim reversed this process, reverting back to the 
conscription process under Amanullah (which had contributed to his upheaval), called nufus 
(population). Under nufus the government would pull conscripts directly out of a given 
population without regard to their tribal affiliations. This removes a mechanism of power for the 
tribal leaders as well as undermines the tribal structure at large (Edwards, 2002, 103) 
 The Safi’s rebelled by capturing a contingent of government troops whom were rounding 
up conscripts, sparking an uprising. In the end a young general by the name of Sardar Daoud (the 
same Daoud who would go on to become PM) subdue the resistance and sent many of the Safi 
tribesmen to the north. This was meant to separate the pugnacious tribesmen while at the same 
time installing more Pashtuns in the Turkmen/Uzbek dominated north (Shahrani, 1988, 58).   
Kandahar Tax Unrest Supported by Local Mullahs(1959) 
Daoud ended tax exemption on Kandahari landowners as well as increased taxes on shopkeeper.  
The local leaders marched to the local mosque where they declared bast or sanctuary.  
Traditionally the government would give in and everything would progress as usual.  This time 
the police blocked the mosque and wouldn’t allow them to declare bast. The landowners and 
religious conservatives (who were still sore from the unveiling earlier in the year) quickly 
whipped up unrest among the youth; riots ensued, targeting symbols of modernity such as the 
cinema and the girls’ schoolhouse. Daoud quickly installed the provincial military commander as 
the new governor, whom brought in the army to assist the police. By the next afternoon the 
unrest had been subdued. Dramatic differences of opinion exist regarding the amount of death.  
The renowned Afghan scholar, Louis Dupree, notes three people were killed and eight were 
injured (Dupree, 1973). 
 The above comparison is simply meant to demonstrate the relatively stability during the 
Musahiban monarchy compared to the current Karzai government. It should also be noted that all 
of the unrest stemmed from Pashtun tribes, little to no disturbances derived from the non Pashtun 
element in the country.   
At this point the analysis has demonstrated how the Karzai government’s relationship 
with the Pashtun tribal and religious communities has fueled instability, and how the Musahiban 
monarchy’s (from 1929 – 1963) relationship with the Pashtun tribal and religious communities 
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has contributed to relative stability. The last part of this analysis will attempt to provide 
suggestions that may resolve the current turmoil in Afghanistan, by applying lessons learned 
from the analysis of the Musahiban period.   
A Comparative Approach: Applying Musahiban Methods to the Current Conflict in 
Afghanistan 
 There was a relatively simple reason behind the peaceful era under the Musahiban 
dynasty under analysis. The leaders during this era placated to and coopted Pashtun tribal and 
religious communities and avoided infringing on traditional tribal and religious norms. 
Musahiban leaders, beginning with Nadir Shah, as rational actors understood their power was 
largely predicated on Pashtun acceptance of their authority. These leaders also sought to develop 
and modernize the country but would only do so in a very gradual fashion, minimizing tribal and 
religious backlash.  The precondition of Pashtun acquiescence over the past thirty years has 
largely been overlooked by the various Afghan governments, including the current Karzai 
government (as well as his foreign government patrons).   
 The patronage network derived originally from the United States, supporting Karzai 
militarily and economically, has had undermining affects on stability. The framework in which 
political clientelism operates in today was born during the 2001 US invasion, in which the US 
reinvigorated northern non Pashtun warlords, while Karzai mobilized lesser Pashtun warlords in 
the south. The emergence of warlordism, rather than being stymied after the Bonn Conference, 
was bolstered with the implementation of the SNTV voting system which gave warlords a 
significant upper hand in the electoral system, utilizing voter ballot stuffing and intimidation to 
garner the small percentage necessary to win an election. Arguably more important than the 
voting system, was the complex clientelistic dynamic that centered on the various warlords, most 
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relevantly those in the Pashtun south and east. In exchange for lucrative security contracts, 
assisting USSF, and monopolizing various drug and smuggling industries, they gave support to 
Karzai, Karzai then intern appointed many of them government officials. Warlords are the 
primary beneficiaries of the conflict that exists, and as rational actors, garner no benefit from 
seeing the end of hostilities. 
 The patronage relationship centered on various warlords has essentially superimposed 
itself on the traditional tribal structure. The Musahiban monarchy utilized this tribal structure at 
all levels of government and as a mechanism for patronage. This became a relationship of mutual 
benefit where a local jirga would appoint a khan as its leader, who would protect the tribe from 
foreign forces and attempt to extract resources from the state. The khan’s position was predicated 
on his ability to disburse patronage to the qawm, and whose authority rested in the hands of the 
jirga and qawm at large. This system has been undermined by warlords usurping the position of 
khan by force or threat there of, whose authority is originated from outside the tribe.  
 The patronage dynamic centered on various Pashtun warlords, as discussed is 
undermining to the stability of Afghanistan. The dynamic has also left many tribal communities 
outside of the patronage relationship with the government, leaving them little incentive to 
support the government. The Musahiban strategy of absorbing tribal constituencies into 
government, with each tribe being represented at the Loya Jirga, and each tribal jirga appointing 
it’s own representatives, would give all tribes an influence in government and a stake in its 
survival. Furthermore, the jirga system of government, where leaders are chosen by local elders, 
could potentially create a more representative government body. Today the SNTV system allows 
warlords to garner the 2-3% necessary to win through voter intimidation and other such acts, the 
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jirga system requires at least a majority and is openly discussed, arguably more democratic than 
the current system, and would weaken the warlords’ ability to undermine the system.   
  During the Musahiban monarchy the patronage network was between individual tribes 
and government, today the government and foreign forces are the patrons and the client is the 
warlord (who in tern has his own clients). Redirecting this patronage and support away from the 
Pashtun warlords and their militias could very well prove difficult. It would take a commitment 
by international agencies and forces to stop using the PSCs as well as a commitment by USSF to 
stop utilizing known warlords as sources of information and assisting in operations.  
Additionally, warlords and their militias controlling major highways would have to be 
dismantled, which would unlikely happen peacefully. Lastly, Karzai could start appointing 
technocrats and traditional tribal elders to local community leader positions, especially as police 
chiefs and governors. In doing this he would likely be forfeiting the votes that warlords garner 
him, making decisions like this all the more difficult.   
 An aspect of the patronage relationship lies in the cultivation of opium. Warlords have 
largely benefitted from the production of the illicit drug, even while government forces continue 
to the eradicate crop. The Musahiban monarchy understood the importance of Pashtun 
livelihoods, especially as it relates to zar, zan, zamin, or specifically the ownership of land. They 
established the Helwan Valley Project to provide land and livelihoods to the Pashtun poor and 
landless, which in turn gave the government additional legitimacy, and changed the common 
perception of the government as the exploiter to social provider. Contrary to the Musahiban era, 
the current government has had a detrimental impact on the livelihoods of many Pashtuns, 
especially in the south. In the southern region where opium cultivation is plentiful, the 
government has continually targeted opium production, which directly negatively impacts the 
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Pashtun farmer, while benefitting the warlords, drug cartels, and smuggling operations by raising 
the price of opium. The destruction of opium crops often times forces Pashtun farmers into 
perpetual debt (through salaam financing), creating further dependence on the lucrative opium 
crop as well as on warlords and drug cartels that operate as financiers.  
 From an international standpoint, continued opium cultivation is clearly an untenable 
option, but outright eradication is untenable to the southern Pashtun farmers who depend on the 
crop and has driven many to join the insurgency. The government and international agencies 
need to provide solutions in terms of agricultural substitutions. Economically feasible 
substitutions should be encouraged and supported by the government, and implemented with 
their support. Outright eradication has proven to improve the lives of no one except the illicit 
drug operators, which further supports the warlords and undermines the Pashtun poor, driving 
many towards insurgency.    
 Development in general has largely been devoid of in the Pashtun south and east. This is 
largely due to the increasing insurgency and the Taliban’s increasing control of the south, for 
reasons discussed. This has made it difficult for international and government development 
projects to be implemented in the Pashtun areas, although they are not fully blameless 
(disregarding for the time being that they’ve contributed to the growing insurgency through 
reasons discussed). The government and international community, in an effort to implement 
development programs in the turbulent east and south, has utilized Provincial Reconstruction 
Teams. These teams are a mix of development workers and military, creating an 
indistinguishable line between the two, making both targets of anti government militias. 
Furthermore, these teams implement projects not on a needs basis but to mollify Taliban 
controlled communities. Additionally, their operating timeframes tend to be very short, which 
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doesn’t allow for proper follow through. It’s understandably difficult for aid workers from both 
the government and international agencies to implement projects in an area of conflict. This 
inability is essentially a product of a growing insurgency caused by reasons this analysis has 
discussed. If or when the insurgency dissipates, development programs could presumably be 
reinitiated.   
 The Karzai and Musahiban governments’ relationship with the religious community, 
currently a primary aspect of the insurgency, provides clear differences in their relationship with 
the group. At the emergence of the Musahiban monarchy, the religious community was at its 
height of influence. To garner their support the government absorbed the ulama into government, 
and allowed the local mullahs autonomy and free from government infringement. More 
importantly the government allowed the religious authorities to implement regulations which 
coincided with religious and cultural norms of the day. The government pursued social and 
economic development but would only do so in a manner that wouldn’t threaten their 
relationship with the group. When the government pushed too hard for reform, such as the 
Liberal Democracy era, they reigned in the liberal reformers and defended the religious 
conservatives.  This allowed them to eventually coopt the religious groups and gradually 
implement reforms without triggering a dramatic religious backlash.  
 The Musahiban strategy of cooption and gradual reforms lays in stark contrast to the 
measures implemented under the Karzai regime as it relates to the religious community. Under 
Karzai and his international supporters, local mullahs have been nearly completely excluded 
from the dialogue. This is largely due to their past relationship with the Taliban and western 
government’s hesitancy to include religious figures in their projects. The ulama at the national 
level has become an ineffective organization, as all Taliban related figures have either been 
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targeted as insurgents or ostracized from government, and secular ideology dominates the current 
debate. Emulating the relationship under the Musahiban era, the Karzai government could 
reestablish its relationship with the religious community and rebuild its Islamic credentials. This 
is especially relevant at the community level, where local mullahs are often times the mouthpiece 
for the insurgence and a primary source of information and propaganda dissemination. Including 
local figures into the dialogue not only brings in an important local authority into the local 
decision making process, but also gives mullahs access to the political structure. This access 
would give them more influence in decision making, a venue to express dissatisfaction with 
government policies, and an alternative political venue to the Taliban which currently is 
essentially the only political venue in which mullahs have a voice. The importance of the local 
mullahs, and their ability to call their constituents to jihad, really can’t be over stressed.  
Additionally, mullah’s that haven’t supported the insurgency should receive some sort of 
protection and acknowledgment from the government. Without this protection, the local religious 
community, have little reason to stick their necks out and support the government.  
 At the national level, the government and its western supporters seemingly haven’t taken 
into consideration the religious and tribal norms that currently exist. The Musahiban monarchy 
allowed the ulama to influence government decision-making on religious issues, which hasn’t 
existed under the Karzai government. Karzai, due to the secular nature of his foreign support, has 
focused on secularizing various aspects of society, specifically in the constitution, education and 
judiciary. As the majority of people believe sharia based law should be the law of the land and 
religion should be a part of the education curriculum, implementing secular reforms will 
continue to exacerbate the problems in the country, and undermine the legitimacy of the 
government; whose legitimacy is historically partly predicated on its religious authenticity. 
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Finding a way to integrate religious ideology into the policy debate and including the 
conservative elements of society, could potentially stymie the influx of Pashtuns joining the 
insurgency on religious grounds. If history is any indication of what the future will hold for an 
Afghan regime pushing secular reforms against the headwinds of traditional and religious norms, 
one could surmise it would be overthrown by religious and tribal forces just as they had done in 
the past.  
 This is not too say instituting new Islamic based reforms would nullify the insurgency all 
together. This pertains more to the Taliban foot soldiers, who don’t necessarily have a particular 
allegiance to the Taliban group but utilize it as a mechanism of rebellion against the government.   
The ‘political’ Taliban, the relatively small group centered around Mullah Omar and the Quetta 
Shura, is essentially a guerrilla movement looking to reclaim power. As Macdonald states, a 
rational actor makes choices to maximizes their expected utility (Macdonald, 2003).  Referring 
to the ‘thick rational’ approach, which assumes actions are made to maximize wealth, power, or 
status (Green, 1994), one could assume the Taliban are not solely driven to establish an Islamic 
state, but are primarily driven to install such a state under their own authority or government. To 
undermine this threat to the current Karzai government, actions would have to be taken to quell 
their influx of support among the Pashtun communities, which this paper has discussed. The 
other aspect of Taliban support is derived from their relationship with Pakistan. The Pakistanis 
have been funding the Islamic extremist elements in Kashmir, FATA, and Afghanistan for 
decades now, with the intention of creating an Islamic coalition in an effort to off set Indian 
hegemony. Creating a government less dominated by secular ideology, could potentially also 
have the effect of easing Pakistani concerns, and reducing their dependence on the Taliban. 
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 It’s also important to note the role of the United States and the effects of their policy as it 
relates to the stability of Afghanistan. The US initially intended to root out al Qaeda, a central 
element in the ‘war on terror’, and later committed to the nation building process. As the 
insurgency reemerged in 2006, countering these guerrilla attacks began to take priority. As US 
withdrawal approaches, it appears the country plans to maintain some sort of presence in the 
Afghanistan, indicated by the construction of permanent military bases, agreed upon by Karzai. 
Although, it’s yet to be seen what roll the US will play in Afghanistan post 2014 (Tolo, 2011).  
The US’s influence in the country, as it relates to the secular nature of policy, alienating the 
religious community, and supporting warlordism, has already been discussed in depth. Other 
policy measures, specifically relating to their support of northern warlords during the initial 
invasion, which allowed for mass retribution against the Pashtuns and eventually led to Northern 
Alliance dominance in government, will be hard to correct. Although today the Afghan National 
Army still stands as an ethnically divided institution. Referring back to the Musahiban 
monarchy, leaders during this time utilized the military apparatus as a mechanism to instill a 
national identity and as an educational institute. Conscription was enforced, where each tribal 
group was expected to supply a certain amount of men. Additionally, the government recruited 
among the tribal elite, giving them positions of authority in the army and the tribes an additional 
stake in the government. Today the army is a fragmented structure, dominated by Northern 
Alliance connected generals, which has created ethnic divisions and loyalties. Unlike the 
Musahiban period when conscription was enforced, the Afghan National Army recruits on a 
voluntary basis and has been attracting recruits from the lowest echelon of society, creating an 
institution with a 90% illiteracy rate, and an alcohol and drug problem, with little national 
consciousness.  Rectifying this problem will take an additional commitment by the United States, 
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its primary patron. Creating a nationally loyal army, utilizing the methods of the Musahiban 
monarchy, by recruiting among the Pashtun elite and instituting compulsory conscription, would 
not only give Pashtuns an additional stake in government but would also provide a loyal 
mechanism of coercion. Similar to how Daoud was able to install social and economic reforms 
with the support of a professional and loyal military, today the institution is needed to pacify the 
country and reclaim Taliban dominated areas. An organically Afghan force is seemingly 
necessary to combat the insurgency, as US efforts have become a primary point of contention 
and disdain.   
 The outcome of this conflict is still uncertain. Whether or not Karzai and his American 
backers can build support among the Pashtun communities and stymie the legitimacy of the 
insurgency seems less and less likely over time. If history is any indication of the outcome, the 
alienation of the Pashtun tribal and religious communities cannot coincide with a peaceful and 
stable government. Measures either need to be taken to rectify the current problems, or the 
government may experience the same fate of the failed governments of the past. 
Afterword 
This thesis was completed in late November 2011. Since that time, the country has made 
little progress towards a peaceful reconciliation between the insurgency and government and 
NATO forces. As the 2014 withdrawal of American and foreign forces looms, it still remains 
unclear what the political landscape will look like in Afghanistan. Both the Karzai government 
and the American government have both reached out to the Taliban and their affiliates, the 
Haqqani network. While all groups have seemingly been receptive, at some level, to initiate 
peace talks, the violence has continued unabated. This was exemplified when Burhanuddin 
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Rabbani, head of the Afghan High Peace Council, was assassinated by Taliban militants, while 
in the process of negotiating with the same group. This left many commentators questioning the 
viability of a peace agreement between the conflicting parties.   
 The Taliban have seemingly little reason to take part in a Karzai government. As the 
antiforeigner sentiment among the populace grows stronger, giving the group additional support, 
major countries such as the United States, the United Kingdom, and France have all set time 
tables for withdrawal, giving them little reason to negotiate. The group has also arguably 
moderated its extremist stance, although it’s unknown how genuine these pragmatic gestures 
really are. Notable among these gestures is allowing girls to go to school and reopening schools 
in Taliban controlled areas, as well as declarations that a new Taliban government would be 
more inclusive. The idea of becoming more inclusive and less Pashtun dominated has largely 
been dismissed by the Uzbek, Tajik, and Hazaras minorities, who still remember their treatment 
under Taliban rule during the 1990s (Trofimov, 2012).   
 With a legitimate peace deal increasingly unlikely, the roll of American forces in the 
country has become less clear. By June 2011, shortly after the US forces killed Osama bin 
Laden, President Obama declared American goals largely achieved in the country, and an 
accelerated drawdown of troops (Landler, 2011), although some element of US forces will exist 
in the country. The extent of these forces is uncertain; as of April 2012, American Vice President 
Biden has publicly supported a counterterrorism strategy, leaving Afghan forces to their own 
devices, while American troops stationed in well protected fortified bases would track down 
terrorist elements when called upon. Although, more recently, Admiral Bill McRaven, head of 
US Special Forces, has put forth a more aggressive strategy of that would replace many of 
currently deployed troops with Special Forces groups who would assist, train, and provide 
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communications and intelligence support. This strategy takes a much more proactive approach 
and requires a larger US presence, arguable not ‘withdrawing’ at all (associated press, 2012). US 
military officials have become increasingly concerned with the influence of the Taliban and anti-
American sentiment, partly due to American and NATO mishaps, such as pictures of US troops 
desecrating Afghan bodies, burning of the Koran, and the Kandahar massacre where a US soldier 
killed 16 civilians in March of 2012. 
 Pakistan also plays an important role in the future of Afghanistan. The American 
government has tried to persuade the Pakistanis to rein in the Haqqani network, largely believed 
to be an ISI agent, although sidelining the government in its peace talks with the Taliban. The 
Pakistanis seemingly have no benefit in restraining the Haqqanis nor the Taliban in general, as 
these groups could potentially take back Kabul in a post US withdrawal government. Having a 
close ally like the Taliban back in power would further the Pakistani goal of offsetting Indian 
regional influence. Karzai has been less amenable to this cause; in late 2011 he signed an accord 
with the Indian government, which included their assistance in training of Afghan forces. Afghan 
policies like this have provoked an immediate backlash from the Pakistani government, giving 
them less reason to support a Karzai government, or a leader within the current regime, after 
American withdrawal (Perlez, 2011).  
 What will become of Afghanistan in the next few years is anyone’s guess. In the probable 
event peace-talks don’t materialize, Karzai or his successor, will likely not survive without 
American military support. This required future support may not be tenable in the current 
American climate of budget austerity coupled with diminishing popularity of the war. Today the 
odds are seemingly against the future existence of the current government, but who knows how 
the final chapter will eventually unfold.   
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